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The British are credited—or charged—with establishing empiricism, the view that all 
knowledge is embedded in sense experience. My project argues for and describes an 
undercurrent of idealism within British empiricism: the writers of my study investigated modes 
of thinking that transform sensory experience. To see their idealism at work, it is necessary to 
look closely at how they conceived of ideas in the mind as pictures. Given that the term “picture” 
was used to refer to both inner ideas and actual paintings, it is not surprising (though rarely 
noticed) that when empiricists wanted to consider how the mind shapes ideas, they turned to the 
history of painting. Painting theory has long manifested a sharp tension between the ambition to 
reproduce observation and the drive to transform what the eye sees. For this reason, it has been a 
congenial medium for thinkers unwilling to give up the authority of sense experience but 
unsatisfied with its yields. I set nineteenth-century texts against foundational Enlightenment 
works to show how that later age worked within and against the tradition known as British 
empiricism. My argument centers on British figures who were compelled to revise the 
empiricism they inherited from the eighteenth century. Constrained as they were within their 
empirical moment, they found empiricism too rigid to accommodate their own modes of thought, 
the cultural products they encountered, and future imaginaries. I examine how a range of authors 
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imported artistic concepts and images into theories of mind in texts of various genres: the 
philosophy of John Locke and the Earl of Shaftesbury, the art criticism of John Ruskin, the 
fiction of George Eliot and Thomas Hardy, and the anthropological scholarship of J.G. Frazer. 
They represent a spectrum of views about the relationship between empiricism and idealism, and 
degrees of skepticism about the relative explanatory power of either.  
Poised at an intersection of literary studies, intellectual history, and the history of art, this 
project turns on two pictorial paradigms: the ideal landscape and the grotesque figure. Framing 
my accounts of Victorian idealism are two skeptical accounts of the mind, by Locke and Frazer. 
Their texts fret over the mind’s ability to imperil knowledge by producing grotesque—unnatural, 
fantastic—images derived from data of the external world. Idealistic accounts of the mind by 
Ruskin and Eliot theorize its ability to form scenic views superior to any offered to sight. Works 
by Hardy and Frazer elegize the disappearance of such scenes, marking the disintegration of the 
project of an empiricist idealism at the end of the nineteenth century. This project is at base a 
defense of the humanities. To read philosophies of mind through the lens of aesthetics is to better 
understand how major British writers invested in ideas, and how they confronted the problem of 
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Images in Philosophies of Mind 
 
 The paintings that appear in Victorian writing—as the subjects of criticism or in allusive 
passages of description—easily lead out in the material world of Victorian life, where so much 
scholarly energy has been spent. This world can to the twenty-first-century reader seem laden 
with objects awaiting analysis. In a field strongly influenced by the orientation and methods of 
cultural studies, Victorianists have treated the artworks in Victorian literature as portals into the 
Victorian art world. This dissertation has a different response to why these artworks feature in 
literature, finding in them a path not outward into the social world but inward, into the mind. The 
mind’s ability to derive knowledge from sense experience was strongly in question during my 
period of focus, when the mind becomes the locus of both anxiety and hope. My dissertation 
proposes that each impulse finds expression through artistic paradigms, reapplied to the mind. 
While the history of ideas is inseparable from cultural history, this project is affiliated primarily 
with the former. 
Central to my project is an understanding of how Victorians inherit and transmute 
questions about image and knowledge raised in British Enlightenment philosophy. Connecting 
the works in this study is the tradition known as empiricism, which, broadly speaking, claims 
that all concepts and knowledge are derived from sense experience.1 British empiricism was 
criticized in the twentieth century by theorists who saw in it a naïve and dangerous confidence in 
observation.2 Locke’s metaphor of the mimetic painting for the idea in the mind and Ruskin’s 
conflation of observed image and truthful painting would seem to support such a position.3 I 
continue to use the term “empiricist” to describe the figures I examine because each of them, 
including Locke and Ruskin, upholds experience, in particular visual experience, as a basis for 
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knowledge.4 The term is not exactly a misnomer. Yet my subjects usually do not treat experience 
as a transparent record, as is sometimes claimed. Examining the place of artistic paradigms in 
British accounts of the mind shows a preoccupation with the mind’s constructive and destructive 
powers during the Enlightenment and nineteenth century. In philosophy and literature, the 
painting stands for observational intake, and also for ideas that depart from sensory impressions. 
While my subjects reject the notion of innate ideas, they find experience to be a fluid, unstable 
medium. Empiricism thus entails theories of skeptical distortion and idealizing emendation as 
well as accurate registration.  
 My project proposes that classical artistic paradigms become a groundwork for British 
empiricists, who conceptualize the mind’s contents as images. Although or perhaps because 
Greek painting did not survive antiquity, accounts of its triumphs have captivated readers. The 
enterprise of mimesis has been questioned; an art image cannot, in truth, replicate vision. Yet 
mimesis has been a powerful aspiration, and it is as an aspiration that I treat it. Vitruvius, who 
wrote the only “extant ancient treatise that deals directly and exclusively with art,” believed that 
artists should be “reproducing clear images of the familiar world.”5 Pliny included the story of a 
painting of grapes so realistic that it attracts birds in his Natural History. In the empirical 
tradition, the mimetic painting tends to represent the sensory idea faithfully recorded by the 
mind. Always in tension with mimesis are methods of altering observed images. My project 
examines ways in which pictorial paradigms—specifically, the ideal landscape and the grotesque 
figure—shape accounts of how the mind interacts with sensory input.  
The framing chapters propose that the grotesque mode expresses skepticism towards the 
mind’s ability to produce knowledge in the respective masterworks of Locke and Frazer. If the 
grotesque figure represents the mind’s destructive potential, the English tend to conceive the 
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ideal through landscape scenes that begin in observation but are generated in the mind. The 
English term “landscape” referred to painted scenes before it came to refer to natural scenes, and 
its origin as a term of art indicates its liminal quality. My dissertation focuses on five treatments 
of the landscape, by the third earl of Shaftesbury, Ruskin, Eliot, Hardy, and Frazer, respectively. 
I treat art historical terms of landscape painting—such as “ideal,” “heroic,” and “picturesque”—
as the literary terms they are, employing them to show how I believe my subjects (themselves 
interdisciplinary) understood and refined existing pictorial genres. The landscapes of these 
writers, not merely settings, contain questions and propositions about the mind’s potential to 
improve on the observed images the eye takes in.  
Part of my premise is that the tradition of empiricism is carried on in the Victorian period 
with more intensity, and in more ways, than is generally believed. The Victorians of my study 
are often said to perpetuate associationism, the empiricist concept that the mind forms lasting 
connections between sensory ideas it receives simultaneously or successively. Mentioned by 
Locke but most influentially theorized by Hume, it was the core of the purest formulations of 
empiricism in the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Hume’s Treatise of Human 
Nature formed a template for nineteenth-century philosophies of mind, along with Hartley’s 
influential Observations on Man, which seeks to give associationism a physiological basis. 
James Mill’s Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind is an extension of Hartley’s 
philosophy of mind (1829). In the System of Logic (1843), J.S. Mill writes that he “derives all 
knowledge from experience” or “experience and association” (171-72). In his Autobiography 
(1873), he names his affiliation as the school of “Experience and Association” (202).6 My studies 
of Victorian texts support Cairns Craig’s assertion that associationism was both a strong standard 
and provocation in the Victorian period. Ruskin, Eliot, and Frazer find association both 
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unavoidable and unsatisfactory. Aesthetic models allow them to conceptualize alternatives to the 
empiricist train of associated ideas.   
 
An Idealism Within Empiricist Philosophies of Mind  
 
This project aims to understand how Victorian empiricists seek ideals through sensory 
perception—or, at the end of the century, regret the inaccessibility of such ideals. When the term 
“British idealism” arises, it is generally with reference to two small movements, one in the mid-
seventeenth century and the other in the late nineteenth century. The Cambridge Platonists 
distinguished themselves from empiricism, holding that moral principles are innate in the mind. 
The British idealists took cues from their German predecessors and maintained that we have 
access to the Absolute. The long period these movements frame is regularly associated with what 
is considered a native and much more major tradition of British empiricist thought. My 
dissertation proposes that there is an idealism within empiricism, characterized not by innate or 
eternal ideas, but assembled by the perceiving mind. Visual aesthetics bring the idealist strand in 
British empiricism to light. 
The generalization that the English tend towards the empirical is at least in part an 
invention of the Victorians themselves. As David Carroll points out, George Eliot has German 
characters critique the naïveté of English culture in her novels, while Germans combine 
largeness of conception with the thorough investigation of facts (10). Writing of Mackay’s 
Progress of the Intellect, Eliot writes of the “solidity and directness of the English mind” and 
Carroll identifies her hope that British empiricism will assimilate German thought (11). The 
Eliot’s debts to German thought are beyond my scope, but this does not prevent me from arguing 
that in writing her nationalistic last novel, Daniel Deronda (1876), she seeks a British basis for 
idealism, and grasps for it in the history of British art. Shaftesbury, Ruskin, and Eliot each use 
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classical paradigms of art to work through the question of how the mind refines images produced 
through the sense of sight. 
While my main subjects were all English, this dissertation is transnational in the sense 
that it seeks to unsettle the national affiliations of modern philosophical concepts. When 
scholarship uses the term “idealism” with reference to the nineteenth century, it customarily 
turns to Kant and the tradition of German idealism. While it is perhaps pointless to pursue an 
ultimate origin for nineteenth-century idealism, it is worth noting that German a priori 
philosophy was strongly influenced by English philosophy, in particular that of Shaftesbury. 
Kant wrote directly in response to Hume and thus in a sense belongs to the empiricist tradition 
even as he pivots away from it. His term “the transcendental aesthetic” demonstrates his aim to 
yoke idealism to the senses.7 G. H. Lewes, a highly representative Victorian, saw Kant as one of 
his own school. He traces two lines of thought in modern philosophy, and groups together Locke, 
Berkeley, Hume, and Kant as figures who analyzed the “nature of Perception,” looking only at 
the “subjective aspect of phenomena” and merging the physical in the mental. “Matter and its 
qualities...were now viewed as creations of mind.... The Cosmos, instead of presenting a problem 
of Mechanics, now presented a problem of Psychology,” he writes.  
While Lewes places emphasis on the mind, British philosophy has come to be 
distinguished by confidence in the senses. This raises the question of whether the course of the 
twentieth century has inflected our understanding of Enlightenment and Victorian thought. 
Perhaps because empiricism issued into experimental science in the later nineteenth century, 
British philosophies of mind, including Locke’s, are now commonly treated as part of the history 
of the science of psychology and seen to prefigure or contribute to its rise. Victorian ideas are 
commonly assigned a source in scientific developments, with empiricism, natural philosophy, 
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and realism—conjoined philosophical, scientific, and artistic modes—representing the pursuit of 
objective knowledge. The humanities have been finding new ways to study (and mimic) the 
sciences, and there is a contemporary tendency to grant scientific developments priority in the 
history of ideas. Readers will notice that my study does not seek to link its philosophies of mind 
to cognitive science of the nineteenth or twenty-first centuries, and this is deliberate.8 This 
project is in part an attempt to restore balance, by showing how artistic ideas shape texts during a 
period when ideas moved more freely among modes of inquiry now considered to belong to 
different disciplines. While it is common to view my period of focus through the lens of the 
scientific revolution—which is to see it as a prelude to our scientifically oriented culture—I 
portray its philosophies of mind as an extended coda to the classicizing turn that begins with the 
Renaissance.  
 
The Art Historical Context of Classicism  
 
 If Mill has been taken as the primary exponent of Victorian empiricism, Walter Pater is the 
period’s theorist of classicism, as he follows the footsteps of Matthew Arnold. Just as my texts 
are not all obvious places to seek philosophies of mind, they do not all explicitly engage 
classicism. I use the term “classical” to refer to Greek and Roman culture and its afterlife, 
including Renaissance painting and its theory, and images in painting and literature that look 
back to the Renaissance. I reserve the term “neoclassical” for the more codified set of strictures 
developed in France, which had a strong influence in England in the second half of the 
eighteenth century. Erwin Panofsky has argued that the notion of the “idea” is central to 
Renaissance art theory as a meeting ground between naturalism and an aversion to natural 
models. Plato’s Ideas, antithetical to material art, are transmuted to ideals located in the artist’s 
mind that are usually said to derive from observation.9 David Summers shifts the emphasis, 
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countering that in Renaissance art theory, Platonic characteristics were “realized in deep 
accommodation” with more Aristotelean characteristics. He affirms that the design of an artwork 
is an idea in the mind, but emphasizes that it is kindled by sensation (284-304). The Aristotelean 
principle that all thoughts come with mental images in fact justified “the magnification of the 
visual arts to a new prominence and cultural significance” (311). The rise of aesthetics came to 
England at the end of the seventeenth century, which with more widespread collecting brought 
interest in and knowledge about painting (Pears 157, 205). To me, it is no coincidence that this 
process coincides with the deployment of aesthetic paradigms in philosophies of mind. As 
philosophy informed art theory, art theory informed philosophy in turn.10 
 The empiricist sensory idea finds a parallel in artistic naturalism, yet aesthetics is also 
central in formulations of the skepticism we know exists in modern empiricism and the idealism 
that has been harder to see.11 This project revolves around two pictorial paradigms that date to 
antiquity: the grotesque figure, expressing anxiety about the stability of the human figure, and 
the ideal landscape, around which possibilities of repair cluster. I propose that the grotesque 
centaur represents Locke’s skepticism about the mind’s powers. Shaftesbury provides an early 
example of what I have come to see as a particularly British stand of idealism, which seeks to 
reach the ideal through empirical data, and situates the ideal in the landscape. Part I involves 
ways that paintings and ideas stand in for one another, and argues that the Victorians Ruskin and 
Eliot draw on the landscape paintings of J.M.W. Turner in their respective theories of the ideal. 
Part II proposes that at the end of the nineteenth century, Hardy and Frazer impart the loss of 
idealism, also through the aesthetics of landscape.  
 The term “grotesque,” originally grottesco, first referred to the ornamental designs of 
Nero’s Golden House of the first century A.D., located in the heart of ancient Rome and 
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unearthed at the end of the fifteenth century. The hitherto unknown style of fantastically mixed 
forms quickly spread across Europe.12 Initially considered a “classical refinement,” the designs 
took on negative connotations with oversaturation and neoclassicism, famously critical of 
aesthetic mixtures. Vitruvius had protested against the fashion of covering the walls with 
monstrous forms and their confusion of heterogeneous elements, and a Neo-Vitruvian academy 
found the designs of the Golden House to be “products of a decadent culture and manifestations 
of a decline in Roman art.”13 The notion that the style signified irrationality and immorality 
spread to northern Europe, merged with Puritan tendencies, and became attached to “fear, shame 
and sin” in England (where it was called the “antique”) by the Elizabethan period.14 While the 
style persisted, the British had a special aversion to the ornamental and the unnatural or “false.”15  
 This dissertation proposes that the grotesque appears in Locke’s Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding (1689) in the recurrent idea of the centaur, which represents the mind’s 
dangerous ability to alter sensory ideas. Mikhail Bakhtin sees the mode as always referring to the 
body and its processes.16 Lee Byron Jennings notes that the term most traditionally and properly 
applies to figures in which human features are mingled with those of animals, plants, and objects. 
He could be describing Locke’s account of the mind forming the idea of a centaur as he writes 
that the original is not so much distorted as it is “destroyed and rebuilt along new lines. There is 
a recombining of the elements of experienced reality to form something alien to it.” The human 
form undergoes change, and the force that alters it is primarily not nature but “the activity of the 
human imagination.” In the grotesque, the “deepest foundations of our being are interfered with: 
the stability and constancy of the human form,” and the grotesque figure expresses Locke’s 
anxiety over the definition of man.17 In The Golden Bough (1980-1915), a fin de siècle text that 
evidences the strength of empiricist notions about the mind, the grotesque appears not within 
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static forms but across time, when humans, animals, and inanimate objects are believed to effect 
magical transformations. The mode expresses Frazer’s fears about the mind’s ability to forge 
irrational links of causality. 
 British empiricists inclined towards the ideal situate it in landscape scenes that have 
various classical models. The taste for landscape painting grew in England during the eighteenth 
century with increasing contact with the continent through travel and prints. I call landscapes by 
Shaftesbury and Ruskin “ideal,” also use the term “ideal landscape” more conventionally to refer 
to the influential French landscapes of the seventeenth century that art history also describes as 
“classical.”18 I find elements of such landscapes featured in works by Eliot, Hardy, and Frazer, 
always in relation with questions about the mind’s ability to form ideals. Eliot models ekphrastic 
landscape images in Daniel Deronda on paintings by Turner that in turn quote the classical 
landscape. Yet by the middle of the nineteenth century, the British had lost their taste for this 
style of landscape.19 The change must partly have been due to the influence of Ruskin, who 
decimates the classical landscape in Modern Painters.20 In novels of the second half of the 
nineteenth century, pastoral landscapes are the scenery for deluded idealism. At the end of the 
century, the landscapes of Hardy’s novel The Woodlanders (1887) dramatize the breakdown of 
(classical) linear perspective and the related device of the grid. Frazer’s scenes of violent ancient 
ritual stand in tension with the classically inflected landscapes that frame them.  
 While the main thread I follow through the Victorian period is the British idealism this 
project seeks to define, I have found that it is inseparable from shifting attitudes towards 
classicism as a tradition.21 Ruskin reacts against a specific classical paradigm, Eliot preserves a 
classical type of landscape image, Hardy signals the unavailability of a classical vantage, and 
Frazer laments the loss of the classical as an ideal. In looking at the place of classical aesthetics 
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in Victorian philosophies of mind, I seek to disturb the classic-to-romantic framework that has 
structured criticism on Victorian aesthetics, presented as a reaction against or combination of 
these precedents. George Landow focuses on how Ruskin renovates neoclassical theories of the 
sister arts and the categories of the sublime, beautiful, and picturesque established in the 
eighteenth century.22 He generally attributes departures from tradition to the influence of 
romanticism.23 Robert Hewison treats Ruskin’s first encounter with a Turner sketch from nature 
as marking “the shift from a classic to a Romantic point of view.”24 While the question of how 
Romanticism influences my Victorian thinkers is large and outside of my focus, I have found 
that Ruskin and Eliot anticipate and caution against linear readings of aesthetic development.25 
Ruskin’s theory of the “imagination associative” revises both eighteenth- and Romantic 
aesthetics. Eliot enjoys double-meanings and seems to present one when she writes, “To say that 
Deronda was romantic would be to misrepresent him” (205). She destabilizes the conventional 
opposition between the classic and romantic when she refers to his “classic, romantic, world-
historic position” (746). Several years before, Walter Pater had pressed against the same 
opposition (originally French, and specific to a French context) by presenting the romantic as a 
quality found throughout the history of art in his essay “Romanticism.” 
 My project suggests that a territory often claimed as belonging to the Romantics is broader. 
It is not unusual for Romanticism to receive credit both for bringing the Enlightenment 
orientation towards the natural world to fruition and for transfiguring the world of appearances 
and theorizing the active powers of the mind. The Romantics are credited with developing the 
visionary and ideal, especially with regard to landscape, and the grotesque.26 Without denying 
their originality and influence, my study of empiricism (which precedes and follows 






My first chapter looks at how classical aesthetic concepts move into Enlightenment 
philosophies of mind. Art collecting and art theory rose in England at the end of the seventeenth 
century. In my view, it is by no means coincidental that philosophy adopts aesthetic paradigms at 
this time. In his enormously influential Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), Locke 
compares sensory ideas to paintings, claiming that the senses produce reliable records of the 
outside world. Yet the paradigm of pictorial composition undermines this argument. The mind 
can break apart and re-combine its images, and this is a liability for Locke. The recurring 
grotesque image of a centaur figures the mind’s tendency to reconstitute its images. The threat of 
the centaur—for Locke a symbol of defective ideas of the physical world—leads him to divide 
untrustworthy ideas of the physical from moral ideas. These, he claims, are not based in the 
senses but are original to the mind. If the grotesque figure represents the mind’s destructive 
potential, the British tend to conceive the ideal through landscapes that begin in observation but 
are generated in the mind. Locke’s pupil Shaftesbury reacted against him, holding that the 
physical world provides all necessary knowledge but (paradoxically) that we must generate ideal 
scenes. He champions the mind’s ability to combine, or “compose,” observed images. I suggest 
that in Characteristics (1711), he transfers a model of painterly idealism from the figure to the 
landscape. A legend greatly popular in the Renaissance tells that a Greek artist painted the ideal 
woman by combining the best features of multiple models. Shaftesbury portrays a novice 
philosopher who learns to join the individual “beauties” of an Arcadian landscape. The ideal 
landscape he constructs initiates an image of social concord.  
 The idealism I find in Victorian literature is bound up with shifting attitudes towards 
classicism in art, especially landscape. John Ruskin, the most important nineteenth-century 
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British writer on art and the subject of my second chapter, reacts against neoclassical idealism. 
But his defense of J.M.W. Turner in the first volume of Modern Painters (1843) fails to 
distinguish between the effects of natural scenes and painted landscapes, and thus carries on a 
neoclassical tendency to render the painting redundant. In recognizing this, I argue, Ruskin 
rewrites the ideal landscape. In Modern Painters III (1856), he explains that Turner’s superior 
pictures consist of imperfect, but perfectly complementary, parts. The “imagination associative” 
is Ruskin’s term for the artist’s composing faculty, and this concept is commonly seen as a debt 
to the empiricist notion of association. Locke proposed, David Hume greatly developed, and in 
the nineteenth century J.S. Mill repeated the notion that ideas which follow one another in 
experience remain linked (or associated) in the mind. But Ruskin tends to take up old terms to 
supplant them. My argument is that his criticism does not simply borrow from empiricist 
philosophy; rather, it undertakes a radical revision. In fact, the term “imagination associative” is 
meant to replace the notion of passive association with active composition. Turner’s paintings 
model the intellectual gift that allows him to grasp nature as one whole. 
The understudied lines of aesthetics in intellectual history run through the medium of 
fiction in the nineteenth century. My third chapter shows that in Daniel Deronda, George Eliot 
sets a degenerate English world against a visionary Jewish realm, and each has its painterly 
model. Eliot critiques what the genre of landscape known as “classical” or “ideal” had become in 
the eighteenth-century by setting the English in such gauzy scenes. She repeatedly alludes to 
painting in passages where the grounds of stately English homes represent a false Arcadia. The 
river landscapes of the Jewish realm are a locus for propositions about how the mind anticipates 
the future through prophecy. The glowing skies represent a way for Eliot to make visionary 
thought empirically concrete. They gesture to the extrasensory, but have an aesthetic and 
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material correlative in Turner’s paintings. That is, in a novel with no major exemplary English 
character, an exemplary English artist stands behind the prophetic landscapes. Like the sunsets in 
Turner’s paintings of the fall of empires, the apocalyptic sunsets of Daniel Deronda intensify the 
sense that an empire and an era are declining. Eliot’s allusions to Turner form part of her effort 
to address the larger question of nationhood in this novel. The nation comprises a group too large 
to be perceived directly—or represented fully in fiction. The didactic writer wants to evoke a 
social body encircled by the mind and apprehended in its visionary capacity. Her gold skies 
direct attention to the edges of perception, pulling the reader’s gaze into a vivid distance to 
discern the ideal she cannot discern. While she does not paint a better nation, she describes 
mental processes that may allow the English to conceive it. In my reading, Eliot uses the arched 
bridge—a motif of classical landscape painting and of Turner’s classical, Claudean mode—to 
revise the major empiricist concept of inference. In empiricist philosophy, the bridge is a 
metaphor for inference, a method of predicting future events by observing that certain 
experiences routinely follow others. Eliot transmutes the shape of the arched bridge into a 
symbol for prophetic thought that links the future intuitively rather than through the associative 
mental operation of inference. 
Several of my key texts demonstrate a rising tension between empiricism and idealism in 
the late nineteenth century. Empiricism began to take the form with which we identify it today: 
an epistemology that treats the mind as a receptacle for stable observations that may become the 
data of scientific study. A British school of idealism, on German models, arose in response. I 
consider these developments in a range of works, including fiction by Thomas Hardy in which 
the tension plays out both in the representation of character and through descriptions of 
landscape. My fourth chapter proposes that Hardy’s novel The Woodlanders (1887) dramatizes 
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the divide between empiricism and idealism by splitting a character in two, reversing his world-
view and aptitudes midway through the novel. The novel thus enacts the breakdown of form, 
which also becomes a theme through Hardy’s depiction of the woodland landscapes. These 
landscapes gesture to the disintegration of classical aesthetic conventions that once ordered such 
scenes. Represented as a deteriorating grid of vertical and horizontal lines, the woodlands evoke 
the breakdown of the stable vantage and ideal order modeled by classical linear perspective.  
 In closing the project, I turn to J.G. Frazer, a figure who holds an unusual status—well 
known but rarely read—and whose masterwork, The Golden Bough (1890-1915), is generically 
unlike any text familiar to our time. While he considered it anthropology, it is above all a 
massive compilation of accounts of ritual. Frazer became part of the vanguard of a critical view 
of the ancients: Locke’s fears of the grotesque reemerge as Frazer describes “primitive” magical 
thought. I argue that his images of ritual participate in the grotesque tradition, updated for the fin 
de siècle. Rather than forming hybrid figures, like the centaur, Frazer proposes that the ancient 
mind linked unrelated creatures and objects through perversions of the timeless empiricist laws 
of association. Framing the rituals are highly conventional landscape images that derive from the 
classical landscape genre. However imperfectly, this painting genre continued to operate as a 
model for writers who wished to supplement empiricist modes of apprehension. The first 
sentences of The Golden Bough describe a Turner landscape, and Frazer (like Eliot) looks to the 
painter’s classical style. In my reading, Frazer’s ideal landscapes reveal his conflicted stance 
towards antiquity. Such landscapes, which had lost their purchase on the English imagination by 
this time, recall what the classical past once offered: a golden age. Juxtaposed with alarming 
rituals, they become an elegy for the Renaissance and its long afterlife, for a time when Europe 
could still idealize antiquity and hope to reanimate it. Frazer elegizes not a pre-modern 
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worldview, but a more recent and acute loss: an image of antiquity that Britain had sustained into 
the nineteenth century.  
 My conclusion briefly traces the shift from philosophy of mind to the science of 
psychology in the second half of the nineteenth century. Finally, I discuss what I see as two 
models of or approaches to improvement. Science provides optimism in progress, which is with 
us, fitfully, in the present. Lost is pictorial idealism, the attempt to create a mental or physical 
image of something better than what surrounds us.  
 Modern British philosophy and literature, especially Victorian literature, is rightly 
considered to be preoccupied with ethics. Yet placing Victorian texts against Enlightenment 
philosophies of mind makes a different pattern appear. My subjects tend to postpone the project 
of ethics to focus on sentience, claiming that before a social morality may be established, the 
mind must be plumbed. Locke expects his Essay to serve as a foundation for a future science of 
ethics. His thesis is that certain knowledge is possible in ethics. “Our business here is not to 
know all things, but those which concern our conduct,” he writes (58). But he does not seek to 
achieve ethical knowledge; this was a complaint of some of the Essay’s first readers. Requisite to 
ethical knowledge is an understanding of how the mind forms the signs that are ideas and how 
the signs of language convey ideas to others. Eliot looks ahead to an improved society whose 
contours remain undistinguished. Frazer, a very late Victorian and my final figure, expresses 
hope that the plethora of facts he has collected “may perhaps serve as materials for a future 
science of Comparative Ethics” in his preface to Part II of The Golden Bough (3rd, 3.viii). Their 
questions regarding the mind gesture to the moral and social, indicating the difficulty of 
producing a stable definition of man and of situating the social world in the natural world, for 
example. Yet ethics is deferred, a dream reserved for the future. 
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1 Like Peter Garratt, who also gathers a variety of texts under the term “empiricism,” I identify 
my set of writers “with a common, primary, deep-seated epistemological impulse.” Victorian 
Empiricism: Self, Knowledge, and Reality in Ruskin, Bain, Lewes, Spencer, and George Eliot. 
(Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2010), 21. 
2 More recently, Lorraine Daston and Peter Gallison’s influential study Objectivity finds the main 
intellectual preoccupation of the later nineteenth century to be the “empirical, mimetic capture of 
objects” (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007), 318. But Christopher Herbert’s Victorian Relativity 
notes that “objectivity” was highly debated (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), xiv. 
Garratt instructively examines “empiricism’s surprising potential for arriving at uncertainty, 
contradiction, and absurdity,” and its tendency to “reflect on the conditions of its own 
possibility,” pointing out that it is in fact this instability that “lends the scene its legitimacy.” The 
instability stemmed from the view that “the contingent self was conceived simultaneously as the 
route toward knowledge and its obstacle.” Victorian Empiricism, 15. See his introduction to for a 
fuller account of contemporary critical responses to empiricism. 
3 Scholars including Theodor Adorno, M.H. Abrams, and Richard Rorty have focused on 
Locke’s use of the mirror as a metaphor for the mind. Yet he easily switches out the mirror for a 
painting, a type of image more subject to alteration.  
4 Jules David Law calls the central tenet of empiricism the claim “that the world as we ‘see’ it is 
actually flat: that what we really see when we look at the world is a two dimensional 
arrangement of color, light, and figure, which only inference, habit, or association can convert 
into an impression of three dimensional space.” The Rhetoric of Empiricism: Language and 
Perception from Locke to I.A. Richards (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), 3-4. He 
notes an array of figures who have seen Ruskin’s theory of perception as the culmination of a 
tradition that begins with Locke (22). Finding an empiricist tendency to conflate visual and 
mental phenomena through rhetoric, Law writes that this conflation “finds its exemplary 
analogue in the tradition of (representational) painting” (235). Conversely, the painting is 
considered to be like an idea. As Garratt suggests, Ruskin’s art theory “encourages the view that 
the flat painted surface of a canvas constitutes an ideational structure.” Victorian Empiricism, 98. 
5 Philip Thomson, The Grotesque (London: Methuen, 1972), 12. J.J. Pollitt lists the other sources 
of ancient art theory: compilers of tradition; rhetoricians who mention the visual arts in stylistic 
analogies with literature or as subjects for literature; philosophers who evaluate the arts based on 
their influence on human morality and awareness; and artists themselves, concerned with formal 
problems and technical procedures. The Ancient View of Greek Art: Criticism, History, and 
Terminology (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 9. 
6 Cairns Craig has noted that while J.S. Mill finds association to be at the center of the crisis he 
experienced in his youth, this is not evidence that associationism was obsolete. Critics have seen 
his crisis as the “overthrow of associationist psychology” and the point when Romantic 
developments supplant it. Yet the vitality of associationism can be seen both in his account of his 
recovery, which he attributes to the effects of poetry through the workings of association, and in 
his own philosophy of mind, which remains firmly committed to associationist psychology as 
“the one which provided the most scientific—and therefore also the most modern account of the 
mind.” Associationism remained a “vigorous, influential, and productive” element in British 
thought throughout the nineteenth century. Associationism and the Literary Imagination: From 
the Phantasmal Chaos (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 1-8. Craig finds that it 
has been “written out of the development of British literature since romanticism” (38). 
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7 David Summers also notes that Kant’s notion of taste “articulates the adaptation of the 
language of sense to the problem of aesthetic judgment that had begun in the Renaissance.” The 
Judgment of Sense: Renaissance Naturalism and the Rise of Aesthetics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987) 107. My project only touches on the enormous aesthetic questions of 
taste and judgment, in chapter 4. Rather, I focus on how aesthetic concepts subtend accounts of 
the mind’s ordinary acts of cognition in response to the outside world, not art. 
8 A prominent example of scholarship that employs cognitive science is Vanessa Ryan’s 
Thinking Without Thinking in the Victorian Novel (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2012). 
9 See Idea: A Concept in Art Theory, trans. Joseph J.S. Peake (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1968). 
10 While aesthetic theory, the philosophical examination of art or beauty, is not my focus, it is 
worth noting that modern aesthetics grew out of the science of sensuous knowledge, as 
developed by Alexander Baumgarten in his Aesthetica (1750-58). According to Summers, the 
mechanical arts were associated with the lower faculties of the senses before the Renaissance, 
when they did not simply become liberal, but “rose to find a new relation with pure, speculative 
intellect.” Judgment of Sense, 235. In other words, “art is aesthetic” (309).  
11 Summers considers naturalism the central artistic paradigm of the Renaissance and writes that 
it refers to painting in particular, “the elements of which are presumed to coincide with the 
elements of optical experience,” including contrast and color. Judgment of Sense, 2-3. He also 
notes that naturalism evolved in relation to other modes, writing, “As the art most completely 
articulating the fit between sense and the world, painting was inevitably the carrier of the 
demand for faith in things unseen and of skepticism, the agent both of indoctrination and doubt” 
(315-16). 
12 Wolfgang Kayser, The Grotesque in Art and Literature (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1963), 19. 
13 Frances Barasch, The Grotesque: A Study in Meanings (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), 24-29. 
14 Frances Barasch “Introduction: The Meaning of the Grotesque” to Thomas Wright, A History 
of Caricature and Grotesque in Literature and Art (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing, 
1968), xxv-xxxiv. 
15 Kayser, The Grotesque, 20. 
16 Rabelais and His World, trans. Helene Iswolsky (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1965), 18. 
17 The Ludicrous Demon: Aspects of the Grotesque in German Past-Romantic Prose (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), 8-9. 
18 As Margarethe Lagerlöf writes, the term “ideal landscape” is “employed in the literature of art 
history on the basis of an implicit but vague agreement as to what is strictly meant.” She 
provides a useful overview of various definitions of “ideal,” “heroic,” “classical,” and 
“historical” landscape. Ideal Landscape: Annibale Carracci, Nicolas Poussin and Claude 
Lorrain (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 17-20. These Italianate landscapes were 
popular in eighteenth-century England, and a debate emerged over the question of whether 
English scenery should be treated in the same manner in the late eighteenth century. See David 
Solkin, Painting for Money: The Visual Arts and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century 
England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 77; and Elizabeth Manwaring, Italian 
Landscapes in Eighteenth Century England: A Study Chiefly of the Influence of Claude Lorrain 
and Salvator Rosa on English Taste, 1700-1800 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925). 
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19 Kathleen Nicholson finds that as early as the 1770s, the classical landscape was assailed by 
both naturalism and history painting, in Turner’s Classical Landscapes: Myth and Meaning 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 19). Dehn Gilmore refers to a reviewer for 
Blackwood’s who writes in 1863 that the art of “Claude...Poussin, Wilson, and even of Constable 
has gone out. The high stately style of the old masters is extinct.” Quoted in The Victorian Novel 
and the Space of Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 132.  
20 But Ruskin’s aversion may also be seen as part of a shift in progress. Classicism was already 
losing its resonance as Uvedale Price and Richard Payne Knight sought to shift the notion of the 
picturesque away from its classicist models at the end of the eighteenth century. Ann 
Bermingham, Landscape and Ideology: The English Rustic Tradition, 1740-1860 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1986), 79-80. 
21 I have found apposite a distinction the intellectual historian George Stocking makes between a 
“paradigm” and a “tradition.” A paradigm is transhistorical, an idea “abstracted from the flow of 
intellectual debate.” It emphasizes the synchronic or disjunctive as such features succeed one 
another at various historical moments. The “grostesque” and “ideal” are paradigms in this sense. 
A tradition emphasizes the diachronic or continuous, and I treat empiricism and classicism as 
traditions. Victorian Anthropology (New York: Free Press, 1987), xiv.  
22 Burke, Gilpin, Price, and others reified terms that were already applied to pre-existing motifs. 
John Dixon Hunt writes that the terms “beautiful” and “sublime” were already circulating before 
Burke made them definitive in 1756. The Figure in the Landscape: Poetry, Painting, and 
Gardening During the Eighteenth Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 
171. 
23 See The Aesthetic and Critical Theories of John Ruskin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1971), 79. 
24 John Ruskin: The Argument of the Eye (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 40-41. 
25 Darrel Mansel, Jr. states that George Eliot follows Modern Painters III in adopting the 
Romantic doctrine of art as an expression of “genuine emotion.” “Ruskin and George Eliot’s 
‘Realism.’” Criticism 7, no. 3 (Summer 1965): 211. K.M. Newton presents George Eliot as an 
“advanced Romantic” for whom subject and object are in a continual state of tension. George 
Eliot, Romantic Humanist: A Study of the Philosophical Structure of Her Novels (Totowa, N.J.: 
Barnes and Noble Books, 1981), 2-3.  
26 Lee Byron Jennings, with a focus on German Romantic and post-Romantic literature, writes 
that the disintegration of institutions in the early nineteenth century was conducive to the 
grotesque mode. The Ludicrous Demon: Aspects of the Grotesque in German Past-Romantic 








Locke’s Centaur: Aesthetics in Philosophies of Mind 
 
 
The reception of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689) has been 
strongly shaped by Book I, which proposes that the senses are the grounds of knowledge. It is 
this book that has sealed Locke’s reputation as the founder of British empiricism. His proposition 
that ideas are formed through the senses was “so dominant” that for a century, there was a 
tendency to “interpret Locke as advocating a simple sensationalism,” and scholars across the 
disciplines continue to accept this interpretation.1 Yet since the middle of the nineteenth century 
at least, readers have observed that the Essay does not permit such a reading.2 As he begins, 
Locke rejects the notion of divinely implanted knowledge and finds a strong alternative to innate 
ideas in the senses and especially sight, considered the most reliable and representative sense in 
antiquity and in the early modern period.3 Locke compares the understanding to the eye in the 
second sentence of the Essay, and describes sight as the God-given faculty that allows us to 
receive ideas “by the eyes, from external objects” (1.2.1). Yet he develops anxieties about the 
mind’s perception of the physical world that cause him to repeatedly propose and retreat from his 
initial position.4 To look at the Essay as a whole and understand the precarious role of the senses 
in its theory of knowledge is to obtain a different view of Locke’s place within the empiricist 
tradition and of that tradition in general. In my reading, the Essay demonstrates a tension in 
Locke’s treatment of empiricism, in which Locke wants to make sensory experience the basis of 
knowledge, yet finds it too inherently limited and too vulnerable to imaginative distortion. The 
stakes are high for Locke, as he saw his philosophy of mind as a necessary preparation for an 
ethical philosophy to come.  
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Scholars have noted that Locke relies on metaphor to describe the mind and its ideas.5 
This chapter looks at the way that Locke uses image6 and word, painting and print, to stand in for 
ideas.7 He relies on them so heavily that they almost cease to become metaphors at all, as if he 
believes that ideas actually inhere in these form. While these habits were not original to him, I 
argue that together they have a special significance in his masterwork in that they display his 
stance towards empiricism. The competing metaphors of painting and print evoke broad cultural 
attitudes about the two media. The Essay participates in a Christian debate about the educational 
potential of image and word, portraying a contest between the observed image, conceptualized as 
paintings in the gallery of the mind, and nonempirical ideas, represented by printed words on 
paper. At first, the painting tends to stand for the simple idea reliably acquired by the senses, but 
tension appears in discussions of the “complex” ideas (his term) the mind constructs. The 
metaphors of image and word become a means for him to divide our deficient ideas of the 
physical world from the moral ideas he wishes to shield as nonempirical. He develops the view 
that moral concepts are independently generated by the mind, and gives them the form of 
language. The metaphor of printed text that Locke uses in relation to moral ideas helps to 
stabilize his trust in moral progress. 
Locke’s relationship to images in the development of his philosophy of mind took place 
against the background of the sixteenth-century Protestant iconoclasm.8 Thomas More had 
debated the pedagogic advantages of images and words, and Erasmus had claimed that written 
descriptions surpass any artistic delineation.9 The Essay compares men’s unexamined principles 
to idols taken for “the Images of the Deity, and the Workmanship of his Hands.”10 Locke later 
expresses an iconomachist stance in The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695): The New 
Testament calls Jesus the “Image of the invisible God,” he states, explaining that “invisible 
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seems put in, to obviate any gross Imagination, that he (as Images use to do) represented God in 
any corporeal or visible resemblance.”11 Margaret Aston has shown that English iconoclasts 
sought to efface not only the physical images on church walls but the images within minds. She  
writes that the iconoclastic movements of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were novel in 
their concern with “attitudes as well as objects. They wanted to obliterate—mentally and 
physically.”12 The iconoclasts’ revolutionary “hatred of the past” may be hard to reconcile with 
the Essay in tone, yet Locke has a characteristically modern mistrust of past authorities. Beneath 
the cool argument against innate ideas lies a powerful drive to efface what are really historically 
mandated ideas, buttressed by claims that they are innate. Iconoclasm’s whitewashing and the 
Essay’s notion of the mind as a blank surface are conceptually related, the first expressing the 
desire for a world uncontaminated by history and the second, the desire for a mind untouched by 
it. While the expression tabula rasa does not occur in the Essay as it was published, Locke writes 
that it is probable that the mind is at first “rasa tabula” in ‘Draft A’ and ‘Draft B,’ where the 
phrase’s presence recalls its lineage in the thought of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Descartes.13 
Locke modernizes the metaphor in the finished Essay, where the blank slate becomes pristine 
“white paper.”14 
The metaphor of the mind as paper competes with the metaphor of the mind as a space 
that holds images. Locke’s shift from image to text, I will suggest, turns on the figure of the 
centaur. The references to the centaur are curious since Locke tends to avoid overt classical 
allusions in the Essay. Yet he perpetuates a classical tradition that considers the mind’s contents 
to be images, and conceptualizes mental images through artistic paradigms.15 A paradigm of 
plastic composition, the centaur, stands for the mind’s tendency to tamper with the senses’ 
work.16  A precedent for the Essay, in this regard, is the discussion of sensation in Book IV of 
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Lucretius’s De rerum natura. In Lucretius theory, the surfaces of objects throw off likenesses 
which move through the air and into human eyes and minds. But “images of things/Many tin 
many modes wander about/In all directions, thin, and easily/Unite when they meet in the air…. 
Centaurs and mermaids in this way we see” (IV.724-32). For Locke, such unions take place in 
the mind. Locke introduces the figure of the centaur at two crucial points in the Essay, when he 
considers the reality of ideas and the truth of propositions. He designates certain complex ideas 
and truths as “chimerical.” The term refers to the incongruity of the ideas combined, and alludes 
to the hybrid creature of Greek mythology. In Locke’s scheme, such creatures, most consistently 
the centaur, exemplify chimerical ideas of the physical world. The centaur represents the mind’s 
worrying ability to break apart observed images and recombine them to produce unnatural, 
fantastic images. The result of a process that is out of our conscious control, and potentially 
indistinguishable from ideas that accurately represent the outside world, the idea of the centaur 
fatally corrodes Locke’s trust in empirical knowledge.  
The most popular composite creature from Greek mythology as a vehicle for metaphor, 
centaurs have since antiquity been thought to represent the “struggle between civilization and 
barbarism, reason and chaos”—and the impossibility of dividing the two.17 The centaur also 
relates to a debate on the artist’s liberty, for the composite figure has represented both excessive 
license and positive intellectual liberty in the Western tradition. At the beginning of the Ars 
Poetica, Horace describes a painted figure with a human head, a horse’s neck, a women’s torso, 
a fish’s tail, and haphazardly placed feathered limbs as an object of ridicule. The opening lines 
are effective as an affront because painting has always had particular difficulty disengaging itself 
from imitation. Acknowledging a traditional license granted to painters and poets, Horace sets 
limits on this right, urging the poet to follow tradition or innovate with consistency for the sake 
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of unity and authenticity. Early in the fifteenth century, Cennino Cennini dignified his art by 
asserting that the painter shares the poet’s freedom of composition, and uses the centaur to 
illustrate this idea.18 Yet centaurs were also frightening, having most commonly been portrayed 
in art and literature as lawless, violent, and sensual, famously in the many ancient works with the 
subject of the Centauromachy. Their “duality of both form and character” had made them “a 
potent symbol of man’s divided nature.”19 Thus in the title-page woodcut of his Book against the 
Barbarians (1493), Erasmus depicted himself as Hercules defeating the centaurs. In Locke’s 
time, John Dryden’s translation of the twelfth book of Ovid’s Metamorphoses describes the 
battle between the Lapiths and the centaurs, started by the “brutal” and “lustful” centaur Eurytus, 
and pursued by the “brutal brood” or “double race.”20 A contemporary treatise on painting,  
 
Figure 1. Antonio Tempesta, The Battle of the Lapithae and the Centaurs, 17th century 
 
 
William Sanderson’s Graphice (1658), warns against displaying pictures of centaurs in the 
home. It is best to “forbear those obscene pictures; those Centaures, Satyrs Ravishings, Jupiter-





Two Metaphors for the Idea  
 
Locke’s early description of the mind as an “empty Cabinet” furnished by ideas admitted 
by the senses has provoked many compelling interpretations that find economic and juridical 
dimensions in Locke’s spatial treatment of the mind, but “cabinet” idiomatically refers most 
commonly to a space designed to house art objects and curios (1.2.15).22 In the Renaissance, 
Italian collectors began to build such rooms to hold their natural and artistic valuables.23 While 
the word “collection” was first used to describe groups of texts, writers began to refer to 
collections of objects in about 1650,24 twenty years before Locke began preparing the Essay.25 It 
is at this time that Thomas Hobbes used “cabinet” in the sense of “a room dedicated to the 
arrangement or display of works of art and objects of vertu; a museum, a picture-gallery, etc.”26       
 
Figure 2. The Green Closet at Ham House, Richmond-upon-Thames, 1637-9 
 
 
In his “Answer to Davenant’s Preface to Gondibert,” he writes that the poet must use words as 
carefully as colors are chosen for a painting, “which, if not done nicely, will not be worthy to be 
plac’d in a Cabinet.”27 Hobbes also uses the term this way in the 1676 preface to his translation 
of the Iliad. While Locke uses the metaphor of the camera obscura for the mind, he decides his 
scheme is more apt when the pictures in the dark room are compared to physical objects. “Would 
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the the Pictures coming into such a dark Room but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found 
upon occasion,” he writes “it would very much resemble the Understanding of a Man, in 
reference to all Objects of sight, and the Ideas of them” (2.12.17). Locke’s numerous references 
to ideas as paintings in the Essay, many of which I will examine below, suggest that his use of 
the word “cabinet” corresponds most closely to its sense of a proto-museum.28   
 While The Courtier of Baldassare Castiglione, a work Locke owned, declares that a 
gentleman must not neglect to cultivate the “knowledge of how to draw and an acquaintance 
with the art of painting,” Locke cautions against teaching painting to gentlemen in Some 
Thoughts Concerning Education, averring that he would be “for” the skill if there were not solid 
reasons against it. He writes, “Ill Painting is one of the worst things in the World; and to attain a 
tolerable degree of skill in it requires too much of a man’s time.”29 Despite his admonition, 
Locke’s views obliquely reflect an interest in drawing and painting that had been growing in 
England since the early sixteenth century, interrupted by the Civil Wars.30 It was driven by an 
acquisitive energy among the English aristocracy, best exemplified by the Earl of Arundel, who 
began to import ancient art objects in the early seventeenth century. English collecting, 
accompanied by an interest in writing on art, was interrupted by the Civil Wars, but reemerged 
with the Restoration.31 In the decades Locke worked on the Essay, a debate over Neoplatonism 
presented the mind as a room hung with pictures.32 The “cabinet picture” genre was common 
from the fifteenth century on, and one in which Dutch artists were prolific in the seventeenth 
century.33 Perhaps Locke became familiar with it during his years in the Netherlands, where he 
for a time had letters sent care of a painter.34 
Locke states that simple ideas cannot be broken down and defined, and describes them 
through figurative language, as Paul de Man notes.35 In the first sentence of the Essay’s first draft 
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(1671), which asserts that “all knowledge is founded on and ultimately derives it self from 
sense,” “Images” acts as an appositive to “simple Ideas.”36 Yet Locke incessantly moves 
between metaphors. He at times compares the newly formed mind to a surface ready to accept 
images, and at times a surface for words in the Essay as it was published.37 In the first chapter of 
Book II, “Of Ideas,” he posits, “Let us then suppose the Mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void 
of all Characters, without any Ideas; How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast 
store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with almost endless 
variety?” The answer is “Experience: In that, all our Knowledge is founded” (2.1.1). First, the 
mind is paper ready to receive what are apparently letters. Once “characters” are replaced with 
“ideas,” the mind becomes a surface for images. The fancy “paints” on it. The words “furnished” 
and “store” recall the cabinet, a space that holds objects of art. While Locke writes that ideas are 
“painted” on the mind, he soon warns against considering perceptions to be “exactly the Images 
and Resemblances of something inherent in the subject.” Certain properties are not “the likeness 
of something existing without us,” but rather the effect of an external object (2.8.7; 2.30.2). Yet 
when he moves from the painting metaphor to a mirror metaphor, he confers a mimetic quality 
on sense perceptions, though he does not use the term.38 He writes that the understanding 
generally cannot fail to accept simple ideas any more than a “mirror can refuse, alter, or 
obliterate the Images or Ideas, which, the Objects set before it, do therein produce” (2.1.25). The 
passage confirms the fidelity of the senses to the outside world. Locke explicitly associates 
painting with imitation when he defines a painter, in the earliest known draft of the Essay, as 
“one that by exercise has got the power or skill to make the resemblances of things.”39 In the 
published Essay, a blind man exclaims that a painting must be a “divine piece of Workmanship, 
which could represent to them all those Parts, where he could neither feel nor perceive any 
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thing” (3.4.12). He characteristically introduces subtexts through examples, and suggests that a 
“Painter or Dyer” has simple ideas “clearly, perfectly, and distinctly in his Understanding.” Still, 
when Locke next compares ideas to paintings in Book II, it is to show the limited role of 
perception in knowledge. A colored globe produces an idea of a “flat circle variously shadowed,” 
and only when judgment acts on the idea do we perceive “a convex figure, and an uniform color; 
when the idea we receive from thence, is only a plain variously colored, as is evident in painting” 
(2.9.8). The suggestion is that the sensory image is meager without the mind’s contribution. 
But the mind is apt to damage sensory ideas. While Locke makes the mirror a metaphor 
for the fidelity of the mind, he has already doubted that a mirror-like surface will retain images, 
comparing the dreaming mind to a mirror “which constantly receives a variety of images, or 
ideas, but retains none” (2.1.15).” In a journal entry from 1678, he lays out a series of fraught 
possibilities in the mental capacities of memory and imagination.40 He describes an idea in the 
memory as a painting, writing that it “is always the picture of some thing the idea whereof hath 
existed before in our thoughts as near the life as we can draw it.... And here it may be observed 
that the Ideas of memory like painting after the life come always short, i.e., want something of 
the original.” The mind holds an imperfect image, for “some of the traces are always left out, 
some of the circumstances are forgotten, and these kind of pictures like those represented 
successively by several looking glasses, are the more dim and fainter the farther they are off 
from the original object.” Locke returns to the painting metaphor to express the destructive effect 
of time on memory: “For the mind endeavoring to retain only the traces of the pattern, losing by 
degrees a great part of them and not having the liberty to supply any new colors or touches of its 
own, the picture in the memory every day fades and grows dimmer and is oftentimes quite 
lost.”41 He also begins a chapter on memory in the Essay by figuring ideas as paintings, with the 
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memory a “Store-house.” He here discovers new confidence, for he declares that in fact 
perceptions can be revived as paintings are restored. Locke writes that “there is an ability in the 
Mind, when it will, to revive them again; and as it were paint them anew on it self, though some 
with more, some with less difficulty; some more lively, and others more obscurely” (2.10.2). Yet 
he finally uses the painting metaphor to strongly express his misgivings about memory, writing, 
“The Pictures drawn in our Minds, are laid in fading Colours” (2.10.5). 
Locke employs the metaphor of print as he seeks to compensate for the shortcomings of 
painted images. While he assails the notion that ideas have been imprinted on the mind at birth, 
he turns to metaphors of print when he wishes to claim that the mind may be trusted to preserve 
simple ideas.42 The printed word was surely seen as the medium of knowledge in seventeenth 
century England, for as several scholars have noted, it is associated with the pervasive conviction 
Locke assails, that knowledge is innate.43 “Not on the mind naturally imprinted, because not 
known to children, idiots, etc.,” reads a section summary near the beginning of the Essay. “It is 
evident that there are no such impressions,” he writes of innate ideas (1.2.5). As Walker writes, 
“A discourse of characters, stamping, impressions, and imprinting...dominates Locke’s entire 
presentation of innatist doctrine in Book I.”44 Yet Locke refers to sensory ideas as impressions as 
well, as Hobbes did before him.45 Finding himself in competition with arguments that men have 
“original characters, stamped upon their minds,” Locke adopts their metaphor.46 Just before he 
compares the mind and its ideas to a mirror and its images, he states that the understanding 
cannot “blot out” simple ideas that have been “imprinted” (2.1.25). Even the idea of the “flat 
circle,” very like a painting, is “imprinted” on the mind (2.9.8). While Locke regularly refers to 
ideas in memory as “dormant Pictures,” he with equal regularity writes that the ideas were 
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“formerly imprinted” and compares the sense organs to wax that takes the impressions of objects 
(2.10.7; 2.29.3).47 
While Locke is content to vacillate between the metaphors of painting and print in his 
discussion of simple ideas, he delineates two kinds of complex idea and tends to assign them 
different formats. The term he uses for the process of combining simple ideas into complex 
ideas, “composition,” has a history in both the art of rhetoric and the closely allied art of 
painting.48 To say that Locke borrows a term of the arts may be to undervalue its shaping role in 
this thought. Paul de Man writes, with regard to another set of metaphors, that Locke’s 
metaphors raise the question of “whether the metaphors illustrate a cognition or if the cognition 
is not perhaps shaped by the metaphors.”49 The analogy between composition and complex idea 
raises this question. Locke taught Greek and rhetoric at Oxford in 1661 and 1662,50 and the 
Essay’s division of ideas into simple and complex mimics an organizing principle of ancient and 
humanist rhetoric and logic.51 Locke seems to transfer rhetoric’s model of complexity 
constructed out of small, simple units to psychological composition. This is the operation 
whereby the mind “puts together several of those simple ones it has received from Sensation and 
Reflection, and combines them into complex ones” (2.11.6). The term’s mixed history in rhetoric 
and painting is an advantage, allowing him to give complex ideas visual or verbal form. Locke 
repeatedly uses the term to describe the mind’s ability to repeat and join simple ideas, as the 
orator composes a sentence and the painter composes a figure or a history.52  
Locke calls the main kinds of complex idea “complex ideas of substances” and “mixed 
modes.” He usually refers to complex ideas of substances, ideas of the external world, as images. 
For example, he writes that “collective complex ideas of substances,” like those of an army or a 
city, may be considered as “one Representation, or Picture” made through the mind’s powers of 
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composition (2.24.1-2). He links mixed modes with text, as when he writes that they “have not 
so much any where the appearance of a constant and lasting existence, as in their Names: which 
are therefore, in these sort of Ideas, very apt to be taken for the Ideas themselves” (2.22.8). As 
Locke progresses, it grows clear that visual compositions disturb him and verbal compositions 
give him courage.  
 
The Secure Moral Idea  
 
The category of complex “mixed modes” includes moral ideas, and are therefore the basis 
of the science of ethics which Locke hopes to provide. His examples of mixed modes include: 
gratitude, murder, theft, obligation, drunkenness, a lie, hypocrisy, reprieve, triumph, justice, 
glory, sacrilege, adultery, parricide, incest, stabbing, and temperance.53 To list all of them, Locke 
writes, “would be to make a Dictionary” of most words used in “Divinity, Ethicks, Law, and 
Politicks” 2.22.12). As he begins Book II, he grounds mixed modes in experience, reiterating 
that sensation and internal reflection provide the “only originals” of ideas (2.1.4). He specifies 
that modes “contain not in them the supposition of existing by themselves, but are considered as 
dependences on, or affections of substances” (2.12.4). But these claims precede an elaborate 
inquiry into complex ideas of substances, where a persistent and growing skeptical strain 
conflicts with the empirical confidence with which Locke sets out. It becomes important to 
portray ethical ideas as invulnerable to the perils of the senses, and he argues that there are moral 
ideas wholly original to the mind, though ambiguities remain.54 To distinguish mixed modes 
from complex ideas of substances, Locke calls them “combinations of simple ideas, as are not 
looked upon to be characteristic marks of any real beings that have a steady existence, but 
scattered and independent ideas, put together by the mind.” He conceives ideas that do not 
31 
	
produce the anxiety that comes with a gap between external original and internal sign. The tone 
is typically uncommitted, yet a shift is clear: 
If we attentively consider those Ideas I call mixed Modes...we shall find their Original 
quite different. The Mind often exercises an active Power in making these several 
Combinations. For it being once furnished with simple Ideas, it can put them together in 
several Compositions, and so make a variety of complex Ideas, without examining 
whether they exist so together in Nature. And hence, I think, it is, that these Ideas are 
called Notions; as if they had their Original, and constant Existence, more in the 
Thoughts of men, than in the reality of things (2.22.2). 
 
The phrase “the reality of things” recurs throughout the Essay, with “things” sometimes referring 
to the outside world, and sometimes to immaterial ideas.55 While “the reality of things” here 
refers to the outside world, Locke soon finds a way to call independently generated ideas “real.” 
Increasingly, Locke divides mixed modes from a basis in the senses. In a chapter on 
“Real and Fantastical Ideas,” he attempts to escape representation altogether. Mixed modes are 
“real” because they are not representations. Locke writes, “These Ideas, being themselves 
Archetypes, cannot differ from their Archetypes, and so cannot be chimerical” unless they are 
jumbled (2.30.4). To be real, they must simply be capable of existing. He slips and calls them 
copies, certifying them as “adequate” because they are not “intended for Copies of Things really 
existing, but for Archetypes made by the Mind” (2.31.3). But after characterizing simple ideas as 
“Ectypes” that reliably correspond to external objects and complex ideas of substances as partial 
copies, he again asserts that mixed modes “are Originals, and Archetypes; are not Copies” 
(2.31.12-14). Later, Locke calls mixed modes the “Workmanship of the Mind,” pure “Creatures 
of the Understanding” (3.5.4-5). Mixed modes are moral ideals that may crucially exist in the 
mind without existing on earth. 
In Book II, Locke tends to assign mixed modes and their constituent simple ideas the 
form of words.56 Idea and name are inseparable in the claim that when men combine words for 
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simple ideas to form mixed modes, the “mark of this Union, or that which is looked on generally 
to compleat it, is one name given to that Combination.” Mixed modes thus collapse into their 
names; idea and name are inseparable. Locke further asserts the interdependence of idea and 
name when he states that mixed modes are generally only formed with the end of language 
(2.22.4-5). Committed to language as a means of conveying moral ideas, he writes that the usual 
way we form these ideas is through explanations of their names and the names of their simple 
ideas (2.22.9). Associating them with language, he disassociates them from sight. A man may 
acquire “the Idea of Sacrilege or Murther, by enumerating to him the simple Ideas which these 
words stand for, without ever seeing either of them committed” (2.22.3). Mixed modes may 
represent “Actions we never saw, or Notions we cannot see” (2.22.9).  
If the Essay’s doubts proliferate around ideas of sensation, its hope is in mixed modes 
and the words that convey them. Locke did not originally intend a full treatment of language, and 
his decision to write Book III, “Of Words,” perhaps relates to his decreasing confidence in the 
senses as the foundation of knowledge (2.33.19). The book begins with the declaration that God 
meant language to be the “common Tye of Society,” and Locke sets out to show how this 
intention might be realized in the second half of the Essay (3.1.1). He first returns to the starting 
point of each prior book by linking the senses and knowledge. It may “lead us a little toward the 
Original of all our Notions and Knowledge,” he writes, “if we remark, how great a dependence 
our Words have on common sensible Ideas; and how those, which are made use of to stand for 
Actions and Notions quite removed from sense, have their rise from thence” (3.1.5). But words 
can “signify nothing but the Ideas, that are in the Mind of the Speaker,” and this is a privilege 
with regard to the possibility of knowledge (3.2.4). 
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Print strongly connotes transfer, and it is largely through printed text, metaphorical and 
literal, that Locke conceives the possibility of a shared ethics. As he invests hope in language in 
Book III, he reintroduces the metaphor of print for idea: “impressions, objects themselves make 
on our minds, by the proper inlets appointed to each sort.” As he writes of “applying” objects to 
the senses as plates are pressed against paper, he stresses the close connection between simple 
ideas and their names (3.4.11). The print represents the complex idea that has been accurately 
conveyed among men through language as Locke writes, “It is in the power of Words, standing 
for the several Ideas, that make that Composition, to imprint complex Ideas in the Mind, which 
were never there before, and so make their Names be understood” (3.4.12). In Book IV, he 
makes his own printed text a metaphor for knowledge, writing, “If there be Sight in the Eyes, it 
will at first glimpse, without Hesitation, perceive the Words printed on this paper, different from 
the Colour of the Paper: And so if the Mind have the faculty of distinct Perception, it will 
perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of those Ideas that produce intuitive Knowledge” 
(4.2.5).57 
Locke’s ambition to provide a basis for ethics through language is, finally, not sustained. 
It is undercut by his increasing sense that most men will not “be able to search into their own and 
others’ moral duties” though they were born with the intellectual capacity required. Locke 
presents the possibility of an ethical system in “increasingly bleak terms.”58 His subsequent turn 
from a new science of ethics to theology in The Reasonableness of Christianity might be seen as 
a final act of giving up. Yet in the Essay, Locke’s hope is in mixed modes and the words that 
transmit them. He raises “problems associated with the use of words” to propose methods of 
reform.59 His “remedies” for the “imperfections” and “abuses” of language involve ensuring that 
words clearly correspond to ideas in the mind and establishing that our names for ideas are 
34 
	
consistent and match those of others. In practice, reform takes places through conscientious self-
examination and discourse. Confident that morality is demonstrable in oral and written language, 
Locke presents a definition of “man” that “concerns not” the definition of man as a substance 
and restores reason as an integral quality. “Moral man” is defined by his reason; he is “a 
corporeal rational Being” (3.11.16). Language represents socially beneficial ideas that are 
independent creations of the mind and makes them clear and communicable. 
 
The Corrupt Physical Idea and the Centaur 
 
As Locke uses the painting to portray sensory ideas, he uses the painting to stand for their 
corruptibility. For him, our ability to construct complex ideas of the physical world is a liability. 
Locke never doubts that our minds take in “something” that exists “without us,” as later British 
philosophers would (4.11.2). However, by the end of Book I, he has concluded that the word 
“substance” signifies “nothing,” representing merely an “uncertain supposition of we know not 
what” (1.4.18). We simply notice that a limited number of simple ideas appear together and 
presume they “belong to one thing.” While we cannot doubt their existence, our senses otherwise 
leave us “in the dark” with regard to them. His illustration carries extra weight: When he writes 
that the idea of the sun is just an aggregate, he casts uncertainty on the enterprise of human 
knowledge, with the sun an ancient metaphor for its source (2.23.1-6). He obsessively returns to 
the flaws of complex ideas of substances. His main concerns are that they are necessarily 
incomplete and that they may be deformed. He compares them to painted images as he writes 
that we generally attend to only two qualities, shape and color, as “in a good Picture, we readily 
say, this is a Lion, and that a Rose...only by the different Figures and Colours, represented to the 
Eye by the Pencil.” Even when we have “copied Nature” by correctly observing which simple 
ideas appear together, we produce a copy that is “very imperfect,” and mistaken conclusions 
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result (3.6.28-29).60 When a child first forms an idea of a man, “it is probable, that his Idea is just 
like that Picture, which the Painter makes of visible Appearances joyned together.” Locke 
presents the mimetic simple idea as an unreliable basis for knowledge when he writes that 
because one constituent idea of man is “White or Flesh-color in England,” the child believes that 
“a Negro is not a Man” (4.7.16). Because ideas of physical substances are always incomplete, the 
painting becomes the metaphor for what is basically inscrutable. 
While the child may correct this particular error, the passage quoted above is only one in 
which man is apprehended as the physical substance that is his body. The question of whether 
man is to be defined by his body or mind runs through the drafts and editions of the Essay. ‘Draft 
A’ contradicts the scholastic assumption that man is by definition rational, pointing out that 
children and some men are not as rational as a horse or dog.61 He writes that a child’s idea of 
“man” is likely “just like that picture which a painter draws of the visible appearances, joynd 
together.” Locke conjectures that the child will mistakenly consider whiteness a constituent 
element in man (S28). In the first sentence of the finished Essay, Locke asserts that “it is the 
Understanding that sets Man above the rest of sensible beings” (1.1.1). As often in the Essay, the 
literal and metaphorical follow closely on one another, and Locke uses the painting to exemplify 
artificial substances and men to exemplify natural ones (2.26.2). Treating man as a physical 
substance later, he finds that the body “would, I guess, to every Body, determine the Man” 
(2.27.15). The idea of man is “the vital union of Parts in a certain shape,” a definition that leaves 
no approach to consciousness (2.27.29). Again considering “man” as a substance in Book III, 
Locke writes that while the word tends to signify a combination of “Animality and Rationality,” 
the “outward shape” is the “leading Quality.” In terms of art, the body is merely a “Frontispiece” 
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(3.11.20). His iterations of the definition of “man” display his apprehensiveness over the senses, 
and his drive to circumvent their limits. 
Locke is most troubled by our propensity for composing complex ideas of substances that 
do not correspond to objects in the outside world. In the journal entry already mentioned, he 
writes that when we “join several Ideas together which we never observed to exist together we 
call it imagination.” Imagination is “a picture drawn in our mind without reference to a pattern.” 
He continues, 
The imagination not being tied to any pattern but adding what colors, what Ideas it 
pleases to its own workmanship, makes originals of its own which are usually very bright 
and clear in the mind and sometimes to that degree that they make impressions as strong 
and as sensible as those Ideas which come immediately by the senses from external 
objects, so that the mind takes one for tother its own imagination for realities, and in this 
(it seems to me) madness consists and not in the want of reason.62 
 
Locke’s uneasiness with images is nowhere more apparent than in this passage, where the mind 
paints fanciful images so vividly that it loses its ability to distinguish between what exists in the 
external world and what does not. 
Locke relays his skepticism about visual ideas of the physical world through the figure of 
the centaur, which exhibits their corruptibility. A visual form composed of incongruous parts, the 
centaur becomes an emblem of the misleading imaginative license he is anxious to control 
through reason. Locke first introduces the centaur in his chapter on “Real and Fantastical Ideas.” 
Complex ideas of substances are “real” if their combinations of simple ideas are really united in 
nature. They are fantastical or chimerical when they are “made up of such Collections of simple 
Ideas, as were never really united, never were found together in any Substance; v.g. a rational 
Creature, consisting of a Horse’s Head, joined to a body of humane shape, or such as the 
Centaurs are described” (2.30.5). Locke repeatedly places “Man” and “Horse” first in lists of 
examples of complex ideas of substances.63 The combination of the two, the idea of the centaur, 
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comprises copies of real substances but defies the aspiration to represent them with accuracy. A 
creature part man and part animal is especially worrisome because Locke has already determined 
that we perceive men and animals in a similar way, identifying both by shape (2.27.6).64 Both 
‘Draft A’ and ‘Draft B’ claim that the distinction between man and beast has not been 
established.65 The figure of the centaur breaks down the distinction between them. In a chapter 
that comes soon after, “Of True and False Ideas,” Locke writes that the idea of a centaur has no 
falsehood in it, since ideas themselves cannot be false, but only the mind’s judgments on them 
(2.32.3).66 Only the judgment that a centaur is a real substance would be false, and a threat to 
knowledge (2.32.5). Such passages call on us to recognize discrepancies between ideas and the 
outside world. Yet this resolution does not fully reassure Locke.  
When he considers the implications of his theory of ideas for the extent of knowledge in 
the Essay’s final book, “Of Knowledge and Opinion,” he stresses that ideas such as the centaur 
do not jeopardize knowledge. Yet his agitation of the question, considered together with his early 
claims for the senses, suggests doubt. After defining knowledge as “nothing but the perception of 
the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas,” Locke 
anticipates dissatisfaction with this definition, in a chapter on the “Reality of Our Knowledge” 
(4.1.2). The first section summary reads, “Objection, Knowledge placed in Ideas may be all bare 
vision,” and the empiricist in Locke expresses his recurrent fear that a reader may find he has 
built a “Castle in the Air,” that he may consider “knowledge placed in ideas” to be “all bare 
vision.” He imagines a dialogue with a reader who objects, “That an Harpy is not a Centaur, is 
by this way as certain knowledge, and as much a Truth, as that a Square is not a Circle. But of 
what use is all this fine Knowledge of Men’s own Imaginations, to a Man that inquires after the 
reality of Things?” (4.4.1). It is a serious objection, since Locke has expressed the hope that his 
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treatise “might be of some use to others,” of “some service” in the Epistle to the Reader. In 
response, Locke assures the hypothetical reader of the reality of both mathematical and moral 
knowledge (4.4.6-8). Complex ideas of substances may also be the basis for “real knowledge” 
about the physical world, but this knowledge “will not be found to reach very far” (4.4.12).67 He 
seems to gain some relief, since he now suggests that the idea of a man without reason is distinct 
from that of man or beast (4.4.13-16).68 Yet the reader gestures towards the worth of knowledge 
of substances in a chapter on “Truth in General,” suggesting that truth can have little value if it is 
“no more than the conformity of Words, to the Chimaeras of Men’s Brains,” and “as much 
concerns Harpies and Centaurs, as Men and Horses.” Locke simply distinguishes “real Truth 
from chimerical,” or “only Verbal,” truth. When he writes that truths are real when they may 
existence in external nature, the “real” slips away from the mental world and returns to the 
physical world it never ceased to connote (4.5.7-8). Since he has not altered his position on truth, 
is questionable whether this answer would be satisfactory, but Locke abandons his interrogator. 
His anxieties dissipate once he leaves the subject of empiricism, and the visual ideas that 
underlie our knowledge of the external world. When he turns to ideas created completely within 
the mind, he no longer has to worry about the mind’s tendency to rearrange what it takes in from 
outside. 
In his “bold” claim that archetypal mixed modes provide the basis for a demonstrable 
moral discourse, Locke favors the word (3.11.16). But to say that the Essay shifts from image 
and painting to word and printed text would be inaccurate. Historians have warned against seeing 
a pure shift in allegiance from image to word in the early modern period.69 Close to the end of 
the text, Locke again links sight to knowledge and compares surveying the world to opening “a 
Book containing Pictures, and Discourses” (4.13.1). Unwilling to relinquish the concreteness of 
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the material world, he throughout blurs image and word through metaphor. The conviction that 
sight is the means to knowledge informs his argument even as he proposes verbal processes for 
establishing virtue. He describes virtue as “visible” (1.3.6; 2.28.11). “Perception” is a faculty of 
both the eye and the understanding, and by repeatedly using the words “clear” and “obscure” for 
moral ideas he, like Descartes, associates them with the authority of sight. He describes flawed 
language through the visual metaphor of mist. Knowledge is tied to the mimetic image through 
the painting metaphor; its association with print comes with the advantages of durability, 
reproducibility, and religious sanction. 
 
The Aesthetics of the Essay 
 
Concepts of classical art theory thus underlie arguments both for and against the senses’ 
reliability in the Essay. There is a small body of scholarship that treats the work in relation to the 
following centuries’ energetic aesthetic thought.70 This chapter has looked at ways in which 
paradigms of art theory enable Locke’s philosophy. As he begins by presenting the senses as the 
source of knowledge, he uses the painting as a metaphor for ideas acquired through the senses. A 
visual concept of mimesis that suggests correspondence between the external world and ideas in 
the mind is central to Locke’s epistemology. Yet the figure of the centaur, a paradigm of plastic 
composition, reflects his growing misgivings over sensory images. Losing confidence in the 
epistemological potential of the senses and the image together, he theorizes ideas original to the 
mind that have the form of language, and the metaphor for the reliable idea shifts from painting 
to print, an ancient technology with a strong association with the word since the invention of the 
letterpress. While some may find John Dryden’s nearly contemporary translation of Charles du 
Fresnoy’s De Arte Graphica (1695) a more likely place to find art theory in England in the late 
seventeenth century, I have sought to show that the Essay relies on it.   
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On one register, the Essay upholds the values of neoclassical art theory, which considers 
history painting the highest genre in its ability to emulate dramatic poetry by depicting heroic 
acts. Locke explores how ideas, rather than art images, may represent virtue by depicting men in 
action. He specifies that simple ideas related to action are among those most modified (2.22.10). 
He repeats that certain ideas represent men’s voluntary actions, making the ethical valence 
explicit when he writes that actions are subject to a rule enforced by reward and punishment 
(2.28.5). With his reference to the portrait of Caesar, a quintessentially neo-classical subject 
which David Hume later takes up in his philosophy of mind, the eminence of history painting 
enters empiricist philosophy (2.29.8). While historical art was upheld in English theory, 
however, it did not really take in England. The objects that arrived at Oxford in 1685 to form the 
Ashmolean Museum’s early collection might be taken as a symbolic inventory of Locke’s 
preoccupations. With a mass of portraits came a group of medallions, including an onyx cameo 
incised with a picture of a centaur aiming his bow and arrow at an armed man, as well as the 
painting thought to be the earliest known landscape by an English-born painter, Sir Nathaniel 
Bacon. While the centaur symbolizes Locke’s final mistrust of experience, his attention to how 
we represent what we see might be said to anticipate the arrival of landscape painting and its 
theory in England. In the first chapter of Book II, Locke writes that one will not have “all the 
particular Ideas of any Landscape...who will not turn his Eyes to it, and with attention heed all 
the Parts of it” (2.1.7). His thought provides both for purer versions of empiricism and for the 
survival of idealism in responses to the question of what we may make of the world outside. 
 
Shaftesbury’s Ideal Landscape 
 
 Locke’s contrary pupil, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, takes up the project of grounding 
ethical knowledge in experience. For him, the minds power of composition, its ability to 
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combine observed images, represents not corruption but potential. Art historians consider him a 
founder of English neo-classicism because he explicitly introduces ideas of classical and 
Renaissance art theory into his philosophical works. He was exceptional in his devotion to the 
ancients in a time when antiquity was rarely “freshly studied,” having long been part of the 
furniture of the educated mind.71 In my reading, he uses a classical notion of the ideal image to 
theorize a mental image of perfect social concord. Greek and Roman texts describe how a painter 
crafts an image of the ideal woman or goddess by combining the best points of five living 
models, and the Renaissance zealously revives this paradigm. Art theorists discuss it with regard  
 
Figure 3. Casa Vasari, 1548 
 
 
to the composition of individual figures, and then apply it to the full pictorial field as this concept 
emerged. Before about 1700, the concept of composition refers to the arrangement not of the 
whole field, but of individual figures or “the narrative unity of the historia as it is enacted by 
human bodies in movement.” Puttfarken suggests that the absence of thought about overall 
effects in painting comes from the focus on the human body, the paradigm of order and 
perfection. It is this, he believes, that “renders the implied analogy between pictorial and 
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rhetorical composition incomplete and limits its critical usefulness.”72 I will suggest that the 
neoclassical notion of ideal composition underlies Shaftesbury’s claim, in The Moralists, that a 
scenic view may be the starting point for an ideal image of society.73  
 The title of his compilation Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1711) 
establishes a connection between ethics and visual aesthetics, with “character” referring to man’s 
moral aspect and to a symbolic form.74 The treatises react against Locke’s reliance on the 
afterlife as the best guarantee of moral behavior and seeks to move the foundation of morality 
from heaven to earth.75 Shaftesbury seems to have in mind Locke’s attempt to make the “real” an 
attribute of ideas, writing that the “realist” in regard to virtue “endeavors to show that it is really 
something in itself and in the nature of things, not arbitrary” in the treatise The Moralists (266). 
He writes in his notes for the art treatises in Plastics, “Hobbes, Locke, etc. still the same man, 
genus at the bottom. ‘Beauty is nothing.’ ‘Virtue is nothing’ (178). His famous notion of a moral 
sense, able to directly apprehend a natural “system,” allows him to argue that the sight of nature 
immediately produces virtue.76 He articulates this theory most completely in his first treatise, An 
Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit. There, Shaftesbury brings the concept of an aesthetic whole 
into relation with the social whole. The later editions of the Inquiry state, “The case is the same 
in the mental or moral subjects as in the ordinary bodies or common subjects of sense. The 
shapes, motions, colours and proportions being presented to our eye, there necessarily results a 
beauty or deformity...so in behavior and actions” (172).77 Shaftesbury suggests that we  
apprehend the whole through simple perception. But as an apparatus to support morality, his 
philosophy belies this proposition.78 He seeks a method of mentally constructing the whole, and 
turns to classical idealism.  
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 Xenophon is the earliest writer known to have described artistic idealization “by a 
rational process of selection and combination of its most perfect parts.”79 Book III of the 
Memorabilia tells of an exchange between Socrates and the painter Parrhasius, who states that 
the painter makes whole bodies appear beautiful by bringing together the most beautiful parts of 
various forms.80 Versions appear in countless Renaissance and neoclassical texts, and the legend 
enters English painting theory in The Painting of Ancients (1638), the first theoretical English 
treatise on painting, translated from its original Latin by its author, the scholar Franciscus Junius 
the Younger.81 Shaftesbury transfers the principle from art images to mental images repeatedly in 
texts of 1709 and 1710. The mental image is at times an image of a perfect individual character, 
at others, an image of a beautiful society or universe. “It is from the many objects of nature, and 
not from a particular one, that those geniuses form the idea of their works,” Shaftesbury writes of 
painters in Sensus Communis, which calls on men to emulate the painter (66-67). Shaftesbury 
also recommends the painter of ideal forms as a model to the writer who wishes to “describe a 
perfect character.” The “true and natural” style “represents the real beauty and Venus of the  
kind.” He asks the reader’s pardon for his “frequent recourse to the rules of common artists, to 
the masters of exercise, to the academies of painters, statuaries, and the rest of the virtuoso tribe” 
(148). An undated note assumes men are seized with admiration for excellent works of art, and 
then shifts in scale to describe the various arts as discrete beauties. He instructs the reader to 
“join all these together” to prepare for the topic of the social whole.82 In another note, after 
affirming that a painting’s beauty is in the whole design rather than a stroke or an inch, 
Shaftesbury asks of the art of painting, “To what does this refer? How stands it in the larger 
piece? How in the whole? What part is it?”83  
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 The title of the compilation of treatises he wrote to instruct artists, Second Characters, 
designates its contents as “under-parts” meant to support the “higher” priority of ethics (3-4).84 
The program of these treatises repeats conventional ideas of the French classical tradition, which 
systematized the developments of the Italian Renaissance. Within this tradition, Shaftesbury 
discusses painting mainly through concepts associated with poetry and history. A Notion of the 
Historical Draught or Tablature of the Judgement of Hercules (1712) contains his directions to 
the painter Paolo di Matteis for a history painting, an allegorical commission based on an episode 
in the Memorabilia, in which Hercules turns from Virtue towards Pleasure.85 Shaftesbury  
 
Figure 4. Paolo de’ Matteis, The Choice of Hercules, 1712  
 
 
determines that the landscape background should include no architecture or landscape 
ornaments, which “would prove a mere incumbrance to the eye, and would of necessity disturb 
the sight, by diverting it from that which is principal, the history and fact.” He writes, “As for 
what relates to the perspective or scene of our historical piece, it ought so to present itself, as to 
make us instantly conceive that it is in the country, and in a place of retirement, near some wood, 
that this whole action passes.”  
 Like this painting, The Moralists offers a scene of Arcadian retirement as the setting for a 
moral dilemma and epiphany.86 The Horatian epigraph reads, “To search for truth among the 
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groves of the Academy,” and the interlocutors Theocles and Philocles meet in the woods at 
sunrise and walk through the countryside in the evening. Erwin Panofsky credits Virgil with first 
framing the idealized pastoral landscape with elegy for its loss, and identifies elegaic sentiment 
as the central quality in the Renaissance pastoral. “One step,” he continues, “and this 
nostalgic...longing for the unbroken peace and innocence of an ideal past was sharpened into a 
bitter, personal accusation against the real present” (303-4). Shaftesbury assigns this attitude to 
the novice of The Moralists, Philocles, who laments the “state of mankind.” For Shaftesbury, 
social concord depends on the belief that the universe is orderly and good. He projects the 
perfect social state into the future, adopting the classical idea that the universe is striving to reach 
perfection.87 No longer a metaphysical given, in Shaftesbury’s thought it is based in a mental 
image that has to be newly built by everyone.  
 In The Judgement of Hercules, Shaftesbury indicates that a “piece must by no means be 
equivocal or dubious; but must with ease distinguish itself, either as historical and moral, or as 
perspective and merely natural,” and di Matteis produced a landscape background 
 of supreme plainness (53). But the philosopher differs from the connoisseur.88 In The Moralists, 
Theocles identifies the dialogue’s analogical genre in painting as “philosophical portraiture,” 
wondering “what sort of picture” he and Philocles are “like to prove and how it will appear” 
(234-35). Yet the landscape is not a backdrop; the figures turn toward it and it contributes to 
Philocles’ progress. Shaftesbury directs the reader’s attention away from human nature, which 
his characters acknowledge can only appear deranged. When Philocles accuses nature of “erring 
in thy chief workmanship,” Theocles responds, “But it was not the whole of creation you thus 
quarreled with nor were you so out of conceit with all beauty. The verdure of the field, the 
distant prospects, the gilded horizon and purple sky formed by a setting sun, had charms in 
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abundance and were able to make impression on you.” The landscape represents not only a 
retreat but the starting point for an orderly social scene Theocles instructs Philocles to compose 
mentally. Its elements initiate a vision of universal order. Shaftesbury again turns to classical 
idealism. As Theocles proceeds with his argument for a universal harmony, he describes a 
process of idealization that expands from the sight of the landscape. He says, “Nor is the 
enjoyment of a single beauty sufficient to satisfy such an aspiring soul. It seeks how to combine 
more beauties and by what coalition of these to form a beautiful society,” and an even nobler 
whole that comprehends all mankind (244). The friends repeat the process as they admire plants 
that grow “to perfection” on an evening walk (273). On their next walk, Theocles bursts into his 
famous hymn to nature, praising the fields and woods and moving out to the celestial bodies, 
before Philocles, persuaded, implores him to return to more sociable places (313).  
 The Moralists asserts that we instantly sense order as it simultaneously suggests that the 
perception of order requires the mind’s effort (274). The moral sense seems to spring from an 
impulse Shaftesbury shares with Locke, to obviate a reliance on the sign in the pursuit of 
knowledge.89 As Locke cannot relinquish the notion that the outside world affects thought, 
Shaftesbury cannot commit to his contrary claim that the sight of the outside world is all that is 
necessary for moral understanding. Sight surely did not generally and immediately produce the 
idea he most wished readers to hold, the idea that the universe is orderly and good. Shaftesbury 
is compelled to locate his ideal of total harmony, his version of the state of nature, in the mind 
and the future. He bequeaths a paradox to the following century: Nature displays knowledge 
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Shaftesbury’s social thought has been criticized as a paternalistic defense of the landed 
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John Ruskin’s Ideal Landscape 
 
 The Earl of Shaftesbury and John Ruskin frame a British tradition that places aesthetics 
in the service of natural theology.1 Each looks to the landscape for evidence of divine intent and 
at times suggests that the sight of the landscape is sufficient to faith. Yet in each case, an appeal 
to aesthetics—more specifically, the mind’s composing faculty—comes with the suggestion that 
pure sight alone is insufficient. Shaftesbury’s image of the ideal landscape derives from and 
resembles nature but is assembled as a painted image is. His aesthetics were taken up on the 
continent before they were “imported back to England from Continental writers who had first 
learned them from Characterisitics.”2 Characteristics was in Ruskin’s library, and Modern 
Painters (1843-60) asks to be read against the tradition of artistic idealism Shaftesbury brought 
to English thought and applied to the landscape.3 Rejecting neoclassical idealism, Ruskin 
defends J.M.W. Turner’s landscapes as superior in their fidelity to nature in Modern Painters I. 
As the first book of the Essay has misled readers of Locke, however, the first volume of Modern 
Painters has given Ruskin too secure a position as a naturalist. Ruskin comes to recognize that 
Modern Painters I, in moving indiscriminately between descriptions of natural landscapes and 
Turner’s painted landscapes and their effects on the viewer, renders the painting superfluous. In 
this sense, he perpetuates a tendency of neoclassical art theory. The neoclassical idea that the 
best painting reproduces nature accompanies the idea that painting is inferior to poetry because it 
is capable of replication alone. An argument for naturalism thus could not be a strong defense of 
painting. The previous chapter focused on the competition between image and word. This 
chapter looks at another contest, between nature and art. If Ruskin is to demonstrate that the 
landscape painting has special value, he must make special claims for it. To do so, I argue, he 
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crafts a theory of artistic idealism in Modern Painters II and III.4 His response to classical 
idealism becomes, at least temporarily, not naturalism but a new theory of ideal composition. 
Ruskin’s idealism appears not in his discussions of individual form, where he has a great interest 
in preserving the particular, but in his extended contemplations of the total field. That is where 
the superior artist combines and idealizes, as several scholars have noted.  
 While several scholars have recognized Ruskin’s theory of ideal composition, his 
presentation of the artist’s composing faculty, the “imagination associative,” has not been 
adequately understood. The premise of this chapter is that Modern Painters, this project’s only 
work of aesthetics proper, responds to the tradition of British empiricism, and not only because 
Ruskin refers explicitly to Locke in his classification of ideas.5 Scholarship tends to assign the 
mind’s “associative” operation an origin in eighteenth-century empiricism, and present the 
intuitive “imagination” as a debt to romanticism. In my reading, the full term “imagination 
associative” represents a revision of both the path Locke’s theory of association took in the 
eighteenth century, and the romantic backlash against it. While Cairns Craig explores efforts by 
associationists to challenge the notion of the mind as a “passive receiver,” and the notion that 
beauty is subjective, they did so with difficulty.6 The romantics tend to exalt the mind’s active 
powers.7 By joining antithetical terms, Ruskin maintains a tension inherent in the classical notion 
of idealism. The image of the ideal woman is based in observation and may be mistaken for a 
copy because it blends its models seamlessly. Ruskin also mends mimesis and composition in his 
conception of the ideal, and the contest between art and nature thus ends in another truce. 
 Yet Ruskin’s theory of ideal composition appears to be the last of its kind, resting as it 
does in the creed of natural theology. After Darwin published Origin of Species (1859), three 
years after Modern Painters III, it was a difficult creed to hold; Ruskin described himself as its 
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last defender (4:xlviii). This chapter will suggest, finally, that Ruskin’s well known enmity 
towards Darwin may in part be related to hitherto unnoticed ways that Darwin treads on the 
traditional meeting ground of natural theology and aesthetics.8 Among the ideas that Darwin 
fatally damaged was that of a whole composed of harmonious parts. 
 
Ruskin on Ideal Form 
 
 The title of Ruskin’s treatise demonstrates his vexed relationship to the classical art 
theory Shaftesbury helped introduce to England.9 French classicism invents the contest between 
the ancients and moderns, the latter being the inferior painters of the Renaissance.10 Ruskin 
adopts the format, but redefines the parties in the battle. The “ancients” are not Greeks and 
Romans, but the classicists who mistakenly believe they uphold ancient principles. Ruskin seeks 
to free English landscape painting from the influence of the seventeenth-century classical 
landscapists Claude Lorrain and Gaspard Dughet, called Poussin, and the British theorists of the 
eighteenth century, in particular Sir Joshua Reynolds (83).11 
 Ruskin traces their offenses to the well known legend of the perfect figure. By the early 
seventeenth century, Henry Peachum advises landscapists to draw according to their  
“invention.”12 In 1875, Alexander Cozens, a British painter of Italianate landscapes, writes that 
the “composition of landscape by invention...is concentrating in each composition the beauties, 
which judicious imitation would select from those which are dispersed in nature.”13 The theorist 
William Gilpin writes, “In judging of a tree, or a mountain, we judge by the most beautiful forms 
of each, which nature has given us.” He analyzes the forms of trees, considering shape and other 
features, identifying the characteristic shape of the boughs, and illustrating his comments with 
diagrams. Because nature “is seldom correct in composition,” the artist must learn to produce 
invented views (103). He defines “composition” as “the art of uniting various parts of a 
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landscape in a pleasing manner.”14 
 Declaring that “Greek idealism is dull,” Ruskin assails the legend as applied to both 
individual form and full field. He refutes an Italian art professor who had lectured on “how 
Apelles painted a perfect girl by putting the head of one on the shoulders of another, and the legs 
of a third” (4:351).15 Ruskin suggests the principle remains prevalent when he writes that “there 
is explanation enough in all treatises on art” (4:112). The method is most harmful as a principle 
of composing the full field, rather than the individual figure. Ruskin locates the “false” idealism 
of classical landscape in its corrupt, clumsy, artificial, absurd, disorganized “arrangement.” He 
writes that what is “commonly called an ‘ideal landscape’” comprises “a group of the artist’s 
studies from nature, individually spoiled, selected with such opposition of character as may 
insure their neutralizing each other’s effect, and united with...unnaturalness and violence” 
(3:xxvi). To him, the “cause of the evil” in landscape painting lies “deep-seated in the system of 
ancient landscape art,” which comes from the “remarks of historical painters on landscape” 
(3:xxix). His account of Claude’s “‘ideal’ alterations” describes a process by which Claude 
eliminates all awful, painful, and unpleasant parts of the scene, rendering it inexplicable in terms 
of narrative and unaffecting (5:42-43).  
 Ruskin’s discussion of “modern” landscape painting suggests that the method of classical 
idealism continues to ruin English works of the genre. He describes a process of error that 
derives from this method in sporadic accounts of the nineteenth-century ideal landscapist at 
work. Ruskin tends to name high targets as his opponents, such as the neoclassical theorists Sir 
Joshua Reynolds and Dugald Stewart. Behind these denouncements seems to lie a reaction 
against the translation of neo-classical concepts into practical principles. Ruskin repeatedly refers 
to “conventional” principles of Italianate landscapes, to “known and constant laws of 
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composition,” to the contemporary “conventional teaching” behind them and the critics who 
enforce “rules derived from consecrated blunders” (3:619). He describes a painter who composes 
by making each part “as beautiful as he is able.” Because “a small proportion” of forms will 
“reach his standard,” the result is “a sickening repetition” (4:230-38). He implies that he 
responds to the landscape drawing and painting manuals that proliferated before and in his time 
when he mentions “interesting and popular treatises on the art of drawing, which tell the public 
that their colours should neither be too warm not too cold” (6:366). Mid-nineteenth-century 
treatises commonly advise landscapists that unity is established through the distribution of light 
and shade and warm and cool colors. Examples include manuals and treatises by Frank Howard, 
John Wood, John Burnet, Thomas Hatton, and T.R. Guest. Frank Howard’s 1837 “Sketcher’s 
manual” may be an example of the type of instruction he opposes. Howard sees the “great 
means” of producing unity as graduated lights and shadows incorporated within one another and 
thus diffused (4-8). John Wood’s 1850 treatise also links “pictorial effect” to distributing light 
and shade and warm and cool tones while establishing principal and subordinate masses to 
maintain “breadth” (32-33). Burnet writes that it allows for the proper effect of light and shade 
and an agreeable disposition of color (7). Ruskin considers the common instructions on 
distributing lights and darks in contemporary landscape painting manuals to be a means of 
concealing repetition. In his narrative, the artist selects one perfect part at a time, inserts it into a 
composition, and tries another if it does not please him. 
 Ruskin dismisses the pursuit of perfect forms, deriving his notion of “ideal form” out of  
a notion of the species that developed in Enlightenment philosophy and continued in natural 
science. Locke presents species as mental constructions “with a foundation in the similitude of 
things” (3.3.13). In a process he calls “abstraction,” the mind focuses on shared features or strips 
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an object of contingent features to form a “General Idea.” Locke models the process of 
identifying species on the experience of looking at a painting when he writes that we commonly 
base ideas of species on two qualities, figure and color, as “in a good Picture, we readily say, this 
is a Lion, and that a Rose” (3.6.29). Mental and artistic images have a reciprocal relationship in 
British thought, and Locke’s theory of general ideas informs Reynolds’ notion of “general 
form.”16 Yet when Reynolds “invokes abstraction in the Lockean sense, he does so with a 
significant difference.” Hazard Adams has noted that he attempts to force the general idea to 
meet the Platonic idea. His artist strips away not the contingent, but “deficiencies” and 
“deformities.”17 Ruskin distinguishes “right” from “vulgar” generalization to point out that 
Reynolds has perverted Locke’s notion of the general idea.18 Classicists overgeneralize, painting 
trees “of no particular species” in large masses (4:173-74).19 It is to Reynolds’s notion of general 
form that Ruskin opposes his claims about “ideal” or “generic” or “specific” form.20 His 
interchangeable use of these terms is a subversive claim that the ideal is in the natural.21  
 Ruskin was not first to encourage artists to study the particulars of nature. Since the end 
of the eighteenth century, manuals on drawing and painting landscape give injunctions to 
reproduce the particular, though these often hybrid texts also offer contradictory imperatives, as 
Reynolds had. Although W.M. Craig, for example, draws the epigraph of his 1793 “Essay on the 
study of nature in drawing landscape” from Reynolds’ Discourses, he asserts the “impossibility 
of painting abstract and general resemblances of nature.” He accepts the method of the Helen 
painting as a “collection of individualities,” but ridicules the principle behind the “present 
prevailing mode of drawing,” which attempts to paint a tree that “shall possess everything that 
trees have in common with each other without being oak, ash, beech....” He writes that 
practitioners of “general imitation” employ signs for natural elements to which they have no 
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resemblance, spreading a “disease of the pencil.” He singles out writers of picturesque tours, 
including Gilpin, as the culprits (7-10). Yet others continue to promote general form. John 
Burnet upholds its importance in 1845 and 1849 landscape manuals, writing that generalizing, 
“the principle by which the historical painter acquires perfect forms,” is of the greatest 
importance, though he is uncertain whether the landscapist can “aspire so far as to reject what the 
painters call accidents of nature” (53-54). 
 Ruskin writes in Modern Painters I that the truly ideal landscape “is the expression of the 
specific—not the individual, but the specific—characters of every object” (3:25-38). The volume 
rejects neoclassical idealism, but perpetuates this sense that painted and natural images have the 
same value, despite Ruskin’s insistence that classical “illusion” differs from Turner’s “truth.” In 
spite of its idealism, neoclassical art theory tends to regard painting’s highest effect as akin to 
that of nature. During the Renaissance and after, theorists locate the value of painting in its 
likeness to nature. When painting was given an advantage over poetry, it was that of the 
immediacy of illusion. Shaftesbury calls painting a “completely imitative and illusive art” to 
differentiate it from other arts. He writes in Second Characters that painting’s “chief province” is 
“the specious appearance of the object she represents” (54). In thus identifying the special 
capability of painting, Shaftesbury renders it redundant.22 Aristotle’s notion, in the Poetics, that 
man takes pleasure in resemblance comes to define what painting offers. Addison calls the 
resemblance between nature and painting a “secondary pleasure,” and Hutcheson calls it 
“relative beauty.”23 When Addison focuses on the mind’s requirement for something more 
perfect than the eye has seen in nature, he turns to the poet’s capability to mend it. Burke also 
writes that the art image mainly differs from the natural image in that it offers the pleasure that 
comes with illusion, and ends with a clear statement of language’s advantages over pictures. 
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Reynolds writes of poetry’s power to engage curiosity in an event, with no equivalent in painting 
in the Discourses (129). According to Christopher Braider, the concern of the ut pictura poesis 
was never truly external nature, but human nature as it should be. While writers were instructed 
to emulate painting’s immediacy, the influence operated in the reverse direction in practice.24 
Ernest Tuveson writes, “Painting is in an anomalous position in eighteenth-century aesthetic 
theory...it does not possess the capabilities for new creation that language does.” Addison is 
representative in his preference is for art that is “least literal, as opposed to literally 
representative.”25 Elizabeth Helsinger has found that romantics including Coleridge, Hazlitt, and 
Wordsworth extend the “antipictorial approach.”26 Ruskin requires a theory of the ideal to defend 
painting’s value. 
 In his 1844 preface to the second edition of Modern Painters I, Ruskin writes, “The 
picture taken as a substitute for nature had better be burned” (3:12). However, while he titles his 
first section “Ideas Conveyable by Art,” Ruskin does not discuss ideas conveyed by art. He 
discusses nature.27 Amid long descriptions of natural phenomena, Ruskin concludes that nature 
produces “scene after scene...of the most perfect beauty” (3:343). Chapters follow a pattern in 
which detailed descriptions of nature are followed by discussions of the accuracy of Turner’s 
“record” (3:435). Ruskin repeatedly claims that at the sight of a Turner, the mind perceives truths 
“just as it would on revisiting a natural scene” (3:492). The painting “invites the same ceaseless 
study as the work of nature herself” (3:544). While he dismisses classical landscapes as 
“monotonous transcripts,” he claims that Turner is “the only man who has ever given an entire 
transcript of the whole system of nature” (3:168-69; 3:616). Graham Hough points out that most 
of Modern Painters “is not about painters at all, but about what the natural world really looks 
like.”28 Francis Townsend writes that the first volume is mainly “a description of nature, with 
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occasional references to the way one painter or another has depicted it.”29 Gary Wihl writes that 
though Ruskin “would like to dismiss the concept of mimesis” from his aesthetic theory, he 
remains entangled with it.30 Tim Hilton calls “the major intellectual difficulty of his earlier 
life...the fact that nature is one thing and art another.”31 Jules David Law writes that 
“descriptions of particular landscape paintings merge into descriptions of the landscape itself, 
and at times it is difficult to tell whether Ruskin is focusing on a canvas or beyond it.”32 Rachel 
Teukolsky affirms that there is “no epistemological distinction between nature and its 
representation” in Modern Painters I.33 
 Readings of Modern Painters tend to emphasize this demand for accuracy to nature in the 
first volume. Yet even there, Ruskin shows he is interested in idealism by using the term “ideal 
form” in an approving way. When Ruskin calls natural specimens “ideal,” he not only elevates 
the natural, but expresses a desire for representation that exceeds it. He also advises that the 
study of nature is preliminary, and that the achievement of “truth” does not constitute Turner’s 
gift. The qualities that contribute to truth “are such as any artist of ordinary powers of 
observation ought to be capable of rendering. It is disgraceful to omit them; but it is no very 
great credit to observe them” (3:609). Ruskin later writes of the first volume, “Having to oppose 
the conclusions of a criticism entirely based on the realist system, I was compelled to meet that 
criticism on its own grounds” (4:164-65). He writes, in his 1883 epilogue to Modern Painters II, 
“The public estimate of me, so far as it is wise at all, and not grounded merely on my manner of 
writing, is, I think, chiefly as an illustrator of natural beauty. They had as much illustration of it 
before as they needed, one would have thought” (4:354-55). The beginning of Modern Painters 
II suggests its corrective to neo-classicism will be different. Ruskin decides that accuracy and 
beauty are not equivalent. “I am at a loss to know,” he writes, “how any so untenable position 
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could ever have been advanced; but it may, perhaps, have arisen from some confusion of the 
beauty of art with the beauty of nature.” It is as though Ruskin is instructing himself not to 
continue to participate in such confusion. 
 
Ruskin on the “Imagination Associative” and Ideal Composition 
 
 In Modern Painters II, Ruskin shifts his attention from the ideal form to the ideal field to 
redress his failure to differentiate nature and art.34 Gesturing towards a culture that values and 
expects realism, Ruskin determines not to address “things outward, and sensibly demonstrable” 
(4:25). He promises a detailed natural history, in a subsequent volume, of how his “types” of 
beauty appear in every part of nature (4:76). Near the close of Modern Painters III, he reiterates 
this plan (5:384). And in volume IV, he cycles back to the project of volume I, to further 
examine Turner’s “representations of the facts of nature” (5:410). But in volumes II and III, 
Ruskin trains his attention away from the outside world (4:142-43). He distinguishes two senses 
of the term “ideal” in the second volume. There is the ideal that exists in reality, in the sense of 
the “assemblage of the all the characters of a species in their perfect development.” It would be 
better, he writes, to call it “characteristic or general, and to reserve the word Ideal for the results 
of the operation of the imagination. Nevertheless, the word Ideal has been so long and 
universally accepted in this sense, that it becomes necessary to continue the use of it, so only that 
the reader will be careful to observe the distinction in the sense, according to the subject matter 
under discussion.” (4:166-75). It is not until this point, when he is halfway through Modern 
Painters II, as he notices, that he is able to distinguish artistic and natural images. He writes that 
“by certain operations of the imagination upon ideas of beauty received from things around us” 
we are able to conceive “a beauty in some sort greater than we can see” (4:209). He determines 
to treat only aspects of beauty “which are to be found, or feared, in painting.”  
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 It is as this point in the development of his thought that Ruskin shifts to the analysis of 
the imagination. He places the operations of the imagination in three categories, calling the 
faculty of genuinely ideal composition the “imagination associative.” The empiricist concept of 
“association” appears in the writings of Aristotle, and the term is Locke’s. The Essay identifies a 
“Connexion of Ideas wholly owing to Chance or Custom; Ideas that in themselves are not all of 
kin” but “come to be united in some Mens Minds, that ‘tis very hard to separate them” (2.33.5). 
Association signifies the mind’s tendency to form lasting connections between ideas it receives 
simultaneously or successively. The concept is marginal in the Essay, an afterthought. Locke 
added a single chapter on it to the fourth edition, asserting that associations may be formed 
voluntarily or involuntary and thus contributing to his argument on the power of habit. 
Association belongs more to the following centuries. It has a central part in the philosophy of 
Hume and Hartley, and became a principle of aesthetic judgment in the writings of Shaftesbury’s 
principal follower, Francis Hutcheson. It became a central component in British aesthetics of the 
later eighteenth century, for example in works by Alexander Gerard and Archibald Alison.35 
Alison centers his aesthetic theory on the principle, proposing the perception of beauty was 
triggered by natural phenomena, but was really in the trains of pleasurable ideas that they 
recalled, from life, history, and art. By the nineteenth century, art theory and criticism that relied 
on associationist principles were commonplace. The use of the term “association” grew in the 
1830s and 1840s.36  
 Ruskin explicitly attacks the associationist aesthetics of Alison and Dugald Stewart in 
Modern Painters. Critics often read his concept of the imagination associative as an extension of 
associationist aesthetics, however, and thus as a contradictory element in an oeuvre famous for 
contradiction. In such accounts, the imagination associative becomes part of the return of 
66 
	
associationism after 1820, following a romantic rejection (Reed 60). This framework tends to 
obscure Ruskin’s tendency to assign terms radically new meanings. In volume I, for example, 
Ruskin distinguishes “right generalization” from Reynolds’ “vulgar” sense of the term. His 
second term for the faculty of composition, “invention,” seeks to supersede a long neoclassical 
tradition. Helene Roberts has written that while associationist art criticism influenced nineteenth-
century art critics, they did “change definitions” and “shift emphases” (91). While Ruskin’s use 
of the term “associative” looks back to eighteenth century aesthetics, and the term “imagination” 
gestures to romanticism, he wishes to revise both sets of predecessors. 
 In Ruskin’s account of Turner’s process, Turner alters natural scenes, removing some 
“component images” and rearranging the whole (5:xvi-xvii). As scholars have  noted, Ruskin 
presents ideal composition not as a collection of perfect parts, but as complementary 
imperfections perfectly conceived.37 For “immediate and close illustration” of a composition 
bearing “distinct evidence of the simultaneous conception” of parts, he chooses Procris and 
Cephalus from Turner’s Liber Studiorum (4:171), shown below. This is a version of the idea, 
 
 





found in the writings of Pseudo-Aristotle and Marcus Aurelius and influential in ancient art 
theory, that the perfect whole has contrast in the balance of inferior and superior elements. 
Ruskin establishes a hierarchy that exalts the truly ideal painting, places the topographical 
“transcript” second, and ends with classical idealism (5:188). Ruskin, like Locke, brings the 
reader into his study. Locke focuses on the white paper in front of him. Ruskin looks at the 
pictures on the walls. He writes, “If it were offered to me to have, instead of them, so many 
windows, out of which should see, first, the real chain of the Alps,” and then other scenes, “I 
would very unhesitatingly change my five pictures for the five windows,” for man’s works are 
necessarily inferior to God’s. But “the picture would be a serious loss; something gone which the 
landscape could never restore, though it might give something better in its place.” Ruskin’s 
windows refer to the master myth of painterly mimesis. Alberti, grounding the painter’s 
intellectual claim in the mathematical skill of perspective in Della Pittura, compares the picture 
plane to “an open window through which I see what I want to paint.” In 1856, the year Modern 
Painters III was published, a manual on the use of perspective in landscape uses the terms 
“picture, “perspective plane,” and “transparent medium” interchangeably as the author, Newton 
Fielding describes an artist who traces a form on a windowpane “exactly as it is seen through it” 
(8). Ruskin distinguishes Turner’s paintings from landscapes that “imitate windows,” finding the 
intellectual basis of painting in the faculty of composition, the imagination associative.  
 Studies of Ruskin’s aesthetic thought by George Landow and Elizabeth Helsinger argue 
that Ruskin maintains the eighteenth-century tradition of associationist aesthetics.38 In my 
reading, Ruskin values association decreasingly over time as an aesthetic faculty, and the 
“imagination associative” cannot be understood as an extension of associationist aesthetics.39 In 
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The Poetry of Architecture (1838), he writes that mountain scenery suffers from the absence of 
human associations (1:79-80). In Modern Painters I, truth depends on “keen sensibility, 
combined with high powers of memory and association” (3:614). In volume III, he contemplates 
the associative power of ruins. Especially famous is the garland metaphor, in the same volume. 
Ruskin describes the typical process in which men admire what is beautiful and then lose 
themselves in an individual “train of thought.” The man who “has most the power of 
contemplating the thing in itself” groups and fastens his associations around the object, which 
remains at the center. Ruskin explicitly proposes the “subordination” of dim thoughts. “If the 
thoughts were more distinct, we should not see so well,” he writes, elevating the beauty of the 
object over the richness of mental associations (5:284). As Roberts, Helsinger, Hewison, and 
others have noted, he refutes the associationist account of aesthetic value for its implication that 
beauty is subjective. Hewison writes that Ruskin had “a serious problem” in dealing with the 
notion that “it was not the object itself that was beautiful, but what one subjectively associated 
with it,” that beauty is determined through “chance connections.” Modern Painters II is intended 
to prove that beauty is “independent of anybody’s taste” (4:4). There, Ruskin insists that beauty 
is universal, timeless, and discoverable by reason (4:62-63). Hewison, in agreement with 
Landow, finds that Ruskin holds the position that beauty is objectively in nature as long as 
possible, examining the complex account of beauty in the first two volumes of Modern 
Painters.40 Ruskin there suggests that association may be an aid to duty but also may obstruct the 
theoretic faculty (4:63-64). Cook and Wedderburn’s appendix to volume 2 has a chapter “Of 
False Opinions Held Concerning Beauty,” which includes the widespread opinion that it is 
dependent on association.41  
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 Because Ruskin strongly qualifies his appreciation for association, scholars have had 
difficultly accounting for his theory of the imagination associative.42 Hewison recognizes that 
“by ‘associative’ Ruskin meant no more than bringing the separate parts of a picture or poem 
together,” and sees the word “as a poor choice, for at first glance it suggests a connection with 
the theory of the association of ideas.”43 I believe that while Ruskin’s use of the term may be 
misleading, but it seems to be deliberate. He adopts the term in order to supplant the former 
sense of “association” with his own. 
 Ruskin’s “imaginative associative” is the mental faculty that allow the painter to compose 
images that convey religious truths. His theory of ideal composition thus underlies not only an 
attempt to differentiate paintings from nature, but also an effort to raise Turner’s landscape 
paintings above poetry, as well as the neoclassical paintings that were said to approach poetry, as 
the following chapter will show.44 Neoclassical art theory holds that poetry is superior in its 
ability to depict human action, and that the highest art depicts the great events of classical history 
and the Bible. Ruskin claims the “ranks” of poetry and painting must be reversing since modern 
man has shown landscape to be his main interest, and the painter is best able to represent it. 
While most modern landscape paintings display a corrupt love of the material, looking to 
“merely to bring out the form of a white cloud” in the sky rather than a divine light, the 
landscape painting that interprets nature rightly is thus of “real importance.” To contribute to the 
prestige of painting over poetry, Ruskin raises Turner above the writer considered the nineteenth 
century’s greatest literary artist of history, Sir Walter Scott.  Dividing human history into Greek, 
medieval, and modern eras in Modern Painters III, Ruskin describes the modern temper to be 
one in which faithlessness is combined with the promising qualities of attention to nature and 
love of liberty (5:327). Scott, the “greatest literary man” of the age, is representative in his 
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“faithlessness,” he inability to believe in anything consistently (5:339). Yet Ruskin finds 
weakness where others see Scott’s achievement, in the historical aspect of his writing. Critics 
had hailed his incorporation of accurate historical detail into romance. Ruskin considers Scott 
representative in his “habit of looking back, in a romantic and passionate idleness, to the past 
ages, not understanding them all the while, nor really desiring to understand them.” His historical 
novels are “the best of the kind that modernism made, but still successful only so far as Scott put, 
under the old armour, the everlasting human nature which he knew.” The excellence of Scott’s 
work is in proportion to the degree in which it sketched from the present (5:336-337). Ruskin 
selects Scott’s poetry, not his novels, as his finest work, and in particular his treatment of 
landscape in poetry.  
Ruskin thus sets up a competition between Scott and Turner as landscape artists (5:244). 
Claiming that “scenes” teach us more than “events,” Ruskin finds that Scott’s poetry displays an 
animation in nature that signifies the divine. Scott does not project his feelings onto nature, as the 
romantics tended to, but represents nature “as having an animation and pathos of its own,” to 
which he defers.45 This is the modern “instinctive sense which men must have of the Divine 
presence, not formed into distinct belief” (5:340-41). Scott is thus cast as Turner’s forerunner: 
his landscapes anticipate the landscapes of prophetic history that are realized by the painter 
(5:384). Ruskin then returns to the task of demonstrating Turner’s fidelity to nature, devoting the 
hundreds of pages of volumes IV and V to the subject. 
 
Darwin and the Destruction of Ideal Composition 
 
 The two central concepts of Darwin’s evolutionary theory, variation and selection, each 
had a long history within the aesthetics of natural theology. Natural variety, for Ruskin and prior 
natural theologians, is evidence of God’s goodness, and British landscape painting had long 
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reflected this world view. Darwin alludes to the tradition that holds both individual species and 
the natural system to be “perfect” and “beautiful” by using these terms. He upholds “the 
beautiful and harmonious diversity of nature” (169). Yet his notion of species as evolving 
renders them radically imperfect in their instability. Softening a chapter on the “struggle for 
existence,” he writes that “we see beautiful adaptations everywhere.” But perfection becomes 
relative in the statement that selection “tends only to make each organic being as perfect as, or 
slightly more perfect than, the other inhabitants of the same country with which it has to 
struggle” (201).  
 The term “selection” is fundamental across aesthetic theories of composition, and a 
remnant of these theories appear in Darwin’s idea of natural selection.46 He writes that natural 
selection is as “immeasurably superior to man’s feeble efforts, as the works of Nature are to 
those of Art” (61). While art here refers to manmade selection or breeding, Darwin places his 
argument within the context of the longstanding competition between nature and art. For him, it 
is nature that meaningfully selects. Shaftesbury and Ruskin present the artistic whole and the 
social whole as analogous in their interdependence of parts.47 Darwin seems to maintain the 
notion of a perfectly whole natural order as writes, “How infinitely complex and close-fitting are 
the mutual relations of all organic beings to each other and to their physical conditions of life” 
(80). Yet these statements become embellishments when he writes that “the instinct of each 
species is good for itself, but has never, as far as we can judge, been produced for the exclusive 
good of others” and that species take advantage of the weaknesses of others (210-11). He 
continues to offer a superficial imitation of natural theology as he insists that nature displays 
“one great system.” He makes the famous argument that descent is “the hidden bond of 
connexion which naturalists have sought under the term of the Natural System.” But first, he 
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outlines the various beliefs naturalists have held regarding this system. Darwin does not 
explicitly reject the belief that this system “reveals the plan of the Creator,” but he makes his 
appraisal of deism clear when he writes that without further demonstration, “nothing is thus 
added to our knowledge” (413). With the publication of Origin of Species came the century’s 
most decisive turn away from theology, as Ruskin recognized. The investigations of knowledge 
that followed, however colored by a theological vocabulary, as Darwin’s was, would require 
different grounds. 
 George Eliot, the subject of the next chapter, suggests that the analogy between natural 
and painted whole no longer holds in her first published writing, a series of sketches called 
“Poetry and Prose, from the Notebook of an Eccentric” (1840). The text begins with the death of 
an invented author who is an attenuated version of Shaftesbury’s contemplative. In this case, the 
friend figure is the editor who brings his works together, since the age forces the genius “not 
above, but simply out of, the sphere of his fellow men.” His “sensitiveness” to “the beautiful” is 
“morbid,” with his ideal acting constantly to reveal the “absence of artistic harmony in the details 
of outward existence.” In this case, his love for certain natural elements—“the blue sky, the stars, 
the clouds, the sea, mountains, rocks, and rivers”—relates to his repulsion for living things. He 
delights most in the “destructive power of the elements.” The first collected piece of the genius, 
titled “How to Avoid Disappointment,” recounts time spent in a French painter’s studio, where, 
as in Shaftesbury’s notes, the artist’s steady work towards a pictorial whole provides a model for 
life. “I say to myself,” ‘Macarthy’ writes, “this is an image of what our life should be,—a series 
of efforts directed to the production of a contemplated whole.” Yet in his model, purpose is 
directed not towards a common good, but away from transient human society towards the 
abstract good, beautiful, and true.48 While the piece cannot be said to represent Eliot’s views, it 
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suggests that the notion of composition no longer served, as least for her, as analogous to and 
generative of communal feeling. The following chapter will examine the revisions of empiricist 
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The Radiant Tableaus of Daniel Deronda 
 
 
In her last novel, Daniel Deronda (1876), George Eliot is preoccupied with the question 
of how to conceptualize the social beyond one’s personal experience. She anticipates Benedict 
Anderson’s famous argument that the nation is “an imagined political community,” imagined 
because “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-
members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion.” Anderson considers a community to be a “creation” that distinguishes itself by the 
“style” in which it is imagined.1 Daniel Deronda examines similar questions of how the mind 
represents the nation in images, and how print may conjure them. The novel anticipates the 
possibility of the demise of social coherence in scenes that serve to stimulate correction, and 
summons the possibility of social renewal. Eliot contrasts the coming of age of Daniel, who 
progresses towards knowledge of his Jewish ancestry, an enabling marriage, and a Zionist 
vocation, the movement of Gwendolen, an Englishwoman with whom he continuously crosses 
paths, towards a crippling marriage and uncertain future. While the novel also alludes to larger 
potential entities, it presents the nation as the largest arena for action in the present. I argue that 
Eliot’s energies address a problem that underlies both nationalism and transnational projects, that 
of grasping the contours of a group too large to be perceived. This essay proposes that Daniel 
Deronda’s strained solution to that problem is represented by ekphrastic landscape images. 
While criticism on Eliot’s didactic ambitions tends to focus on her statements that realist fiction 
extends a reader’s sympathy, my essay looks at how her social concerns in fact lead her to turn 
from the moral concept of sympathy to images that are in dialogue with empirical philosophy 
and the history of art.  
80 
	
This essay first looks at Eliot’s engagement with the empiricism Britain inherits from the 
eighteenth century, in particular its role in the ethical program and realist form she at times 
advocates for fiction. I then argue that John Ruskin’s attention to J.M.W. Turner in Modern 
Painters (1843-60) comprises a second important context for the novel that, once seen, reveals 
the import of the prophetic landscape image. Eliot sets Gwendolen in landscapes in the depleted 
neoclassical tradition, while the Jewish prophets Daniel and Mordecai occupy Turnerian 
landscapes with golden skies and arched bridges over water. Finally, I argue that these classically 
inflected landscapes are meant to compensate for the failures of literary realism: realism may 
create sympathy but now Eliot shows that sympathy cannot push beyond the known community 
to broader social entities.  
In my reading, Daniel Deronda seeks a different basis for social community, one not 
forged by bonds of sympathy but encircled by the mind and apprehended in its visionary 
capacity. The novel revises the empirical philosophy of mind that subtends the ethics and 
aesthetics of sympathy to theorize how the mind grasps what is peripheral and even out of sight. 
Alongside corresponding essayistic passages, descriptions of landscape scenes depict mental 
processes that may allow the English to conceive the nation. The novel thus shows Eliot reaching 
beyond realism and what can be represented in a novel, in an effort to draw the mind past 
experiential knowledge. Eliot’s sense of fiction’s social purpose in her last novel is very 
provisional. The glowing images that produce visionary thought in her final novel comprise an 
attempt to direct the reader’s gaze to a vivid distance to discern the ideal Eliot cannot apprehend. 
 
Eliot’s Theory of Realist Fiction and the Legacy of Empiricism 
 
Eliot had before Deronda been more conventional in the ethical rationale of her novels. 
Critics have long discussed her “aesthetic of sympathy,” which she ties to the realist mode in 
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early essays and her first novel.2 In the doctrine of literary realism, contact with fictional 
characters supplements direct experience. She explains this in “The Natural History of German 
Life” (1856), writing that the “greatest benefit we owe the artist” is the “extension of our 
sympathies.”3 Eliot suggests in “Worldliness and Other-Worldliness” (1857) that sympathy is 
infinitely extensible: “Through my union and fellowship with the men and women I have seen, I 
feel a like, though fainter sympathy with those I have not seen, and I am able to live in 
imagination with the generations to come,” she writes.4 Chapter 17 of Adam Bede (1859) 
famously draws an analogy between realist fiction and Dutch genre painting’s “faithful pictures 
of a monotonous homely existence.” The outcome Eliot expects for the reader or viewer of 
realistic art is, as she repeatedly states, an expansion of sympathy.5 Yet critics have tempered 
these assertions.6 Fionnuala Dillane has recently argued that these early mandates intentionally 
articulate the values and expectations of contemporary editors and readers, and appear 
ambivalent when read in context.7 By Middlemarch, Eliot presses against the limits of the moral 
idea of sympathy. The closing statement that Dorothea’s effect on those around her was 
“incalculably diffusive” is colored by the doubt expressed the word “incalculably,” the definition 
of “greatly” shadowed by the definition of “uncertainly.”8 The extension of sympathy through 
representation continues to operate in Daniel Deronda. Gwendolen draws Daniel’s interest 
because her acts imply “a nature liable to difficulty and struggle…. Persons attracted him…in 
proportion to the possibility of his defending them, rescuing them, telling upon their lives with 
some sort of redeeming influence” (297). After he chastises Gwendolen’s “want of ideas and 
sympathies,” the novel shows that his sympathy is effective on her and helps her to develop this 
trait (421). Yet Eliot presents sympathy as a preliminary merit. As David Marshall finds, the 
novel’s investigations of sympathy “look back to the eighteenth century…as if Eliot were 
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declaring her novel to be a continuation or a commentary” on its ideas. He notes that the novel is 
often read as a warning against excessive sympathy, with Daniel’s “many-sided” sympathy 
described as too “reflective and diffuse,” and a danger to the  development of purpose (335-36).9 
Eliot’s idea that she has a “fainter” sympathy with those unseen remains troubling. She here 
seems to doubt that sympathy can travel to the edges of the nation and into the future. 
 Sympathy, the centerpiece of morality in British empiricism, was said to derive from the 
mind’s processes of association. In the first book of the Treatise of Human Nature (1738-40), 
David Hume identifies three universal laws of association: resemblance, contiguity, and cause 
and effect.10 His account of the understanding prepares for his discussions of the passions and 
morality, where he suggests that the laws of association impose moral limits. Hume remarks on 
our “remarkable” propensity, due to the importance of contiguity, “to sympathize with others, 
and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments.” Yet “the sentiments of 
others have little influence, when far remov’d from us” (207). The imagination is not engaged by 
what is “remote” (250). Considering the implications of our partiality for ourselves and our 
families, Hume deems us nearly unfit for society. Leslie Stephen attests to the ongoing 
dominance of David Hume’s philosophy of mind in the opening pages of his History of English 
Thought in the Eighteenth Century (1876), published in the same year as Daniel Deronda. 
Stephen considers Hume the latest “turning point in the history of thought.”11  
Constrained as she was within her empirical moment, Eliot finds empiricism too rigid to 
accommodate the creative modes of thought she perceived in herself and others, and the 
demands of the future she saw on the horizon. While she is unable to reject empiricism, Eliot is 
in my reading revising a major empiricist concept, that of inference, a method of making 
predictions. Hume states that we learn to predict the future through experience, by observing that  
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certain occurrences routinely follow others (50-55). This concept of inference remains central in 
Victorian philosophies of mind. The introduction of J.S. Mill’s System of Logic (1843) closely 
conforms to Hume’s account of inference. Eliot’s partner, George Henry Lewes, places himself 
in the same school in Problems of Life and Mind (1879), another text which conforms to the 
outlines of classical empiricism.12 To pursue the repeated aim of bringing empiricism and 
idealism together, he simply applies the language of idealism to empiricist concepts; for 
example, he uses the terms “idea” and “ideal” interchangeably.13 The notion of inference has 
particular potential to be treated as idealist, since causation is the single relation “that can be 
trac’d beyond our senses” in Hume’s account of the mind (53). Lewes writes that the work of 
science with symbols “enables us to foresee results,” a process he calls both “inference” and 
“prevision,” which is a key word in Daniel Deronda (I, 78-93). The novel is saturated with the 
vocabulary of empiricism, and assigns Gwendolen and Daniel opposite problems in its terms. 
The quintessentially empiricist word “impression” appears throughout as Eliot presents varieties 
of perception. The narrator discloses Gwendolen’s inaccurate surmises about Grandcourt’s 
thoughts in a series of parenthetical “pauses” in a conversation between them (98-100). There is 
an ironic play on an empiricist term when the narrator states that Gwendolen is “busy with her 
small inferences of the way in which she could make her life pleasant,” inferences which are 
then called “blind visions.”14 The novel pursues an alternative way of conceptualizing the 
future.15 The Turner-like landscapes of Daniel Deronda’s Jewish realm are a locus for 
propositions about how the mind anticipates the future through prophecy rather than inference. 
 
The Historical Art of Daniel Deronda 
 
 With an orientation towards the future, Eliot tests a new approach to historical art. Daniel 
Deronda, the only novel Eliot set in the contemporary period, contains both a theory and an 
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example of historical art, starting with the epigraph to the first chapter. Eliot’s original epigraph 
announces that that “men can do nothing without the make-believe of a beginning” because “no 
retrospect will take us to the true beginning” (7). This statement may be read as the novel’s ars 
poetica. In an undated note titled “Historic Imagination,” among the “Leaves from a Note-Book” 
published after her death, Eliot presents a method of “historical picturing” that applies to her first 
six novels. She demands “veracious imagination,” defining this as the “working out in detail of 
the various steps by which a political or social change was reached.”16 The epigraph in Daniel 
Deronda reads as self-revision, a correction to such an empirical approach to history. Hume’s 
History of England begins by declaring that it will neglect “all traditions or rather tales 
concerning the more early history of Britain” and hastens to the history of civilized Britain, 
presumed to be of more interest to civilized readers.17 Daniel Deronda frames the historical past 
and present with a legendary past and a visionary future. Geoffrey of Monmouth’s patriotic 
History of the Kings of England provides the main model for Gwendolen Harleth, a legendary 
queen, and a model of history that is also romantic fiction and prophecy.18 The characters Kate 
and Mab Meyrick, who have learned “world-history” through the engravings that hang in their 
home, describe this kind of history as “history brought near us with a strong telescope,” alluding 
to the novel’s preoccupation with bringing the remote near. Mab comments, “I don’t care what 
you call it. Call it a Chapter in Revelations,” noting Western literature’s main model of prophetic 
history and anticipating the title of a later section of the novel (166).  
Eliot aligns herself with Ruskin by jettisoning the kind of historical image that had been 
preeminent. On the first page of Daniel Deronda, and at other points, Eliot affirms Ruskin’s 
assessment of neoclassical history painting. The first scene takes place in a fashionable casino on 
the continent, with “gilt mouldings, dark-toned colour, and chubby nudities” (3). The art 
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historian Ellis Waterhouse calls neoclassical painting on walls and ceilings “decorative 
history.”19 With the ironic comment that the casino’s décor has a source in the “enlightenment of 
ages,” Eliot links the neoclassical cherubim to the contemporary philosophical movement. The 
ironic commentary on the Enlightenment continues when Eliot writes of the various Europeans 
who are gambling, “Here certainly was a striking admission of human equality,” their equality in 
their “uniform negativeness of expression” (4-5). The novel thus begins by suggesting that the 
main philosophical and artistic traditions of the eighteenth century are exhausted.  
The decorative allegorical art in England’s grand houses, such as the “ceilings painted in 
the Italian style” at Grandcourt’s estate Ryelands, on which “Spring was shedding painted 
flowers, and…foreshortened Zephyrs were blowing their trumpets,” is a mockery of allegory 
(284; 329). The English are throughout shown to be inept with the historical mode of allegory. In 
Book I, Gwendolen, who characteristically sees herself as a painter’s model, places herself in a 
portrait in the neoclassical style, saying, “I will be Saint Cecelia: some one shall paint me as 
Saint Cecelia” (22).20 She reads her own allegorical significance wrongly, miscasting herself as 
the patron saint of music. Meanwhile, she remarks that Catherine Arrowpoint “would make quite 
a fine picture in that gold-coloured dress,” adding, “Well, perhaps a little too symbolical—too 
much like the figure of Wealth in an allegory” (86). But Catherine is musically and morally 
superior and would make the better model for Saint Cecelia, while Gwendolen represents 
materialism and chooses “puerile” music” (39).  
The novel’s painter, Hans Meyrick, Daniel’s friend at Cambridge, is a mixed character 
who has begun his career with the mistake of deciding to paint histories in the grand style. The 
narrator implies that he has artistic potential by imparting that he was “daringly christened after 
Holbein,” who represents a bridge between medieval religiosity and modern humanism (165). 
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Ruskin wrote an essay on “Sir Joshua and Holbein” in 1860, the comparison reflecting favorably 
on the “unaffected resoluteness” of the latter’s portraits and biblical scenes (XIX, 1-16). The 
Meyricks, a family with partly foreign origins, has been successfully transplanted. In naming 
Hans after the brilliant foreigner who established portraiture in England, Eliot reinforces the idea 
that a foreign idea may be a national resource if properly reconceived. Yet while Hans believes 
his history paintings demonstrate that “the seed of immortality has sprouted” within him, Daniel 
tells him that one painting requires a neoclassical scroll, “else people will not understand” the 
story, since “you can’t tell that in a picture.” Daniel also knows that the Jewish woman he 
rescues, Mirah, would not be a willing or good model for the historical Berenice, who attaches 
herself to her people’s enemy (426-28). Daniel’s uncle, Sir Hugo, at times speaks wisdom 
unwittingly, and Hans interprets Sir Hugo’s advice that he abandon history painting as a 
judgment that his efforts in this genre “are simply pitiable” (600).  
 Eliot’s historical art in this novel participates in the rhetorical tradition of ekphrasis, the 
description of artworks, which was understood to have the capacity to evoke images of the past 
or future.21 Yet before she describes the visions of the Jewish realm, Eliot prepares the readers to 
find prophecy in painting through a scene in which Gwendolen’s reacts to a painting in her 
temporary home of Offendene. Just after Gwendolen arrives and finds the drawing-room a 
suitable background for her portrait, her sister finds a painting of “an upturned dead face, from 
which a figure seems to be fleeing with outstretched arms” inside a hinged panel of the wainscot. 
Gwendolen’s silent “shudder” and angry determination to lock the panel indicate a reaction more 
profound than distaste (22). As readers have noticed, the Englishwoman is receptive to prophetic 
inklings, which prophecy doom because she ignores her better instincts out of self-interest. Soon, 
as she plays the statue of Hermione in a tableau based on The Winter’s Tale, the panel springs 
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open, causing her to let out a “piercing cry” and her expression to change to “frozen terror” (54). 
In ironic contrast with Shakepeare’s comedic ending, her disturbance prefigures the death of the 
husband she has not yet met, a death which symbolizes the death of the old aristocratic order in 
England. The novel goes on to suggest that the source of Gwendolen’s turpitude is an English 
tendency to idealize the world in an outdated mode. 
 
The English Landscape and the Jewish Landscape, with a Philosophy of Mind 
 
In Daniel Deronda, Eliot sets a degenerate English world against a visionary Jewish 
realm, and each has its painterly setting. There is a symmetry in the novel’s landscapes, with two 
landscapes framing the English in a style of the past, followed by two Jewish landscapes with a 
contemporary model. The term “landscape” referred to painted scenes before it referred to 
natural scenes, placing the genre in a liminal zone between nature and art. In a genre called 
“ideal” or “classical” or “pastoral” landscape, which peaked in the seventeenth century, painters 
sought to elevate landscape to the status of history painting by placing scenes of biblical or 
mythological history in the foreground to convert the natural setting to one of the legendary past. 
Covering only a fraction of the painting’s surface, the figures were essential in allowing the 
painting to share the moral dignity of history painting. The scenes of two archery meetings, 
where Gwendolen is courted by her disastrous mate, Grandcourt, are described as the 
mythological landscape paintings on which the upper classes modelled their parks and gardens. 
Eliot repeatedly alludes to painting in these passages. She critiques what the ideal landscape had 
become over the course of the eighteenth century—that is, thin and deeply conventional—by 
setting the English in such gauzy scenes.22  
 Eliot presents the grounds of English stately homes as a false Arcadia.23The setting of the 
first archery meeting has a “gentle” recession into the distance, a castle “full of lights and 
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shadows” on a hill, and “green slopes” above gleaming water. Masses of trees break up the 
composition in an orderly way, and the archery hall “showed like a white temple above the 
greenery.” “What could be a better background for the ladies?” the narrator asks, drawing the 
allusion to painting. The classical landscape had become formulaic and cloying, and an 
appropriate setting for Eliot’s vain, vacuous cast of English characters. Examples by English 
painters such as George Lambert and James Wootton bear the generic title Classical Landscape, 
at times joining classical conventions to rustic English scenery. The figures in Daniel Deronda 
are compared with irony to the creatures of myth who occupy such landscapes: Gwendolen is an 
exceptionally lovely “Calypso among her nymphs” (89-91). The reader is able to picture her 
posed with her bow as Diana in an English portrait, such as the one by Gainsborough below. Sir  
 
Figure 6. Thomas Gainsborough, A Lady as “Diana”, Walking in A Landscape, 18th century 
 
 
Hugo later calls her “the Leubronn Diana,” with reference to the German town where Daniel first 
meets her (269). The goddess Diana has an ironic association with a number of characters in late-
century novels, including Isabella Castlewood of Thackeray’s History of Henry Esmond 
(1852)24; the misguided Isabel Archer of Henry James’s Portrait of a Lady (1881), whose 
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surname marks the allusion; and the title character of George Meredith’s Diana of the Crossways 
(1885), who describes Italy as an Arcadian paradise while in the grip of a destructive love affair. 
Gwendolen is among this company as she is awarded the winning gold star. “The perfect 
movement of her fine figure was a thing to behold in the clear afternoon light,” and she becomes 
“the central object of that pretty picture” (96). 
 Gwendolen and Daniel both meet their future spouses in Book II, “Meeting Streams,” 
and the landscapes anticipate the promise of each relationship. At a second, roving archery 
meeting, where Gwendolen anticipates Grandcourt’s proposal, she feels herself “moving about 
like a wood nymph.” The group meets in a grassy spot called “Green Arbour,” and the main 
competition is again reserved for the “exquisite lights of the afternoon” that typically fill the 
idyllic scenes of neoclassical landscapes. The narrator again alludes to painting, writing that “a 
painter would have been glad to look on” (130-31). This idealized scene is disturbed by the 
appearance of Grandcourt’s mistress.  
In fact, the two English landscapes in the mode of outworn neoclassicism occur, in the 
chronology of events, after the prophetic moment when Daniel rescues Mirah, which is presented 
several chapters later. The movement back in time allows Eliot to portray the debased English 
world first, and allows the reader to recognize the landscapes of the Jewish realm as of another 
order. Victorian readers and more recent ones have noticed that these scenes on the Thames are 
“Turneresque,” but in an unexplored way.25 To allude to Turner was to allude to Modern 
Painters. While Eliot praises Ruskin’s call for accuracy in an 1856 review of the third volume of 
Modern Painters, calling him a “prophet for his generation” in his doctrine of truth to nature, she 
here looks to Ruskin for a theory of historical art that presses against realism.26 Ruskin’s well-
known tenet of mimetic accuracy is in tension with other aspects of his thought, even though 
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scholars have stressed the relationship of Modern Painters to natural history.27 When Ruskin 
considers artists as natural historians of the contemporary landscape, he writes that the 
topographical landscape painting may usefully record the present for posterity.28 But such 
landscapes are of secondary importance; he later writes that the unimaginative painter is to 
dedicate himself to the topographical landscape (VI, 28-31). The other main branch of history 
painting, neoclassical painting of biblical or classical events, has in Ruskin’s view entirely failed, 
though the genre was at the time held to be highest for its ability to depict human action.29 
In order to usurp the place of history painting in the grand style, Ruskin theorizes 
Turner’s landscapes as history in its high mode of Christian prophecy. In Modern Painters I, he 
argues that no painter before Turner depicted receding space well. The tonal system of the old 
masters “compelled them to give up all real relations of retirement, and to represent a few 
successive and marked stages of distance.” While their paintings are like a history that omits 
most parts, Turner’s are like a history that gives “all its parts abridged in the order of their 
importance” because his approach to tone allows him to capture a gradual recession (III, 259-67; 
III, 319-22). Ruskin praises Turner for, “without one break in the magnificent unity of progress,” 
carrying the viewer’s eye “up towards the heaven” (III, 467). In emphasizing the sky, he gives 
the distance a Christian emphasis traditional among painters and critics of landscape art.30 
Turner’s spatial progressions convey historical knowledge as Ruskin understands it from the 
Bible (III, 130; III, 585; III, 163). Rather than painting biblical scenes, Turner portrays nature in 
a way that evinces God’s providence. At the end of the volume, as Ruskin calls for didactic 
landscapes, he credits Turner as a painter who “looks back over the the universe of God and 
forward over the generations of men. Let every work of his hand be a history of the one, and a 
lesson to the other. Let each exertion of his mighty mind be both hymn and prophecy” (III, 625-
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31). Eliot transposes the idea that the landscape image can evoke prophecy to the secular world, 
with the exempla of Turner’s paintings.  
 In the first of Daniel Deronda’s two primary scenes of vision, Daniel rows on the 
Thames, passing under Kew Bridge at sunset: 
It was his habit to indulge himself in that solemn passivity which easily comes with the 
lengthening shadows and mellowing light, when thinking and desiring melt together 
imperceptibly, and what in other hours may have seemed argument seems to take on the 
quality of passionate vision. By the time he had come back again with the tide past 
Richmond Bridge the sun had was near setting, and the approach of his favourite hour—
with its deepening stillness, and darkening masses of tree and building between the 
double glow of the sky and the river—disposed him to linger as if they had been an 
unfinished strain of music. He looked out for a perfectly solitary spot where he could 
lodge his boat against the bank, and throwing himself back with his head propped on the 
cushion, could watch out the light of the sunset and the opening of that bead-roll which 
some oriental poet describes as God’s call to the stars, who each answer, “Here am 
I.” He chose a spot in the bend of the river just opposite Kew Gardens, where he had a 
great breadth of water before him reflecting the glory of the sky” (172-73). 
 
The gold skies are a way for Eliot to make visionary thought empirically concrete. Eliot seems to 
conceptualize visions in the classical sense of visiones, imaginary scenes with rhetorical 
potential.31 Margaretha Lagerlöf points out that though landscape images are “far removed” from 
the rhetorical emphasis on action, they could “satisfy another of the key requirements of rhetoric, 
namely the demand for the concrete and actual.”32 Daniel Deronda’s prophetic landscapes 
gesture to the extrasensory, but have a concrete aesthetic and material correlative in Turner’s 
paintings. The Thames scene above strongly alludes to Turner, for whom the golden sky was a 
signature.33  
 In fact, it is curious that in a novel with no major exemplary English character, an 
exemplary English artist stands behind the prophetic landscapes.34 Although Eliot gives only 
Jewish characters the faculty of vision, she grounds hope for the English in her allusions to 
Turner’s landscapes. Writing on Ruskin’s lectures in 1854, Eliot repeats his entreaty that the 
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English appreciate the “treasures of their own hearts and minds.” She states, “That Turner was a 
great artist, we hope and believe few will now be found to question.”35 Daniel Deronda links 
England’s national fate to its fine art through a reference to the National Gallery. The visionary 
Jewish nationalist Mordecai, for whom a section of the novel is named, visits the museum to 
look for portraits that will nourish his hope of passing his ideas on to a similar Jewish visionary, 
searching unsuccessfully for “grave and noble types of the human form, such as might well 
belong to men of his own race” (440). Founded in 1824, the museum realized a long effort on the 
part of British art theorists to connect the concept of the British nation to the fine art it 
appreciated, collected, and displayed. For Ruskin, Turner’s horizons contain are theologically 
inflected; they are where the earth meets the heavens. The sunsets of Daniel Deronda conjure the 
sense that an earthly order, rather, is deteriorating, but may rise again.36 Eliot’s Turner-like 
scenes correspond to Turner’s paintings of the fall of empires. We know that Turner conceived 
his enterprise in relation to, and competition with, the classical landscape tradition.37 When the 
National Gallery opened, Claude was by far the best-represented artist.  At his request, Dido 
Building Carthage (1815) was hung beside a Claude in the National Gallery. Turner here adopts 
Claude’s soft light effects and sense of peaceful order, though unlike Dido, Claude’s Seaport 
with the Embarkation of the Queen of Sheba (1648) gives the viewer ground to stand on. The 
companion piece to Dido is The Decline of the Carthaginian Empire. It has a similar structure. 
But the sunset is fierce and tumult spills across the foreground.38 In Ovid Banished From Rome, 
the setting sun signals Rome’s decline. The Fighting Temeraire, with another setting sun, 
represents the weakening of British naval power. Like the skies in Turner’s paintings, the sunsets 
of Daniel Deronda intensify the sense that an empire and an era are declining.  
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The glowing skies brighten and intensify the distance that Hume had presented as dim 
and insignificant. To Hume, distant objects “appear in a weaker and more imperfect light,” 
affecting the imagination, will, and passions less (274). Daniel Deronda describes prophetic 
thinking, or “precious seeing,” as the “bathing of all objects in a solemnity as of sunset-glow, 
which is begotten of a loving reverential emotion” (538). Eithne Henson notes that Eliot’s scenes 
on the Thames are “barely described,” yet the reduction of a scene to its main elements gives 
them symbolic weight.39 John Kearney objects that while such a passage may have been able “to 
convert a hostile public to one of Turner’s late seascapes,” it was unreasonable to expect it “to 
stand on its own as the vehicle for depicting the mysterious providence in the religion of 
humanity.”40 However, Eliot does not seem to expect it to stand on its own. Eliot’s description of 
the light at sunset forms part of an effort to describe how the mind moves away from its 
immediate circumstances and into more far-reaching thought.  
The bridges in the novel’s river scene form a metaphor for prophecy. Eliot’s account of 
prophecy begins with a vignette in which Daniel at thirteen intuits that his ancestors are not those 
he has believed them to be. His imagination “suddenly rushed towards his own history and spent 
its pictorial energy there, explaining what he knows, representing the unknown.” He is possessed 
by “new images.” He at this young age tends to draw connections mistakenly, “making 
conjectures about his own history, as he had often made stories about Pericles or Columbus, just 
to fill up the blanks before they became famous” (152-53). The question of how to fill in blanks 
was a preoccupation of Eliot’s. Her note on historic imagination instructs the artist to use “all 
extent evidence and supplying deficiencies by careful analogical creation.”41 In chapter 9 of 
Middlemarch, Dorothea “filled up all the blanks” in her thoughts of Casaubon “with 
unmanifested perfections” (68). Eliot writes of Daniel’s first prophetic experience, “There came 
94 
	
back certain facts which had an obstinate reality, — almost like the fragments of a bridge, telling 
you unmistakably how the arches lay” (140).42 The fragment is for Eliot and Lewes a metaphor 
for empirical fact. The novel suggests that vision must be reached through experience, including 
the experience of reading prose. The newspaper placards with which the narrator says prophecy 
may begin are significantly located on a “bridge beyond the cornfields” (319). What is metaphor 
in philosophical passages becomes a concrete representation of visionary thought that is able to 
link the past and future through means other than inference. Daniel Deronda shows the influence 
of German thought in its romantic nationalism and its emphasis on intuition. But Eliot takes an 
empiricist route by revising the construct of the train of thought. For her, sense impressions 
become the supports of vision. 
The bridge metaphor in Daniel Deronda relates to Lewes’s description of the “visionary 
hypothesis” as a “bridge” over gaps in observation in Problems of Life and Mind. Since we 
observe the processes of nature in fragments, he proposes, we must “imagine what we cannot 
see, and link the fragments into a whole,” making visible to the mind “what is invisible in the 
facts presented.” He writes, “There is a gap to be filled up. How? Not by direct vision. Then by 
indirect vision.” An inference “is placed under, and supports the observed facts; it is the 
imaginative arch thrown over the gap which we may traverse like a bridge.” Many visionary 
hypotheses are no better than the arch of a rainbow, beautiful but impossible to walk upon (I, 
288-89). Lewes theorizes the bridge as the path of knowledge, with inferences “welded” by 
sensible accompaniments (I, 321). In the 1855 essay “The Future of German Philosophy,” Eliot 
had similarly praised Ludwig Feuerbach because he renounces “the attempt to climb to heaven 
by the rainbow bridge of ‘the high priori road’, and is content humbly to use his muscles in 
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treading the uphill a posteriori path.”43 In Daniel Deronda, the route to knowledge is neither 
arduous trail nor rainbow bridge, but a material bridge seen in a certain light.  
 The image of a ruin of an arched bridge in the scene of Daniel’s premonition recalls a 
motif of classical landscape painting, transmuting its shape into a symbol for thought that rises 
above experienced fact. It is the bridges of Eliot’s visionary landscapes that make them a clear 
allusion to Turner’s classical, Claudean mode. In this sense, Eliot departs from Ruskin’s model. 
Ruskin praises certain Turner landscapes with classical themes, such as “Ulysses deriding 
Polyphemus,” yet he depreciates those which conform to Claudean formats. Even as Turner 
captured the effects of nature along the Thames, he sought out motifs that would link the 
landscape to the tradition of seventeenth-century classical landscape painting.44 The arched Ponte 
Molle, a bridge over the Tiber at the entrance of Rome, was painted by Poussin, by Claude 
regularly, and by their English admirer Richard Wilson, the first major British painter to 
concentrate on landscape, who trained in the classical landscape tradition in Rome. After his 
return, Wilson painted English scenes, including scenes with arched bridges and of the Thames 
under a large, bright sky. As a link between the Italianate and the English landscape, he affirmed 
that a foreign influence could be naturalized in England, as Eliot might wish with regard to 
Jewish nationalism. Turner followed in the footsteps of Claude and Wilson to make a watercolor 
and graphite sketch of the Ponte Molle in 1819.45 His numerous images of London’s similarly 
shaped bridges transfer the motif to contemporary England, though only some share Claude’s 
idyllic tone. The images below show a drawing by Claude with the Ponte Molle and a similar  








Figure 8. Joseph Mallord William Turner, Bridge in the Middle Distance, 1808 
 
 
shape into a symbol for prophetic thought. The apocalyptic tone of “The Decline of the 
Carthaginian Empire,” rather than a pastoral calm, infuses the river scenes of Daniel Deronda. 
Eliot would never go as far as Turner did in his two paintings titled The Burning of the Houses of 
the Houses of Lords and Commons (1835), which join the arched bridge motif to an apocalyptic 
fire that figures destruction in England. While Turner produced these paintings during the 
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volatile years of the early 1830s, Eliot’s late-century images light up a calcified decline.  
 Eliot paints the novel’s second and central visionary landscape from Mordecai’s point of 
view, which allows her to frame Daniel more clearly as the hero he is becoming. The previous 
scene where he meets Mirah suggests that he is receptive to “vision,” yet he is passive. He 
forgets everything but the view “in a half-speculative, half-involuntary identification of himself 
with he objects he was looking at, thinking how far it might be possible to shift his centre till his 
own personality would be no less outside him than the landscape” (173). This ability to desert 
himself is portrayed as a virtue but only insofar as it allows him to sympathize with others; it is a 
virtue that he transcends to discover national purpose. His visionary thought has to develop out 
of experience since he does not naturally tend to “second-sight” (438). In the case of Mordecai, 
Eliot gives the ideal priority over the empirical, and shows the reader the prophetic vision he 
sees. She writes that his “yearnings, conceptions—nay, travelled conclusions—continually take 
the form of images which have a foreshadowing power: the deed they would do starts up before 
them in complete shape, making a coercive type.” The statement that his mind “wrought so 
constantly in images, that his coherent trains of thought…resembled dreams in their way of 
breaking off the passage from the known to the unknown” announces Eliot’s revision of the 
traditional empiricist notion of a train of thought, which follows patterns laid by observation or 
departs with dangerous irrationality (439-41). Mordecai generates visions by going to London’s 
bridges at dawn and sunset. The symbolic bridges in Eliot’s prophetic landscapes—Kew Bridge, 
Richmond Bridge, and Blackfriars Bridge—were all painted by Turner. In a scene on the Thames 
at sunset about halfway through the novel, Mordecai recognizes Daniel as the incarnation of his 
prophecy. Eliot is thus able to indicate that Daniel will fill the role of a national redeemer 
without having to show him occupy it. The moment of recognition takes place as Mordecai 
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stands at sunset on Blackfriars Bridge46 and Daniel rows towards him:  
It was half past four, and the grey day was dying gloriously, its western clouds all broken 
into narrowing purple strata before a wide-spreading saffron clearness, which in the sky 
had a monumental calm, but on the river, with its changing objects, was reflected as 
luminous movement, the alternate flash of ripples or currents, the sudden glow of the 
brown sail, the passage of laden barges from blackness into colour, making an active 
response to the brooding glory. 
 
The scene then shifts to Daniel’s point of view, allowing him to take in the prophetic sight of 
Mordecai’s brightly lit face and spiritually emaciated body. The text returns to the perspective of 
Mordecai, who recognizes Daniel’s face as the face of prior visions. His prophecy is fulfilled: 
“The prefigured friend had come from the golden background, and had signalled to him: the rest 
was to be” (459-60). Yet Eliot’s new didactic approach comes with complications. 
 
The Problems of Eliot’s New Didactic Approach 
 
The recurrent image of Mordecai’s visions, a figure “darkly painted against a golden 
sky,” is, in my reading, Eliot’s version of a heroic landscape for the nineteenth century (441-42). 
Classical landscapes are sometimes described as “heroic” for their scenes of legendary history.  
Eliot superimposes an idealized human figure against a charged sky to produce a contemporary 
heroic landscape. Yet a fracture opens between foreground and background, which represent 
competing ideas about the source of idealism. The prophetic scenes of Daniel Deronda contain 
different accounts of how national identity is produced. One inheres in the figure of Daniel; the 
other is represented by the glowing river scene behind him. The idealized figure has been more 
discussed: centered in it is Eliot’s consideration of hereditary identity, perpetuated through 
Darwinian descent. The novel suggests that it is Daniel’s pedigree that makes him a fit leader for 
his people. Pulling against this idea is the notion that national identity is an effect of one’s 
environmental and cultural surroundings and a Darwinian adaptation to habitat. I find in Eliot’s 
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last novel an early version of the argument about the import of heredity, centered in the portrait 
of Daniel, and of environment, contained in the novel’s landscapes. 
Eliot’s idealized portrait of Daniel relates to the neoclassical idea that history painting 
addresses the viewer rhetorically through vivid images of heroic men. Yet the figure of Daniel 
stands in uneasy relation to the tradition of neoclassicism since Eliot omits its most elevated 
subject, heroism in action. Daniel goes on to spend more time with Mordecai and Mirah, and 
finally to discover his Jewish heritage and realize Mordecai’s hopes. Yet the figure remains 
problematic at the end of the novel, as Daniel prepares to leave England with uncertain plans. As 
readers have noticed, the possibility of action on a public scale is postponed. It is impossible to 
know what Daniel and Mirah, his bride, do in the East. In any case, he is able to serve as a model 
for the English in a limited way because Eliot portrays his nationalism as at least in part a racial 
trait. Once he decides to go to the East, his attention is divided between Gwendolen and his new 
sense of unspecified vocation. Suzanne Graver writes that this diminishment of sympathy 
constitutes a “heresy” for Eliot, “an unorthodoxy in violation of her own credo” (146). Yet Eliot 
seems to purposefully revise her earlier views, presenting sympathy as an initial virtue that is 
ultimately unable to produce the sense of social wholeness that is her focus in this novel. Daniel 
has “the stamp of rarity in a subdued fervour of sympathy,” and under his direction, Gwendolen 
becomes more sympathetic towards her family, remaining indifferent to all that does not involve 
her directly until the very end (149). She continually worries that he will be remote from her. 
“Will you sit near me?” she asks after Grandcourt drowns (588). She insists, “You must be near” 
(590). Daniel delights in “meeting the wish of beings near to him,” but he tires of Gwendolen 
(628). He looks “miserable” as he promises to visit her (649). His departure does not harm the 
novel’s moral program, because his instruction in sympathy is only a partial education, and 
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Daniel learns to devote himself less to it. When he tells Gwendolen he plans to depart, it is a new 
sense of her distance from him that gives her a sense of a larger world.  
In a letter Eliot wrote two years after Middlemarch was published, she describes herself 
as an “aesthetic teacher” with the aim of making “mankind desire the social right.”47 Throughout 
the novel, Eliot plays on the common etymological root of “novel” and “newspaper,” with her 
newspapers allowing her to present a theory of the novel’s place in the social world. Various 
characters model ways of reading the news in England. Mrs. Meyrick, whose parlor on the 
Thames becomes a “temple” when the sun is on the river, is a “great reader of news” and has a 
refined ethical and aesthetic sensibility (194; 675). The complacent Gascoignes, in contrast, fail 
to see to trouble before them as they sit “running their eyes over the Guardian or the Clerical 
Gazette” (59). Vignettes in which visionaries read newspapers by implication confer value on 
novels. Mordecai is reading “yesterday’s Times” with a “physiognomy as that might possibly 
have been seen in a prophet of the Exile” when Daniel first sees him in a London bookstore 
(356). As Daniel becomes “a part of her conscience,” Gwendolen finds him “looking over a 
newspaper” (386). Daniel Deronda suggests that the modern British nation has failed to cohere 
and thus brings its own worth into doubt, since print has proven to be an inadequate social bond. 
Yet Eliot maintains the claim of prose to social utility even as she articulates its limits. The 
narrator challenges readers to look for prophecy in prose, writing, “To glory in a prophetic vision 
of knowledge covering the earth, is an easier exercise of believing imagination than to see its 
beginnings in newspaper placards” (352). This passage seems to allude to the novel’s prophetic 
passages, claimed to be capable only of sparking a perception of social unity. The narrator also 
remonstrates that prophetic prose is often ignored when, at the close, she proposes that “the 
larger destinies of mankind” have “lain aloof in newspapers and other neglected reading” (747).  
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 Daniel Deronda’s philosophy of mind begins (and ends) Eliot’s search for a supplement 
to sympathy, a broader mental perspective. The novel ends without a mechanism of social 
binding comparable to sympathy, but seeks to provide a conceptual framework for its discovery. 
Despite its idealism, the novel is in a sense Eliot’s most skeptical work, both in its dark portrayal 
of England and in its unfinished, imperfect quality, which suggests growing uncertainty about 
the claims of fiction itself. Eliot expresses her uncertain hopes through a final sunset image with 
Daniel and Gwendolen in Genoa, midway between western European England and Daniel’s 
future home in the East.48 In this scene, Gwendolen’s own frightening recurrent prophecies are 
fulfilled with the drowning of her husband. As she is pulled from the water, Daniel walks by, 
having just met his mother and learned the fact about his ancestry that will allow him to marry 
Mirah and dedicate his life to “some effort” at “restoring a political existence” to the Jews (746-
47). Behind Gwendolen, “the sun had set behind a bank of cloud, and only a faint yellow light 
was giving its farewell kisses to the waves, which were agitated by an active breeze” (638). 
Turner made a watercolor of Genoa with a lemon sky over the sea, among other images of the 
Italian city. This last sunset in Daniel Deronda, however, calls to mind one of many Turner 
paintings of disaster at sea, a late landscape with a pale yellow sky, The Morning After the Wreck 
(1835-45).49 While Turner’s morning setting suggests renewal, Eliot’s fading sunset represents 
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The Collapse of Framework in The Woodlanders 
 
 
Previously, I compared Locke’s account of his study, where he looks down at the page, to 
Ruskin’s gaze at the walls of his study, hung with pictures. Relevant to this chapter is the 
attention Ruskin and Thomas Hardy pay to carpets on the floor. Textiles have been a metaphor 
par excellence for patterns in art. In describing his austere upbringing in his autobiography, 
Praeterita, Ruskin writes that at age five or six, he could occupy himself “contentedly in tracing 
the squares and comparing the colours of my carpet…. The carpet, and what patterns I could find 
in bed-covers, dresses, or wall-papers to be examined, were my chief resources” (12). Ruskin 
thus invents the child who prefigures the aesthetically gifted adult. In the autobiography The 
Early Life of Thomas Hardy (1928), Hardy conceives a balance between nature and invention 
through the following metaphor for artistic work: “As in looking at a carpet, by following one 
colour a certain pattern is suggested, by following another colour, another; so in life the seer 
should watch that pattern among general things which his idiosyncrasy moves him to observe, 
and describe that alone. This is, quite accurately, a going to Nature; yet the result…is purely the 
product of the writer’s own mind” (198).1 This chapter proposes that a crucial pattern in The 
Woodlanders (1887) is, paradoxically, the breakdown of design.2 The Woodlanders displays this 
breakdown in Hardy’s treatment of the character Edgar Fitzpiers, and thematizes fracture in the 
wooded landscapes. 
The doctor Fitzpiers is a character whose fictional life lacks design; he is, in fact, two 
significantly distinct characters under one name. The man who returns to the wife he abandoned, 
Grace Melbury, is fully a new character, and there are cues that we are meant to read him in this 
way. He begins the novel as an idealist in the German style. His second incarnation is a figure of 
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shrunken empiricism. Through this character, I argue, Hardy represents a splitting between 
empiricism and idealism that took place in British intellectual culture from about the 1860s on.3 
The division in Fitzpiers’s character is, in my reading, Hardy’s skeptical response to the mid-
Victorian drive to bring empiricism and idealism into accord. Hardy’s own highly empirical 
approach to life and art is rarely in question. He states in a note, sounding very much like Hume, 
“I have no philosophy—merely what I have often explained to be a confused heap of 
impressions.”4 Most scholars agree with Francis O’Gorman that for Hardy, “empirical, 
experienced, terrestrial existence was the only reality,” and the narration of The Woodlanders 
reflects this, with its attention to appearances and the limits of their legibility.5  
The Woodlanders expresses a profound mistrust of the aspiration towards an empiricism 
that could accommodate ideals. I argue that Hardy depicts how aesthetic frameworks that had 
been built to organize experience were breaking down through the geometry, and especially the 
lines, of the novel’s settings.6 A highly visual novelist, as has been noted many times, Hardy 
refers to two related ways of structuring drawn and painted images, that of classical perspective 
and the grid.7 Traditional means of achieving order, Hardy makes these conventions shatter in his 
images of the woodland landscape. As Victorians had turned to aesthetic paradigms to give ideal 
shape to experience, as I have argued with regard to Ruskin and Eliot, Hardy deploys aesthetic 
paradigms to present the disintegration of form.8  
Before proceeding to my reading of The Woodlanders, it is necessary to draw the outlines 
of a particular ongoing tension between empiricism and idealism in the late nineteenth century. 
While Ruskin and Eliot—as well as Mill—had sought to reconcile this tension, the party lines 
had been drawn decades earlier with Mill’s essays on Bentham and Coleridge, as A.M. Quinton 
and Rick Rylance point out.9 The school of experience faced the school of intuition, which was 
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also represented by the Scottish common sense philosophers and Kant. Both Quinton, writing on 
idealism, and Rylance, focused on the science of psychology, portray the late-century iteration of 
the contest as largely provoked by the remarkable scientific developments taking place after mid-
century in Britain. Beginning in the 1860s, the philosophical tradition known as British idealism 
arose in the tradition of Kant and Hegel within academic circles. Rylance characterizes the 
attacks of idealists such as T.H. Green on such scientifically minded thinkers as Herbert Spencer 
and G. H. Lewes as a response to the event that the “refurbished realism promulgated by Spencer 
and others, flowing with the general scientific tide, was bidding powerfully for the current of 
mainstream opinion, including that of liberally minded religious thinkers.”10 Empiricism had 
since Locke at least, and especially in the case of Hume, led to fears of a godless materialism 
among the devout. Nineteenth-century scientific empiricism triggered such fears, which again 
found an outlet in anti-empirical philosophy. Kant and especially Hegel, newly available, seemed 
to show the way to an alternative.11 
In the later nineteenth century, then, empiricism became a scientist empiricism, and 
idealism became the province of academic philosophy, and took the purer German form, with its 
notions of the a priori and the Absolute.12 According to Quinton, the first major works of this 
strand of idealism were published in the mid-1870s and at that time entered a vigorous 
competition with scientific psychology. The movement of idealist theory was the “short-term 
victor” against psychology and the tradition of British empiricism, yet experimental science was 
the “mainstream development in the long run.”13 While I will return to the competition between 
idealism and the science of psychology, science is represented by medicine in The Woodlanders.  
As Tabitha Sparks shows in her study The Doctor in the Victorian Novel, the doctor 
represents “the empirical mindset” in Victorian literature. She treats the “doctor-character as a 
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human index of modern material and physiological knowledge.” Novelists tend to choose the 
doctor over the scientist because the former has to approach natural knowledge through 
individual human cases, and thus indicates the “usefulness, authority, and application of 
naturalistic knowledge.” Sparks outlines a revolution in Victorian medicine in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, which “instituted an epistemological shift...and embraced, or at least 
confronted, a newly rational and empirical consciousness.” In the second half of the century, and 
particularly after 1870, the scientific doctor’s authority is seen to come at the cost of isolation 
from society and morality.14 The best known doctor in Victorian fiction, Middlemarch’s Tertius 
Lydgate, represents a talented scientific mind that comes to nothing because he fails to read the 
character of the woman he marries. In my reading, Fitzpiers’s plot ironically reverses this 
storyline. First, he is an idealist unsuited to his occupation. His rebirth as an empiricist brings 
him into accord with his wife and surroundings, but this is not, Hardy suggests, a great success. 
 
Fitzpiers, the Idealist 
 
Through most of The Woodlanders, Fitzpiers is a country doctor with a tiny practice and 
strong philosophical leanings. He is described as philosophical a number of times. First, Grace’s 
father, George Melbury, responds to superstitious claims by neighbors that Fitzpiers has 
bargained with the devil and practices black arts. Melbury responds, “He’s only a gentleman 
fond of science, and philosophy, and poetry, and, in fact, every kind of knowledge.”15 The 
doctor’s experiments reflect the route empiricism took into the sciences in the late nineteenth 
century, and Hardy here sets up a conflict between the intellectual pursuits of science and 
philosophy that will emerge. (I will return to his interest in poetry at the end of this chapter.) 
After Grammer Oliver, Melbury’s servant, describes Fitzpiers to Grace, the young woman 
“allowed her reasoning fancy to play in vague eddies that shaped the doings of the 
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philosopher…. It was strange to her to come back from the world to Little Hintock, and find in 
one of its nooks, like a tropical plant in a hedgerow, a nucleus of advanced ideas and practices 
which had nothing in common with the life around. Chemical experiments, anatomical projects, 
and metaphysical conceptions had found a strange home here” (51). Again, science and 
philosophy are placed side by side, but uncomfortably joined because Fitzpiers is shown to have 
an aptitude for only one at a time.  
Once he appears, and through most of the novel, Hardy assigns Fitzpiers an anti-
empirical, metaphysical mindset that is atypical for a doctor in a Victorian novel. His approach 
to scientific thought seems to be pseudo-scientific, with poor results. Grammer’s account of him 
includes one example: he has rationally but inauspiciously chosen a location for his practice by 
using a technical drawing instrument (a significant object in this novel, as I will show). After 
marking the practices of four other doctors on a map, Fitzpiers then “took a pair of compasses, 
and found the exact middle of the country that was left between these bounds” (50). The novel 
also implies that he is a poor doctor precisely because he is not an empiricist. The narrator states 
this judgment explicitly: “His eyes were dark and impressive, and beamed with the light either of 
energy, or of susceptivity—it was difficult to say which; it might have been chiefly the latter. 
That quick, glittering, empirical eye, sharp for the surface of things if for nothing beneath, he had 
not. But whether his apparent depths of vision were real, or only an artistic accident of his 
corporeal moulding, nothing but his deeds could reveal…. His presence bespoke the 
philosopher.” When the narrator comments that Fitzpiers “was a rare kind of gentleman and 
doctor to have descended, as from the clouds” onto Little Hintock, the reference is both to his 
prestigious status and to his orientation away from the earthly (99). Right after this passage, the 
doctor is called to the house of John South, whose health has apparently been damaged by his 
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fear that a swaying tree will crush his house. This is one of only two highly contrasting scenes 
that shows Fitzpiers at work as a doctor; one precedes his departure for the continent, and the 
other follows. Fitzpiers at this point demands that the tree be felled, and South dies the next day. 
While there may or may not be a connection, Fitzpiers believes his cure killed John South.16 He 
certainly did not understand South’s case.  
 Soon, Fitzpiers is representing himself as an idealist. On a ride with the woodsman Giles 
Winterborne, who shares Grace as an object of affection, the doctor describes love as “joy 
accompanied with an idea which we project against any suitable object in the line of our vision, 
just as the rainbow iris is projected against an oak, ash, or elm tree indifferently.” (This is one of 
the novel’s clear parallels between the verticals forms of human and tree.) He declares, “I am in 
love with something in my own head, and no thing-in-itself outside it at all,” showing that he is 
familiar with Kant’s ideas. When Winterborne asks whether it is “part of a country doctor’s 
duties to learn that view of things,” Hardy has the opportunity to emphasize, through his 
response, that it is not (113-114). The narrator implies he is a better empiricist than Fitzpiers 
through his analysis of character. He states that “Miss Melbury’s view of the doctor as a 
merciless, unwavering, irresistible scientist was not quite in accordance with fact. The real 
Doctor Fitzpiers was a man of too many hobbies to show likelihood of rising to any great 
eminence in the profession he had chosen, or even to acquire any wide practice in the rural 
district he had marked out as his field of survey for the present.” He is fickle, but “had lately 
plunged into abstract philosophy with much zest” (118-19). When Grace has an errand as his 
house soon after, she finds him sleeping and stands “gazing with much embarrassment at the 
reclining philosopher.” She is a “sensitive” beholder but her experience is insufficient to assess 
him. She understands his rarity, but “the occasions on which Grace had observed men of this 
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stamp were when she had been far away from Hintock; and even then such examples as had met 
her eye were at a distance” (122). Assuming that he had saw her in a dream, while he actually 
glimpsed her reflected in a mirror, he reports that he thought, “What a lovely creature!—the 
design is for once carried out. My thoughts ran in that direction because I had been reading the 
work of a transcendental philosopher last night; and I dare say it was that dose of Idealism that I 
received from it that made me scarcely able to distinguish between reality and fancy” (125). He 
will go on to project ideals onto her, and then onto their neighbor Felice Charmond.  
Before Grace leaves his house, Fitzpiers has her look in a microscope at a sliver of John 
South’s brain. He says he is “endeavoring to carry on simultaneously the study of physiology and 
transcendental philosophy, the material world and the ideal, so as to discover a point of contact 
between them” (125-27). This declaration stands as a précis of a major Victorian ambition. By 
placing it in the mouth of a dilettante, Hardy casts a look of skepticism at this aspiration; it is 
simply modish.17 In fact, Hardy splits the two world-views of transcendental idealism and 
empiricism across Fitzpiers’s character. By this point in the century, science and metaphysics 
had split into specialized and separate pursuits. Fitzpiers may believe that he is equally 
committed to empiricism and idealism, but he has so far been shown to be an idealist. He is 
superficially scientific: at the beginning of the next chapter, the narrator says he is scientific in 
the sense that he is “ready and zealous to interrogate all physical manifestions; but primarily he 
was an idealist. He believed that beyond the imperfect lay the perfect.” Hardy plays on a 
philosophical term when he has Fitzpiers say of Grace, “This phenomenal girl will be the light of 
my life while I am at Hintock.” In Kant’s scheme, phenomena are the appearances that constitute 
experience, and this line suggests that the disciple of Kant will experience her according to pre-
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existing mental schema.18 Hardy reiterates her status as “an object of contemplation” (128). The 
references to Fitzpiers as a philosopher then end, and the novel moves into its marriage plot. 
 The doctor’s thoughts of Grace are consistent with his detachment from the sensible 
world. As “he dreamed and mused till his consciousness seemed to occupy the whole space of 
the woodland round,” he thinks of living a calm, content, domestic life with Grace in Little 
Hintock (134). As the summer progresses, he continues to be “enchanted enough to fancy” that 
“the Idea had for once completely fulfilled itself in the objective substance—which he had 
hitherto deemed an impossibility” (137). But after he marries Grace and meets Mrs. Charmond, 
the latter becomes the subject of his daydreams. She is vividly present to his mind as he speaks 
to Grace, and his memories of several days they spent together long ago “opens up all sorts of 
imaginings.” Mrs. Charmond participates in “picturing the possibilities of that time,” and asks 
him not to “spoil the picture.” The narrator writes that they turned the short span into “a canvas 
for infinite fancies, idle dreams, and pretty alluring assertions that could never be proved or 
disproved” (181-83). Grace discovers him looking in the direction of Hintock House, his lips 
moving “as on some impassioned visionary scheme” (189). She had idolized him, and he has a 
new idol: this is Hardy’s depiction of idealism in the novel. As Fitzpier’s passion for Mrs. 
Charmond continues, and Grace begins to idolize Winterborne as the “fruit-god and the wood-
god” (258), Fitzpiers makes a raving speech that indicates a shift in his world-view. “I used to 
read more in metaphysics than anybody within fifty miles: and since I gave that up there’s 
nobody can match me in the whole county of South Wessex as a scientist,” he claims (236). The 
reader learns then that he has given up metaphysics to concentrate on science, though his 
idealism continues to rule and disrupt his life. But after he and Mrs. Charmond flee, he returns to 
Little Hintock a different man. I will return to this new character. 
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Geometry and the Breakdown of Perspective 
 
The characters of The Woodlanders are continuously shifting in position and viewpoint, 
and the natural world around them is constantly changing in appearance, sometimes gradually 
and predictably and at other times with surprising violence. Embedded in this narrative of 
metamorphosis are allusions to artistic methods of ordering and stabilizing images of the world, 
yet they will not stay in place. Scholarship has long noted the prominent allusions to paintings 
and painting styles in Hardy’s novels,19 and associated The Woodlanders with European 
Impressionism.20 Alastair Smart finds that Hardy first refers to Impressionism in 1886, when a 
society of painters who introduced French Impressionist principles to England was founded and 
he visited their exhibitions. In Smart’s reading and in others, Impressionist painting is a relevant 
analogy to the prose of The Woodlanders. Smart writes that a description of the girl Marty South 
makes use of “one of the principal canons of Impressionist theory—that all forms lying outside 
the immediate focus of the gaze are inevitably blurred and indistinct, and that it is therefore 
legitimate for the painter, having selected his focal point, to treat them as such” (278-79). The 
novel also dismantles the notion of the stable vantage offered by linear perspective. Given his 
architectural training, Hardy would have noticed that Impressionists were abandoning and 
distorting the laws of linear perspective, still taught in European academies.21 Scholars have 
pointed out that the novel is marked throughout by abrupt shifts in vantage, but without 
mentioning the echoes of the language of perspective, which register the loss of one world-view 
as Hardy puts forward his own.22 
Pertinent to my argument is the architectural training Hardy glossed over in The Early 
Life of Thomas Hardy. He became apprenticed to an architect who specialized in church 
restoration in 1856, and spent four years in training. In the chapter “Early Life and Architecture,” 
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he writes that he spent more time reading than drawing. Despite the greater demands of “surveys, 
measurements, and sketches of old churches,” he reports, he maintained his interest in the 
classics. He discusses only literary acquaintances. Dividing his life into three parts: “the 
professional life, the scholar’s life, and the rustic life,” he gives the first little attention (40-41). 
In a chapter on “Work in London,” he writes of beginning work as an architect’s assistant, a 
position in which he remained for five years, in an office specializing in the design and 
restoration of churches, usually in a Gothic Revival style. He felt that “architectural drawing in 
which the actual designing had no great part was monotonous and mechanical” and “reverted to 
the literary pursuits that he had been compelled to abandon” (61). Some readers have followed 
Hardy’s lead, and consider his practice of architecture a burdensome necessity, obstructing his 
true literary affinities.23 Yet the Life inadvertently points out the skills he developed in his early 
professional life, and the amount of time he spent employing them. While the previous chapter 
lights up the persistence of the classical tradition in the nineteenth century, arguing for the 
existence of a “classical” Eliot interested in the rhetoric of ekphrasis, the tradition overall was in 
decline. Hardy dramatizes its inaccessibility in Jude the Obscure, as the province of a small 
circle of professional academics in rarified spaces. Yet in the perspective drawing that was part 
of architectural training, craft meets the classical tradition.24  
Hardy compares the town of Sherton-Abbas to an architectural drawing in the market 
scene that comes early in The Woodlanders: Winterbourne “drove on ahead into the streets, the 
churches, the abbey, and other mediaeval buildings on this clear bright morning having the linear 
distinctness of architectural drawings, as if the original dream and vision of the conceiving 
master-mason were were for a brief hour flashed down through the centuries to an unappreciative 
age. Winterbourne saw their eloquent look on this day of transparency, but could not construe it” 
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(37). Momentarily, Hardy imagines the stable design of a higher intelligence outside of human 
life. As David Summers writes, artistic naturalism implies “universality of audience based on 
presumed universality of a certain structure of perception” inherent in the viewer, and 
perspective is the most generalized and abstract form of naturalism (316-17). Samuel Edgerton 
notes that while perspective was a tool for accuracy, the order of the perspectival setting was also 
a “visual metaphor” for a “superior existence.”25 But the structural design breaks down or 
dissolves, in a variety of ways, over the course of Hardy’s novel. Here, he immediately turns the 
notion of a masterly point of view on its head by suggesting that the most accurate perspective is 
none at all. The narrator introduces Grace by stating, “From the highest point of view, to 
describe a human being…how impossible.”  
Perspective was a central skill in English art instruction in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, and Ruskin provides a Victorian treatment of this skill.26 He published The Elements 
of Perspective, “arranged for the use of schools” and intended to meet a “want, among students 
of Drawing, of a written code of accurate Perspective Law,” in 1859. It consists mainly of a 
series of technical problems, with an introduction. Hardy shows his familiarity with such guides 
in The Well-Beloved, whose protagonist Pierston looks at a road “tapering to a vanishing point, 
like a lesson in perspective” (108). As I have shown, Ruskin’s voice can change drastically when 
he is instructing students rather than evaluating known artists. While Modern Painters 
dismantles the belief that a superlative landscape resembles a scene framed by window, his 
perspective manual opens with that very idea.27 He begins with an optical experiment of the type 
one finds throughout Modern Painters:  
When you begin to read this book, sit down very near the window, and shut the 
window.... Whatever the view may be, we shall find enough in it for an illustration of the 
first principles of perspective (or, literally, of ‘looking through’). Every pane of your 
window may be considered, if you choose, as a glass picture; and what you see through 
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it, as painted on its surface. And if, holding your head still, you extend your hand to the 
glass, you may, with a brush full of any thick color, trace, roughly, the lines of the 
landscape on the glass.28  
 
In The Woodlanders, Hardy uses windows, and the views in and out of them, to dramatize 
destabilizing shifts of perspective in space. Scholars have pointed out his tendency to draw, and 
disrupt, frames in his novels.29 The first window of The Woodlanders is drawn for a “spectator” 
behind a van that picks up a visitor to Little Hintock in the first scene. This spectator, says the 
narrator, would be able to see “through its interior, a square piece of the same sky and landscape 
that he saw without, but intruded on by the profiles of the seated passengers” unaware that “their 
mannerisms and facial peculiarities were sharply defined to the public eye” (7). Hardy seems 
hyperconscious of this public eye throughout the novel, and to be endeavoring always to prevent 
it from resting for long at any vantage. In a notable scene already mentioned, Grace looks out of 
her window at night to see the light from Fitzpiers’s window, its position directly across from her 
creating the sense that she is parallel to him. Winterborne, on the contrary, looks up at Grace 
through her window (55). He and Fitzpiers together see her pull her curtains (115). Later in the 
novel, Grace and Winterbourne interact through his window when he gives her shelter, and 
Grace throws gravel at the windowpanes of her father’s house to summon Fitzpiers to 
Winterbourne’s aid. 
In the introduction to The Elements of Perspective, Ruskin explains the technique of one-
point perspective, which fixes the sizes of objects by “absolute mathematical law.” To employ 
perspective, an artist must occupy a fixed position and expect the same of the viewer. Ruskin 
tells the reader to hold his head very still and shut one eye, since “perspective can...only be quite 
right, by being calculated for one fixed position of the eye of the observer.” The artist must 
establish the “Sight-Line,” representing the level of the eye of the observer, the “Station-Line,” 
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the line on which the observer stands, and the “Station-Point,” that distance at which the picture 
is meant to be seen (235-246).30 
Hardy eradicates the stationary point of view in his novels, with the point one 
geometrical motif related to perspective in The Woodlanders. Criticism has used the term “point 
of view” to refer to the metaphorical outlooks of fiction but also to the visual vantages which so 
often represent them in Hardy’s fiction. The narrator mocks Grace, who daydreams of the 
continent, when he comments that “the homely farmsteads did not quite hold their own from her 
present twenty-year point of survey” (44). Fitzpiers’s point of view swings dramatically. After 
re-encountering Mrs. Charmond in Little Hintock, he “found himself regarding that hamlet in a 
new way—from the Hintock house point of view rather than from his own and the Melburys’” 
(180). The notion of a point of view recurs with skepticism about its reliability and finality. 
Points indicate not only station-points where characters stand, but what what could be called 
vanishing points, taken not in the technical sense of a point on the horizontal line, but as the most 
distant point visible to a character. They tend to appear in moments related to error, as though 
characters simply cannot see far enough. The “point of light” that shines in Fitzpiers’s window 
draws Grace’s attention (49). From Grace’s perspective on the ground, Winterborne in a tree 
becomes “a dark gray spot on the light grey zenith” (92). Points of other kinds indicate the limits 
of human judgment. Fitzpiers has chosen Little Hintock by pinpointing the locations of four 
other doctors on a map (50). Winterborne decides he must “bring matters to a point” with Grace 
(67). There is the point of contact Fitzpiers hopes to discover between the material world and the 
ideal (127). 
 






While the Impressionists who influenced Hardy during this period built up paintings 
through patches of color, often producing them through small strokes that just touch brush to 
canvas, The Woodlanders is a novel filled with lines. Light creates its own lines: “Pencils of light 
streamed out of the windows” of the Melbury house (46). The moon’s rays touch the houses of 
Little Hintock (68). Characters becomes their outlines, seen or unseen: The narrator calls Grace a 
“conjectural creature who had little to do with the outlines presented to Sherton eyes: a shape in 
the gloom” most clearly apprehended through fragmentary elements by an astute observer (39-
40). The unreliable outline relates to the theme of the unfixedness of line. As Joan Grundy 
writes, the “firm outline” is rare in the novel, for forms dissolve and lose solidity (59). Later, the 
narrator notes that Winterbourne recognizes Mrs. Charmond less by her outline than by her 
groom’s dress (55). Grace and Marty see her in outline with her false hair (95). Hardy uses 
language related to line, literal and metaphorical, to arrange the marriage plot; it is especially 
prominent in the scenes that set it up. He uses it with reference to the paths the characters take: 
Winterbourne, Grace, and Marty have “converging” destines when they meet on a road (46). 
There is the “line” of Winterbourne and Grace’s course through the woods, and the “line” of 
Mrs. Charmond’s path as it meets Melbury and Grace’s (52-55). The curved paths of the 
woodlands contribute to disorientation in a number of scenes where characters get lost.31  
However, straight lines comprise the scaffolding in the novel I wish to discuss. In the 
description of the landscape at the beginning of chapter 7, overloaded with the imagery of lines, 
“angles were taking the place of curves, and reticulations of surfaces—a change constituting a 





retrogressive step from the art of an advanced school of painting to that of the Pacific Islander” 
(52). The comment is ironic, since the novel represents the acquisition of culture—in Grace,  
Fitzspiers, and Mrs. Charmond—as destructive. The reticulated surfaces relate to a device used 
to render drawings in perspective. Albrecht Dürer illustrated the device in a woodcut showing 
how the human figure can be drawn in perspective by the use of a framed net between artist and  
 
Figure 9. Albrecht Dürer, Painter's Manual (1525) 
 
 
subject.32 The paper before the artist is marked with a grid, and the artist transfers the images 
seen in the squares of the net onto the corresponding squares on the paper. Horizontals and 
verticals also comprise the majority of lines in several kinds of architectural drawing in which 
perspective plays no role. The collection of architectural drawings by Hardy held at the 
University of Texas at Austin mainly include floor plans and scaled drawings of the sides of 
churches viewed head-on, which do not require perspective. In addition to floor plans, there are 
exterior views, labeled “north elevation,” “south elevation,” etc. There are also interior views, 
such as one labeled “Transverse section looking east,” and working drawings for masons. A 




Figure 10. Thomas Hardy, Church of St Juliot, Cornwall, in its present state 
 
 
In the landscapes of the The Woodlanders, horizontal and vertical lines in motion depict 
the loss of stable lines within any single vantage. Hardy is, I believe, especially concerned to 
include verticals, which are fewer in country landscapes, for the sake of creating a grid pattern. 
So while the roads and paths conspicuous in many of his novels cut across landscapes, he finds a 
means to upend the road in the first sentence of The Woodlanders by situating it geographically 
and arranging it north to south; it runs “almost in a meridional line.” The Woodlanders is special 
among Hardy’s novels in its condensed forest scenery, which serves in part to establish a 
pronounced vertical axis, together with the more diminutive and fragile humans who live in the 
woods.33 The reader is repeatedly reminded of the verticals of the trees, hemming in the 
characters and obstructing their vision and movement. Hardy also draws horizontal branches, 
with the lower limbs in the same passage “stretching over the road with easeful horizontality, as 
though reclining on the insubstantial air” (5). The emphasis will be repeated; later, Marty looks 
at “the bare bough of a tree stretched horizontally” at sunset and Winterborne and Fitzpiers pass 
under a “horizontal limb” (68, 112). These linear patterns form a grid, but the design is unfixed. 
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When Winterbourne travels to the market to sell apple trees and cider, a tree is “tied across the 
gig.” This image forms part of a pattern in the novel in which lines rotate in orientation: it is an 
image of changeability. Hardy then emphasizes the horizontal branches again, the gig moving 
“under the boughs” (35). The tree is righted again as Marty South sees Winterbourne in the 
marketplace, “holding the tree like an ensign” amidst other sellers with boughs rising above their 
heads (38).  
 The scenes of John South’s illness and death are structured around such rotating lines. 
The man fixates on the idea that the tall tree growing in front of his house “will blow down and 
kill us,” as Marty reports. When Winterborne comes into the room, South is “pillowed up in a 
chair between the bed and the window, opposite the latter, towards which his face was turned.” 
Facing the tree that consumes his thoughts, he is poised between an upright and a flat position. 
He says of the tree, “He’ll come down upon us, and squat us dead,” his “illusion” based on an 
image of instability. When Winterborne follows his gaze, he sees the tree rocking in the wind. 
Winterborne’s solution is to cut off the lower branches. The destruction is meant to calibrate the 
relation between John South and the tree: the bare vertical line will stand more stably. The 
narrator describes the scene in detail, and its lines move violently: Winterborne “with a ladder 
climbed into the lower part of the tree, where he began lopping off…the lowest boughs. Each of 
these quivered under his attack, bent, cracked, and fell into the hedge. Having cut away the 
lowest tier he stepped off the ladder, climbed a few steps higher, and attacked those at the next 
level. Thus he ascended with the progress of his work far above the top off the ladder, cutting 
away his perches as he went, and leaving nothing but a bare stem below him” (89-91). This is 
one of the novel’s several vivid images of branches falling.  
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A shift-of-vantage scene follows, in which Grace breaks her engagement to Winterborne. 
She passes below the tree and looks up at him, and Winterborne mechanically moves higher into 
the fog, until “he could only just be discerned as a dark grey spot on the light grey zenith; he 
would have been altogether out of notice but for the stroke of his bill-hook, and the flight of a 
bough downward, and its crash upon the hedge at intervals” (92). The symbolism of the scene is 
multifold, even with regard to what it suggests about vision alone: it is in the obscurity of the fog 
and the positions of the two characters, with Grace’s upturned face an ironic reversal of how they 
stand in relation to each other in the social world.34 The crash of the branches is analogous to 
Grace’s severance of the engagement, but also has a place in a broader pattern of moving lines in 
the novel. The crash underscores that lines appearing secure are easily detached and displaced. 
The point is made more forcefully when Fitzpiers orders of the tree, “Down with it.” Keeping 
John South’s blind “down” as well, several men saw through the trunk. The next day, they lower 
the tree, and Hardy again makes the parallel between tree and man explicit. He writes, in the 
novel’s central image of dismantled form: “It was a business difficult to do quite silently; but it 
was done at last; and the elm of the same birth-year as the woodsman’s lay stretched upon the 
ground. The weakest idler that passed could now could now set foot on marks formerly made in 
the upper forks by the shoes of adventurous climbers only, once inaccessible nests could be 
examined microscopically, and on swaying extremities where birds alone had perched the 
bystanders sat down” (100). Tree and man are analogous, and both stand for a larger natural 
process of disintegration. Into the nineteenth century in Britain, many continued to believe the 
world was of God’s design. The Woodlanders is a world in which one can only watch the 
patterns of nature develop but mostly disintegrate. The suggestion is that Fitzpiers is mistaken in 
his orders to fell the swaying tree because to erase the world of contingency is to erase the world. 
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 The cumulative effect of the novels rising, rotating, shifting, and falling lines is that of a 
diagram disintegrating. Later, Fitzpier’s view of woodsmen “dragging away a large limb which 
had been snapped off a beech tree” instigates a bout of dissatisfaction with the world of Little 
Hintock (205). The process his affair sets in motion leads to a confrontation between Grace and 
Mrs. Charmond on one of the novel’s weaving paths, after which Grace finds she is lost. The 
narrator describes the unfamiliar elements she sees around her as alterations in line: “the 
transformation of outline had been great; old trees which were once landmarks had been felled or 
blown down, and the bushes which had then been small and scrubby were now large and 
overhanging” (225). Previous verticals have become horizontal, and there are new verticals. The 
theme reappears as Grace experiences a violent storm while she stays in Winterborne’s hut, in 
flight from Fitzpiers after his return. “The next morning Grace was at the window early,” and the 
windows of the hut frame views of disarray. “Dead boughs were scattered about like 
ichthyosauri in a museum, and beyond them were perishing wood-bine stems resembling old 
ropes. From the other window all she could see were more trees” and “more trees close together, 
wrestling for existence, their branches disfigured” (288).35 The narrator compares the setting to 
an exhibit in a natural history museum, but what is visible to Grace is a framed image of 
collapsed lines. Winterborne has also been left horizontal, lying on hay where Grace finds him, 
and then in bed.   
 
Fitzpiers, the Empiricist 
 
 The treatment of Fitzpiers at the end of the novel may be read as a portrait of an 
empiricist without stable structures for experience. The scene that follows Grace’s discovery of 
Winterbourne outdoors is the first that shows Fitzpiers after he returns to England and comes 
into the vicinity of Little Hintock. Before turning to this scene, it is necessary to move back to 
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the moment in the novel when Fitzpiers meets Grace. Once he sees her, his attention moves from 
“objects of the inner eye” to the outside world, and he “walked from one window to another” 
(120). This moment marks a shift towards empiricism, and brings out the theme that empirical 
condition involves a shifting perspective. Although, as I have shown, he continues to tend very 
strongly towards idealism during his courtship and after he marries Grace, the marriage plot sets 
him on a path towards empiricism. Soon after he learns of her existence, he watches her through 
the window, walking to his house and passing through the “garden-door” (123). Hardy’s fallen 
garden is one in which the ideal is unavailable but, I will suggest, very missed. J.B. Bullen places 
the novel in the tradition of pastoral elegy, writing that The Woodlanders “resembles an act of 
mourning for some kind of loss…it is the loss of a simple, primitive mode of perception—for a 
change which has come over the face of nature” (175-85). I find the same elegiac tone in the 
tone, but see its object slightly differently. To me, Hardy elegizes not the primitive mode of 
perception he assigns Winterbourne and Marty in contrast to an introspective, subjective modern 
view of the world, but a more historically available ability—the ability to aesthetically frame an 
orderly nature. 
 Later, after Grace finds Winterborne gravely ill, she asks where to find “a medical man, 
competent and near.” Previously, Fitzpiers was portrayed as incompetent professionally, poorly 
suited to his medical work. But the next paragraph declares, “There was one such man and only 
one, within accessible distance.” The narrator continues,  
One speciality of Fitzpiers was respected by Grace as much as ever: his professional skill. 
In this she was right. Had his persistence equaled his insight instead of being the 
spasmodic and fitful thing it was, fame and fortune need never had remained a wish with 
him. His freedom from conventional errors and crusted prejudices had indeed been such 
as to retard rather than accelerate his advance in Hintock and its neighborhood, where 
people could not believe that Nature effected cures, and that the doctor’s business was 




Suddenly, the novel provides a new assessment of his aptitudes. Somehow, between his 
departure from England and his return, he has become a highly skilled doctor, and his ability 
seems to be based on a newly empirical nature. When Grace takes him to Winterbourne’s 
sickbed, Fitzpiers’s “inspection was concluded in a mere glance.” He provides a precise synopsis 
of Winterborne’s condition and its progress up to that moment. He then draws an “inference” 
about Grace and Winterborne, provides Grace with a medicine to safeguard her, and departs 
(298). At the beginning of the next chapter, the drops cure Grace’s fever, and she remarks, “How 
clever he is!...Why could he not have had more principle so as to turn his great talents to good 
account! Perhaps he has saved my useless life” (305). In a few pages, Fitzpiers has become an 
empiricist who gives evidence of his gifts to affect the material world. 
In my reading, Hardy means us to understand the world of The Woodlanders as 
incoherent, and the a novel itself as lacking form, with his treatment of Fitzpiers drawing an 
intentional fissure. Hardy’s novels tend to describe obstacles to love and marriage, yet Fitzpiers 
and Grace remain married and seem to suit each other. They also suited each other early in the 
novel. Representing their minds in the geometrical terms that are so significant in the novel, the 
narrator says that Winterbourne immediately notices a “curious parallelism between Mr. 
Fitzpier’s manner and Grace’s” (114). After Winterborne’s death, Grace approaches Fitzpiers 
with a bad conscience about her possible role. His efficacy is again emphasized, by now to the 
point of farce: “The relief of consulting a skilled mind, the one professional man who had seen 
Giles at that time, would be immense” (311). Fitzpiers provides the precise yet uncertain 
empirical response that she is unlikely to have contributed, but the question is unanswerable. He 
then declares that he loves her in a new way, not related to her “material conditions,” but to her 
character “as revealed by closer observation” (315). Fitzpiers is led through observation to 
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accurate, if qualified, inference. Yet Hardy’s focus at the end of the novel is not the question of 
knowledge. He has already gone over this treacherous territory. Rather, the reader is in the realm 
of taste. This, Hardy suggests, is what is left to guide us. 
Grace and Fitzpiers are moderns, the doctor finally the representative of scientific 
empiricism, and the pair a portrait of where the empirical condition places its occupants. As 
Summers finds, the modern notion of taste descends from the Renaissance belief that judgment 
originates in the senses, and thus in the particular intellect (319). Taste is in a sense an alternative 
to knowledge, as represented by a fixed perspective.36 It is a concession to the sense of relativity 
produced by an empirical world-view that sees every mind as essentially self-contained. Grace 
marries Fitzpiers for the possibility he offers of a “refined and cultivated inner life, of subtle 
psychological intercourse” (156). The suggestion at the end is that she has this. “The tastes she 
had acquired from Fitzpiers had been imbibed so subtly that she hardly knew she possessed them 
till confronted by this contrast” of a tavern she visits with Winterborne. “How could she explain 
in the street of a market-town that it was her superficial and transitory taste which had been 
offended?” (264-65). Yet her taste is her most stable aspect. Fitzpiers describes his love a second 
time through a quotation, and Grace recognizes it as a line from Measure for Measure. There is 
then yet another “crash of a felled tree in the depths of the nearest wood” (315). Their 
reconciliation is stalled, but seems to in fact be assured from the moment Grace recognizes 
Shakespeare’s line. Fitzpiers tells her he will come “look at your window” every two weeks, 
placing her firmly in his line of focus. Once they decide to resume life as husband and wife, they 
agree to meet at the hotel she favors, though she worries, “I haven’t a brush or a comb or 
anything!” He may not value her for her material exterior, but she must be well groomed, and 
they will travel in style. The end of the novel establishes Marty as Winterborne’s “true 
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complement,” sharing a capacity for “intelligent intercourse with Nature,” but they are obvious 
exceptions in the world of The Woodlanders (306). While the novel ends with Marty at 
Winterborne’s grave, Grace is the center of interest, and the novel is primarily a comedy, but a 
bitter one.37 The ending of the novel suggests that judgment established through fashion is 





































1 While the autobiography was published under the name of Hardy’s wife, Michael Millgate has 
shown it to be his own work. This passage comes from 1882. J. Hillis Miller takes the passage as 
Hardy’s definitive statement of an art that is at once “objective and subjective” in Thomas 
Hardy: Distance and Desire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 258. As Peter Garrett 
notes, empiricism is a “subject-centered philosophical position,” and empiricist debate was 
reinvigorated in the nineteenth century by an “understanding of the subject at the center of it” as 
unfixed and mutable. Victorian Empiricism, 32. These ideas are reflected in criticism on Hardy. 
J.B. Bullen writes that Hardy raises questions about the relation of eye and mind, related to the 
subjective nature of experience. His narrators draw attention to the fact that the eye is “fallible,” 
“distorts what it sees,” and “tends to observe parts rather than wholes” The Expressive Eye: 
Fiction and Perception in the Work of Thomas Hardy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 11-12. 
He connects the theme to the empiricist tradition, pointing out that Hardy’s notes show the 
“ultimate sources” of his ideas on sight are Locke, Berkeley, and Hume (66-79). Sheila Berger 
argues that “as an empiricist, he stressed the senses—primarily the visual sense—as the basis for 
knowledge,” in spite of his skepticism, but she conflates “knowledge” and individual “meaning” 
as the fruit of “subjective perception” Thomas Hardy and Visual Structures: Framing, 
Disruption, Process (New York: New York University Press, 1990), 11.  
2 Peter Garratt remarks that the tendency of Victorian empiricists to reflect on “the problematic 
construction of reality” affects the texture of their narratives, “destabilizing narrative forms.” 
Texts dramatize the principles of limitation and provisionality. Victorian Empiricism, 21.  
3 Bullen finds a similar theme in Jude the Obscure (1895), with Jude shifting between the ideal 
and real and unable to reconcile them. Expressive Eye, 241. This chapter suggests Hardy was 
ruminating on the problem a decade earlier. 
4 In Phillip Mallett, “Hardy and Philosophy,” Companion to Thomas Hardy, ed. Wilson 
(Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010). 
5 Francis O’Gorman, “Hardy and Realism’ in Thomas Hardy in Context, ed. Phillip 
Mallett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 121. 
6 Bullen writes that Hardy’s pictorialism is in the service of symbolism. It is an “anti-naturalistic 
device. For Hardy, the literal transcription of the physical world was uninteresting.” Expressive 
Eye, 6. Michael Irwin considers Hardy’s ability to create an illusion of the physical world 
through description to be central to his fiction, but adds that the landscape constitutes a 
“conceptual background” that should be read metaphorically. Reading Hardy’s Landscapes 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), ix; 14.  
7 Penelope Vigar finds that Hardy “employs techniques comparable to those of the painter—
chiaroscuro, perspective, effects of distancing and balance” in The Novels of Thomas Hardy: 
Illusion and Reality (London: Athlone Press, 1974), 15. Bullen compares Eliot and Hardy, 
writing that she is a “conceptualist” and he is a “technist,” “more engaged with the technical 
means of creating images. He employs terms of painting and art criticism such as “line,” 
“perspective,” “foreground,” and many color words. Expressive Eye, 7. Alastair Smart and Joan 
Grundy also make note of the technical language of painting in his novels. See “Pictorial 
Imagery in the Novels of Thomas Hardy.” The Review of English Studies 12, no. 47 (Aug. 1961): 
271; and Hardy and the Sister Arts (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1979), 19.  
8 Grundy notes that ‘Form’ is among Hardy’s Muses in the poem “Rome: The Vatican: Sala delle 
Muse.” Ibid., 177. Berger writes of Hardy’s work, “We are shown what has been lost; the frames 
of monistic and universal truths about life and about narratives.” In The Woodlanders “Older 
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forms, frames, exist in mind and memory but inevitably they collide with new structures.” 
Thomas Hardy, 108-11. 
9 See A.M. Quinton’s article “Absolute Idealism” in Rationalism, Empiricism, and Idealism, ed. 
Kenny, 124-50; and Rick Rylance, Victorian Psychology. 
10 Ibid., 241-42. 
11 The Scottish philosopher William Hamilton introduced Kant to Britain as early as 1836. 
Garratt, Victorian Empiricism, 45-46. To explain why Hegel took so long to have an impact, 
Quinton notes that his works became available much later than Kant’s. 
12 Garratt, tracing various definitions of empiricism, notes that it is with regard to science that the 
term means “objectivity,” denoting the “rigorous pursuit of exactitude, descriptive purity, or a 
neutral and final description of reality-as-given.” Victorian Empiricism, 23.  
13 Rylance, Victorian Psychology, 312. 
14 See 2-7. 
15 The Woodlanders, ed. Dale Kramer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) 33. Further references 
are to this edition and appear in the text. 
16 Andrew Radford describes Fitzpiers’s act as a misunderstanding of the “intricate mechanisms 
and agencies of the irrational and the inspirational.” See “Dethroning the High Priest of Nature in 
The Woodlanders,” Companion to Thomas Hardy, 317. 
17 Levine reads Fitzpiers as a parody of the bohemian intellectual, and Levine claims that 
Fitzpiers’s ideas about subjectivity are not far from Hardy’s own, made ridiculous in their 
formulation and context. See “The Woodlanders and the Darwinian Grotesque” in Thomas 
Hardy Reappraised: Essays in Honor of Michael Millgate (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2006), 189-90. Levine connects Hardy’s commitment to subjectivity to his idealism rather than 
his empiricism (179). Because Fitzpiers’s enterprise is so close to Lydgate’s, “it is hard not to 
think of this as something of a parody of George Eliot, herself; but in any case, it is a parody of 
ideas that Hardy takes with the greatest of seriousness and that are central to the novel.” He 
affirms that the novel “is thick with the ironies of the incompatibility between consciousness and 
matter…. The contrast between the material and the ideal is strikingly present even in the 
smallest of details.” “The Woodlanders,” 191. 
18 In The Well-Beloved, serialized in 1892 before it was published as a book in 1897, the narrator 
calls the Well-Beloved of the Platonic idealist Jocelyn Pierston, an intangible ideal that migrates 
from woman to woman, “a subjective phenomenon” (11). 
19 Scholars have especially connected Hardy’s novels to the “low” school of Dutch painting and 
genre painting generally. See Grundy, Hardy, 28-40. Ruth Yeazell writes that Hardy’s rustic 
images owe much to Eliot’s precedent of taking Dutch painting as a model. Art of the Everyday, 
xviii. While Eliot’s representations of rural subjects concentrate on the figure, Hardy’s “rural 
painting of the Dutch school,” Under the Greenwood Tree, “occupies a more ambiguous place 
between genre and landscape” (138). 
20 Alastair Smart’s “Pictorial Imagery in the Novels of Thomas Hardy” is a foundational study in 
this regard. He quotes a journal entry by Hardy that states, “The impressionist school is strong. It 
is even more suggestive in literature than in that of art…. Their principle is, as I understand it, 
that what you carry away from a scene is the true feature to grasp.” Vigar expands on this 
connection, calling The Woodlanders the most static and pictorial of Hardy’s novels and writing 
that the background has a special importance because of its “illusive, kaleidoscopic quality.” 
Novels, 25-26. Bullen also links the significance of Impressionist technique to the novel’s 
presentation of a “subjective response to visual stimuli.” Expressive Eye, 182. Yeazell writes that 
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while Hardy never abandons the Dutch model, his taste would move towards Turner and the 
impressionists. She especially notes the influence of contemporary painting on The 
Woodlanders, which shows a “radical impatience with daily appearances.” Art of the Everyday, 
153-59. I find a parallel to Hardy’s woodlands in Paul Cézanne’s fractured forest scenes. 
21 See Robert Solso, Cognition and the Visual Arts (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), 220. 
22 Bullen notes his multiple angles or “perspectives,” and his tendency to stress various modes of 
perception and interpretations of optical images. Expressive Eye, 62; 70. He sees The 
Woodlanders as a departure, in which Hardy’s interest shifts from physical attributes, presented 
as psychology externalized, to mental attitudes. “Gone is the stable, substantial world of 
appearances, which provided a “stable frame of reference for the characters within it; instead 
change and flux prevail in the woodlands” (170-71). Berger echoes this idea, and emphasizes the 
non-authoritative, multi-perspective, sometimes contradictory points of view in Hardy’s fiction. 
Thomas Hardy, 17, 25, 105. 
23 Hillis Miller, however, sees his architectural training as highly relevant to the structuring of 
the novels, writing that when “seen from a distance, as a spatialized form,” they “reveal 
themselves to be constructed like a well-designed building. They are organized around 
symmetrical recurrences of theme and event, each prominent motif balancing another one in 
another part of the book.” Miller credits Proust with recognizing these “parallelisms.” Thomas 
Hardy, 206-07. Grundy asserts that “the architectural features of Hardy’s art derive more from 
his experience of actual buildings than from his experience at the drawing board.” Hardy, 178-
79. Bullen contrasts the technical architectural drawing Hardy had to perform with a genuine, 
lifelong interest in drawing and painting. Expressive Eye, 15-16. He argues that while Hardy was 
uninterested in “technical detail,” architecture has a symbolic role in A Laodicean, where 
ekphrasis is used to express an apparent conflict between the traditional and the modern, which 
are in fact both part of the eclectic romantic spirit (118-136). Timothy Hands traces the many 
points at which architecture informs the content of Hardy’s works, and suggests ways in which 
Victorian writings on Gothic architecture inform his literary style. “Hardy’s Architecture: A 
General Perspective and a Personal View” in The Achievement of Thomas Hardy, ed. Phillip 
Mallett (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). 
24 The ancient Greeks and Romans used perspective, and it reappeared in Florence in 1425 when 
Brunelleschi used a mirror to demonstrate he had managed to determine the complex geometry 
needed to render space. He passed the skill on to painters. Ten years later, Alberti approached 
perspective in theoretical terms in De Pittura. The concept of perspective was applied to 
landscape spaces, as Vasari attested in the sixteenth century, writing that “we apply it not only to 
the lines of buildings...we also represent landscapes.” Puttfarken, Discovery, 118. According to 
Edgerton, the purpose of perspective was to square “what was seen empirically with the 
traditional medieval belief that God spreads his His grace through the universe according to the 
laws of geometric optics.” The Renaissance Rediscovery of Linear Perspective (New York: 
Basic Books, 1975), 162.  
25 Ibid., 30-41. 
26 The 1768 instrument that established that Royal Academy in England provides for a Professor 
of Perspective and Geometry to instruct students on “propositions of Geometry, and principles of 
Lineal and Aerial Perspective.” Instruction in perspective formed part of the educational program 
Ruskin established at Oxford a century later. 
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27 Elizabeth Helsinger notes that The Stones of Venice also “censures Renaissance pride in 
perspective, denying the rationalization of space” can provide accuracy to perception. Ruskin and 
the Art, 196.  
28 Perspective is continually associated with images of pure clarity. In the nineteenth century, the 
manuals of Francis Nicholson, William Orme, and Newton Fielding, for example, draw a 
correspondence between a picture that employs linear perspective and an accurate tracing of a 
landscape through a windowpane. Yet perspective also sharpened awareness of the limits of 
ordinary vision. The anonymous writer of a 1690 British manual on the “geometry of landskips” 
writes that perspective renders “distinct and compleat” what would appear “obscure and 
confused” in a “real view.”  
29 See Berger, Thomas Hardy, 13-14, and her chapter “Framed Images.” She writes that “framing 
is a fictional enactment of Hardy’s empiricism and his aesthetics, the exchange between external 
stimuli and creating perception, the image and the eye” (56). The “ultimate frame is subjective 
perception” itself. She finds that in Hardy’s writing, frames exist to be disrupted (90-92). 
30 The art historian Svetlana Alpers notes that with regard to the picture as Alberti conceived it, 
“the viewer, rather than the world seen, has priority,” which relates to Hardy’s preoccupation 
with subjectivity. See “Art history and its exclusions: the example of Dutch art,” in Feminism 
and Art History: Questioning the Litany, ed. by Norma Broude and Mary D. Garrard (Harper & 
Row, 1982), 185-87. 
31 Berger points out that the characters often walk in circles. Thomas Hardy, 56. 
32 William Ivins Jr. finds that Dürer in fact had difficulty understanding the perspectival systems 
of his predecessors. On the Rationalization of Sight: With an Examination of Three Renaissance 
Texts on Perspective (New York: Da Capo Press, 1973), 34.  
33 Bullen writes that in the mind of the narrator, trees are “not just trees: they are transformed 
into quasi-human presences.” Expressive Eye, 172. 
34 Social status forms one vertical axis in the novel, and is connected, sometimes ironically to 
physical positions. Repeated reference is made to Grace’s social “level,” to her rise and potential 
fall back to the common “plane” of the town (79, 83, 85). Berger points out that Hardy often 
arranges characters along vertical lines in space, and their constant movement signifies the 
inescapability of change. Thomas Hardy, 146-47. 
35 Grundy identifies the “decay” in the forest of The Woodlanders as a new element in Hardy’s 
treatment of landscape. Hardy, 57. Irwin also writes that Hardy “savors” decay. He writes that 
nature is shown to be “self-destructive, endlessly wearing itself out,” referring in particular to 
this scene. Reading, 94-99.  
36 Hume contrasts reason and taste, the latter being the subjective realm. See Summers, Judgment 
of Sense, 323. 
37 Levine also reads the ending as a comedy, calling it a “farcical anticlimax” and “bathos.” He 
connects it to Darwin, referring to Dwight Culler’s argument that the “essential form of Darwin’s 
argument is comic” in its rhetorical inversions of the traditional arguments of natural theology. 
“The Woodlanders,” 179, 185. Levine sees the “double and (bitterly) ironic vision” at the end of 
The Woodlanders as Darwinian in that it breaks down categories, juxtaposing the comic with 
pastoral elegy (185-86).  
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The Golden Bough: The Grotesque Against the Picturesque 
 
 
 J.G. Frazer’s The Golden Bough (1890-1915) is often referenced but rarely read. The text 
is generically unfamiliar to our time, based as it is on an outdated methodology, the comparative 
method, which takes the present world to contain all the gradations of human progress.1 The text 
is above all a compilation of accounts of ritual presented in great detail, its examples drawn from 
histories of the distant past and from accounts of ‘primitive’ people living in Frazer’s time, with 
so-called primitive culture then the province of anthropology.2 Yet its main predecessor in the 
field is less difficult to situate. Edward Tylor begins Primitive Culture (1871) with a definition of 
culture as comprehending “knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs, and any other 
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society,” and then clearly presents the 
“great principles” of scholars of society: human nature has a “uniformity” that ensures similar 
responses to similar influences, but the speed with which cultures move through “stages of 
development or evolution” depends on their distinct histories. These “definite laws” allow him to 
claim that the study of human life may proceed with as much certainty as physical science (1-4). 
The Golden Bough offers the reader no such scientific signposts. Instead, Frazer begins, “Who 
does not know Turner’s picture of the Golden Bough? The scene, suffused with the golden glow 
of imagination in which the divine mind of Turner steeped and transfigured even the fairest 
natural landscape, is a dream-like vision of the little woodland lake of Nemi” (1:1).3 That is, 
Frazer begins with an ekphrastic image of a classical landscape. While Hardy dismantled the 
conventions that ordered the ideal landscape, it is intact in The Golden Bough. 
The opening, where an “enchanted landscape” precedes the “mystery of the Nemian 
grove,” is the first sequence in a pattern of an “idyllic picture” followed by a nightmare.4 This 
chapter will suggest that The Golden Bough contains two stances towards antiquity, each 
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associated with a pictorial mode that has classical origins. The mode of the grotesque governs 
Frazer’s presentation of figures performing acts of ritual, and Frazer’s landscapes participate in 
the pictorial mode of the picturesque. By the fin de siècle, the grotesque was associated with the 
‘low’ forms of popular comedy and caricature, while the picturesque had become a ‘high’ but 
nearly obsolete mode of landscape art and description.5 Yet certain the grotesque had been an 
aspect of the classical, though Victorians articulated a “battle between the Grotesque and the 
Classical.”6 In my reading, for Frazer, trained as a classicist, each aesthetic mode retains the 
dignified position it held in the Renaissance, whether he combines them wittingly or unwittingly. 
A revision of a classical mode defined by the mixing of heterogeneous elements, the grotesque 
elevates scenes of savagery by conferring a gravity on them. The implication is, then, that the 
classical serves as a guide for the modern, even as Frazer censures the ancients. Each mode is 
linked with a different understanding of the myth of the golden bough. Frazer’s title has a double 
meaning, alluding to a passage in the Aeneid and referring to the murderous ritual of succession 
that, in his view, lay below the classical myth.7  
It is well known that his account of antiquity would alter the image of classical culture. 
Frazer’s biographer Robert Ackerman calls The Golden Bough a large step in the “process, 
which began at the end of the seventeenth century and gathered force throughout the 
Enlightenment, to dethrone the cultures of classical antiquity from the privileged position they 
had enjoyed since the Renaissance.”8 Frazer’s golden bough represents access to an ancient 
world of irrational violence, produced by a mindset terrifying both in its difference and its 
similarity to the modern one. Frazer suggests he is aware of his possible effect on the prestige of 
classical antiquity when he writes that there is “little danger of undervaluing” its contributions to 
progress (3.421). Later, he refers to “people of fastidious taste” who may “object that the Greeks 
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could never have conceived Demeter and Persephone to be embodied in the form of pigs.” He 
quotes Pausanias on a picture in the “cave of Phigalia in Arcadia,” where the “Black Demeter 
was portrayed with the head and mane of a horse on the body of a woman” (7.21). He thus in 
miniature inscribes an archetypal grotesque image, combining man and animal, within a cave in 
the part of Greece most associated with scenic purity since Virgil. I will propose in this chapter 
that his account of the primitive mind updates the grotesque mode for his time. 
Frazer replaces the golden bough of antiquity with the “golden key” of modern science. 
He presents himself as a scientist and proponent of science, writing,  
The abundance, the solidity, and the splendour of the results achieved by science are well 
fitted to inspire us with a cheerful confidence in the soundness of its method. Here at last, 
after groping about in the dark for countless ages, man has hit upon a clue to the 
labyrinth, a golden key that opens many locks in the treasury of nature. It is probably not 
too much to say that the hope of progress—moral and intellectual as well as material—in 
the future is bound up with the fortunes of science (11:306-07).9 
 
Frazer identified his subfield as “mental anthropology,” a science that would trace the evolution 
of the mind.10 With his theories discredited, Frazer has tended to become, to Victorianists and 
historians, a figure in the history of science. For certain literary scholars, such as Angus Fletcher, 
The Golden Bough retains the value it held for such moderns as Sigmund Freud, T.S. Eliot, and 
W.B. Yeats.11 These readers grant Frazer insight into how the mind works with symbols, even 
though his conclusions about the ancients are false.12 Others have admired The Golden Bough for 
so-called “literary” or “artistic” or “imaginative” qualities, which are seen as the means by which 
it attracted subsequent more eminent writers to its analysis of magical thought.13 Such readings 
perpetuate the notion that the style is best treated in isolation from the erroneous findings. I find 
that the aesthetic modes of The Golden Bough give access to a late-Victorian ambivalence 
towards the question, never directly addressed by Frazer, of what the past has to offer the 
present. In one sense, The Golden Bough offers assurance that the present is better off. Yet both 
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primitive and modern culture appear pale in comparison to an image of antiquity that was once 
held. The ancient past had offered early modern and modern Britain more than science could in 
its images of a golden age.  
To Ackerman, Frazer’s idealized descriptions of the landscape are decorative. He calls 
them self-contained “set pieces” and “special effects” with that implication.14 In characterizing 
these descriptions as ornamental, Ackerman follows Frazer’s lead. Frazer gives a practical 
rationale for these passages: they are an attempt to make his text more palatable, more appealing 
to a broader audience. “By discarding the austere form, without, I hope, sacrificing the solid 
substance of a scientific treatise,” he states in the preface to the third edition, “I thought to cast 
my material into a more artistic mould so as to attract readers, who might have been repelled by 
a more strictly logical and systematic arrangement of the facts. He conceives of the text as a 
painting, a “gloomy canvas,” referring in particular to his decision to place “the mysterious priest 
of Nemi, so to say, in the forefront of the picture...because the picturesque natural surroundings 
of the priest of Nemi among the wooded hills of Italy, the very mystery which enshrouds him, 
and not least the haunting magic of Virgil’s verse, all combine to shed a glamour on the tragic 
figure” (1:vii). What does “glamour” mean in the context? Frazer later suggests that the classical 
age throws a cloak of “glamour” over barbaric antiquity.15 The glamour seems to be the lure of 
the classical age itself.  
When Frazer calls the Italian landscape “picturesque,” he takes up a term that is 
sometimes used to denote a particular kind of landscape favored by late eighteenth century 
aesthetic theorists, and which in its most basic sense it refers to a landscape worthy of being 
pictured.16 The British picturesque tradition reaches back towards seventeenth-century classical 
landscape painting and the Renaissance and classical pastoral poetry that informed it.17 Thus 
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Frazer, like George Eliot, looks to the classical side of Turner that Ruskin could not tolerate in 
his opening passage.18 Ruskin writes with reference to Turner’s painting of The Golden Bough 
that “though Turner had now broken through accepted rules of art, he had not broken through 
accepted laws of idealism.”19 When Ruskin wrote, the taste for ideal landscape had been 
pervasive in England for more than a century. By Frazer’s time, this had changed. The unspoiled 
landscapes of The Golden Bough represent a ruin in toto, standing for the vision of the classical 
world that the text goes on to demolish. Placed against scenes of violent, irrational ritual, 
Frazer’s landscapes gesture to what antiquity had been to modernity, from the beginnings of 
humanism until the nineteenth century. Landscapes of the seventeenth century conjure a golden 
age,20 and Frazer conveys the loss of Europe’s idealization of the ancient world by framing 
grotesque rituals with such idealized landscapes, though the precise significance of the contrast is 
not stable.21 At moments when Frazer expresses faith in scientific modernity, he sounds a death 
knell for the belief in a golden age. When he loses this faith, his contrasting modes read as an 
elegy for the aspiration to revive it.  
The contrast between an idealized classical world and a barbarous ancient world reflects 
Frazer’s ambivalence about the standing of the classics. The Golden Bough thus asks to be 
situated within the history of the disciplines as they developed in the late nineteenth century. The 
obscure status of the text reflects its disciplinary entanglements. Anthropology grew out of the 
antiquarian tradition that had existed in England since the sixteenth century.”22 The science 
Frazer practiced incorporated philology, the source of the comparative method,23 and what may 
be characterized as a humanist aesthetics that finds models in the classical world. The very 
competition that Frazer establishes between antiquity and modernity may been seen as a legacy 
of humanism. The Golden Bough continues an an eighteenth-century debate, or cluster of 
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debates, about the status of various intellectual pursuits. The question of whether modernity was 
superior to antiquity took its modern form in seventeenth-century France, and was a 
preoccupation of eighteenth-century England, as is well known. As the guiding concept of 
Modern Painters attests, the question remained vital in the nineteenth century, which kept it alive 
and shaped it as the modern academic disciplines emerged. Matthew Arnold famously defended 
the value of antiquity in Culture and Anarchy (1869), and soon after, Walter Pater sought to 
redefine modernity in The Renaissance. Frazer’s desire for an affiliation with “science” perhaps 
shows a desire to share in the growing prestige of the social sciences in the late nineteenth 
century. Yet in Frazer’s time, the term “science” could refer to any rigorous, systematic pursuit, 
and could be applied to any discipline.24 Still, Frazer’s use of the term seems to denote more than 
an appeal to legitimacy on the grounds of method. His contrast between modern science and 
ancient magic places The Golden Bough within a realm of discourse that was already more than 
two centuries old, the battle between the ancients and the moderns, and within this context Frazer 
appears as a late humanist rather than an early scientist.25  
 
The Dissonance in the Opening of The Golden Bough 
 
The text begins with the ritual of the golden bough, though, as scholars have noted, it has 
a “very minor role” in the larger work.26 Frazer links the golden bough to a murderous ritual of 
succession, with the theory that Greek priests of a “barbarous age” had to guard a sacred tree. If a 
runaway slave was able to break off a branch—the golden bough in myth—he could challenge 
the priest to mortal combat for his role. In Frazer’s interpretation, the priest of Nemi was 
considered the incarnation of plant life, which thrives or fails as he does. He must be killed in his 
prime and replaced so his soul will be transferred to a successor and nature will be renewed 
(4:205). The golden bough was a totem believed to contain the priest’s soul. In presenting 
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examples of “killing the god” among the “semi-barbarous Latins” of the Arician grove and other 
inhabitants of Italy, Frazer undermines the British regard for ancient Rome as the epitome of 
classical refinement (9:273-74).27 
Yet, in my reading, Frazer looks back to what the golden bough had been with 
ambivalence. The opening passage refers to a painting Turner exhibited in 1834, its title taken 
 




Figure 12. Frontispiece, The Golden Bough 
 
 
from Christopher Pitts’s translation of the Aeneid.28 In Book VI, Aeneas passes into the sacred 
grove of Diana and meets the Sibyl. She tells him, in Pitts’s translation: “A mighty tree, that 
bears a golden bough,/Grows in a vale surrounded with a grove,/And sacred to the queen of 
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Stygian Jove./Her neather world no mortals can behold,/Till from the bole they strip the 
blooming gold” (Aeneid, VI.133-39). For Virgil, the magical key to the underworld represents 
heroic access to knowledge. After Aeneas plucks the golden bough, he passes into an underworld 
with realms of torment and happy peace and liminal stasis. He in Elysium meets his father, who 
assures him that the Trojans will reach Italy to found a new kingdom. He foretells the history of 
Rome, culminating with the rise of Caesar Augustus, who will “bring back the Age of Gold.” 
Virgil thus praised the age in which he lived.  For Turner, influenced by the landscapes of the 
seventeenth century, the story, with the “archetypal pastoral elements” of grove and pool, 
represents access to an idealized classical world.29 Perhaps the early nineteenth century could not 
believe with the Renaissance that classical antiquity could be recreated on earth, but Turner’s age 
could still believe at least that it could be revived in art.30  
Immediately after describing Turner’s mythological scene, Frazer offers a brief 
description of the contemporary setting that is equally idealized. “No one who has seen that calm 
water, lapped in a green hollow of the Alban hills, can ever forget it,” he writes, going on to 
mention the “characteristic” villages and palazzo on its banks. There is the insistence on 
familiarity of Turner’s scene, with Frazer’s assumption that everyone knows it, and on the 
indelible quality of the natural scene, though Frazer himself had not seen it.31 The “sylvan 
landscape” that begins the next paragraph may refer to either scene or both scenes (1:1). There is 
a sense in which the two are interchangeable, both as familiar as the ideal landscape in the 
collective memory of Britain. Yet even by mid-century, classicism and the classical landscape in 
particular were losing favor in Britain. Frazer’s landscape becomes a way of contemplating the 
idealism of the Renaissance as it waned. 
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 Classical landscape paintings typically set heroic legendary or historic events within the 
idealized scenery, and a landscape was rendered paradise by the presence of divinities.32 But in 
The Golden Bough, as Frazer himself emphasizes, the “natural beauty of the spot and the dark 
crimes” that took place at Nemi are inextricable; the violent ritual is an effort to promote natural 
regrowth. The beautiful landscape is impetus for the “strange and recurring tragedy” that takes 
place before it, with a “grim” figure hunting another strange figure (1.1; 1.8).33 Frazer writes that 
the sight of the priest “might well seem to darken the fair landscape, as when a cloud suddenly 
blots the sun on a bright day.” He first offers the elements of an ideal landscape, “the dreamy 
blue of the Italian skies, the dappled shade of summer woods, and the sparkle of the waves in the 
sun.” He then replaces the sunlit landscape with the wilder, gloomier type associated with 
Salvator Rosa, also a part of the picturesque tradition, with the implication that this setting is 
more consonant. “We picture to ourselves the scene,” Frazer encourages, a “somber picture,” 
with “the background of the forest shewing black and jagged against a lowering and stormy sky.” 
He includes a pale moon and matted bough (1:9). He then portrays the ritual as an interruption 
of, or rather irruption into, an Italianate landscape that in fact resembles an English landscape. 
Frazer states, “No one will probably deny that such a custom savours of a barbarous age and, 
surviving into imperial times, stands in striking isolation from the polished Italian society of the 
day, like a primeval rock rising from a smooth-shaven lawn” (1:10).34 Frazer thus reverses the 
scheme of Wolfgang Kayser, who is the pioneer of scholarship on the grotesque but who touches 
little on English literature scheme. Kayser describes the grotesque as the “dark and sinister 





The Ancient Mind and the Grotesque 
 
A brief account of the nineteenth-century history of the term “grotesque” will provide 
context for Frazer’s grotesque. In the nineteenth century, Jean Paul believed the English had a 
special gift for the grotesque in literature, while early Victorians often associate it with German 
culture.36 Scott associated it with the Romantic and German in his 1827 essay on E.T.A. 
Hoffman. He writes that in this genre, “all species of combination are attempted and executed 
without scruple,” including mixed creatures such as centaurs, griffins, sphinxes, and chimeras.37 
The Stones of Venice (1851-53) and Modern Painters III both distinguish a “noble” Gothic 
grotesque from an “ignoble” grotesque associated with Roman and late Renaissance art. Ruskin 
claims that a laudable griffin or centaur is produced when the artist renders a composite form 
perceived whole in the imagination.38  
Yet a figure nearly contemporary with Frazer suggests the fin de siècle was moving away 
from a definition based in the hybrid form. The Spanish-American philosopher George 
Santayana proposes in The Sense of Beauty (1896) that mixed forms are not timelessly grotesque. 
We easily assimilate or “accept” such forms, and that once we stop focusing on the “divergence 
from the natural” or the “incongruity with the conventional type,” the form ceases to be 
grotesque. That is, grotesque forms themselves may become conventional, and cease to be 
disturbing. Santayana declares that “what was impossible and ridiculous at first takes its place 
among recognized ideals. The centaur and satyr are no longer grotesque; the type is accepted.”39  
In The Golden Bough, Virgil’s underworld, “the world immersed in the misty depths of 
earth,” becomes the buried ancient world (VI.306).40 With Frazer’s theories based in large part 
on reports of archeologists working in the Mediterranean, the unearthed image remains linked to 
the grotesque in his text. The grotesque of The Golden Bough is located not in incongruous 
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forms, but irrational notions of cause and effect, for Hume the “most extensive” associative 
operation (1.1.4). Like other Victorians, such as Herbert Spencer, Frazer marries the concept of 
evolution to associationism.41 While Ruskin and Eliot reworked Hume’s associationism in the 
nineteenth century, Frazer strictly upheld Hume’s laws of association as the basis of all thought 
and used them to explain the psychology behind ritual.42 Frazer’s conviction that the laws of the 
mind are static contributes to his uncertainty about modern progress. The “fundamental 
conception” of sympathetic magic is “identical with that of modern science.” Both assume that 
the succession of natural events is regular and certain, and that those who discover knowledge of 
causes can control effects (1:220-21). Frazer writes that “our resemblances to the savage are still 
far more numerous than our differences from him.” Our fundamental ideas were developed in 
antiquity, and the ancients’ “errors were simply hypotheses” that were justifiable and later 
proven inadequate (3:422).43 “Magical ceremonies are nothing but experiments which have 
failed” (4:269). As Robert Fraser writes, Frazer found a “kernel of empiricism” in magic.44 
Christopher Herbert, conversely, writes that the “magical character of comparatist study is 
plainly enough insinuated in Frazer’s own text,” where the law of similarity clearly operates.45 
Put another way, the form of The Golden Bough itself is grotesque, with disparate rituals from 
distant periods yanked together in illogical units.  
To Frazer, ancient and modern man apply the principles of association differently: 
“Legitimately applied, they yield science; illegitimately applied, they yield magic” (1:222). He 
contrasts his systematic scholarship with “art” of the primitive cultures he studies. Because the 
magician “never analyses the mental processes on which his practice is based, never reflects on 
the abstract principles involved in his actions,” magic to him is always “an art, never a science; 
the very idea of science is lacking in his undeveloped mind.” Although “art” here refers to 
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practices unguided by theory, Frazer’s distinction echoes evokes the centuries-old idea that the 
faculty of reason governs science while the distinct faculty of imagination guides less developed 
pursuits.46 It is up to the modern “philosophic student” to trace the “train of thought” underlying 
ritual to “disengage the abstract principles from their concrete applications; in short, to discern 
the spurious science behind the bastard art” (1:53). It is the false science of the ancient mind, its 
faulty inferences, that Frazer presents as grotesque. Philip Thomson’s claim that the grotesque 
“derives at least part of its effect from being presented with a realistic framework, in a realistic 
way,” affirms that the grotesque can fit within a work of scholarship.47 Walter Scott had 
introduced a type of grotesque combination that is relevant to The Golden Bough: “Sudden 
transformations are introduced of the most extraordinary kind, and wrought by the most 
inadequate means.”48 To Frazer, the ancients attempted such transformations through magic. 
Frazer describes how the primitive mind broke down the boundaries between humans, 
other living things, and inanimate objects in its understanding of cause and effect.49 His notion of 
“sympathetic magic,” with its two principles of “imitative” and “contagious” magic, is derived 
from two of Hume’s principles of association, resemblance and contiguity.50 Magic rests on the 
belief that “things can physically affect each other through a space which appears to be empty” 
(1:54). Magical practices come down to what Frazer calls “action at a distance through a secret 
sympathy” or “mistaken notions of cause and effect.” The magician believes that things that 
resemble each other are the same, and he can through “imitative” or “mimetic” or “homeopathic” 
magic produce an event by imitating it. An example of mimetic magic is the effort to harm a 
person by making and destroying an image of him, such as a likeness drawn on the ground, an 
effigy, or a carving on a tree (1:51-55).51 It is possible to inflict harm by trampling on, striking, 
or stabbing a shadow, regarded as a man’s soul (3:77-78). Primitive man believed that by a secret 
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sympathy “the little drama which he acted...would be taken up and repeated by mightier actors 
on a vaster stage” (4:266). “Contagious” magic is based on the assumption that things that have 
once been in contact are always in contact (1:52-53). An object a man has touched may be used 
to harm him. The savage believes he acquires physical, moral, or intellectual characteristics of 
the animal, man, or god he eats (8:138). Such practices link objects and events known by modern 
man to be disconnected.  
Frazer’s commentators suggest that his image of antiquity as confused and base draws on 
the grotesque tradition by echoing the language that has been used to describe the literary genre, 
though they do not name it. Scholars of the grotesque have found a through line in the of 
violation of natural order. Wolfgang Kayser describes the mode as the “expression of 
estrangement and alienation which grips mankind when belief in a perfect and protective natural 
order is weakened or destroyed.” It is an unfamiliar world where the “realm of inanimate is no 
longer separated from those of plants, animals, and human beings.”52 Arthur Clayborough writes 
that the term is generally used to describe “that which is not congruous with ordinary 
experience.” It rejects the natural order and refers not to what is strange but to what is “abidingly 
strange.”53 Clayborough, Jennings, and Thomson point to the particular combination of the 
“ridiculous and repulsive” or “ludicrous and fearsome” or “ludicrous and terrible,” a formulation 
that corresponds to Frazer’s mixed attitude of dread and derision.54  
Ludwig Wittgenstein notes that Frazer tells the story of the King of the Wood at Nemi “in 
a tone which shows that he wants us to feel that something strange and dreadful is happening.”55 
Frazer’s protégé Bronislaw Malinowski writes that Frazer was “passionately devoted to all that 
was strange, usual and exotic in humanity.”56 Ackerman writes that Frazer rhetorically 
“heightens the strangeness and otherworldliness of what took place.”57 Herbert find that Frazer’s 
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interpretation of ancient culture “has as its chief characteristic its astonishing power of 
metamorphosis.” Completely unbound from the physical world, it “constructs its own 
autonomous world in the medium of fantastically exfoliating symbolic imagery, where tree-
spirits, shape-shifting goddesses, sacred plants and animals, and priestly kings and queens freely 
transform themselves into one another.”58 Characterizing these descriptions as “grotesque” 
allows Frazer’s deep, ongoing engagement with the classical tradition to appear. Placed against 
one another, the two classical aesthetic modes that control the text display Frazer’s stance 
towards the ancient past, and one perspective on how the nineteenth century experienced the 
fading of the classical.  
 
Looking Back to the Ideal 
 
 The contrast between grotesque foreground and pastoral landscape refuses the possibility 
of rest in the notion of either an inferior or superior antiquity. The text evokes the ideal through 
the landscape, while signaling that it is unavailable. For Frazer, as for Hardy, the ideal landscape 
belongs to the past. Frazer begins his engagement with the picturesque in his edition of 
Pausanias’s Description of Greece (1898), a “guide-book to travelers” (xxiv).59 This Greek text 
from the Roman period is the “only extended example of periegesis to survive into the 
Renaissance,” and had become a locus of attention for those interested in landscape style. Jaś 
Elsner notes that a major theorist of the picturesque, Uvedale Price, published an anthology of 
“picture-postcard views” from the Description. The first complete English translation was 
produced by an English Platonist, Thomas Taylor, and offers an “idyllic Greek landscape,” and 
the English artist Joseph Michael Gandy captures and reifies this version of the text in pictures 
after this translation. Frazer’s translation and commentary is “in certain respects” a “rationalizing 




Frazer also displays an idealizing tendency in the landscape descriptions of his edition, with its 
connections to the modern travelogue.61 As Frazer notes, Pausanias omits landscape, with 
mountains, plains, and seas appearing only for their religious or historical interest (xxv). John 
Vickery writes that Frazer’s style is marked by its “concreteness,” its quality of “presenting the 
external world in all of its sensuous immediacy.”62 Ackerman notes the diary Frazer kept as he 
followed Pausanias’s path in Greece displays a modern tendency to focus on landscape 
description, and finds that Frazer embellishes his landscapes in a way foreign to Pausanias.63 
Fraser similarly writes that Frazer “embellished” a landscape he derived from Turner, Macaulay, 
and Roman poetry.64 Sabine MacCormack writes that Frazer is “captivated” by nature in his 
commentary.65  
 In coming to write The Golden Bough, Frazer was in fact mistaken about the setting of 
Turner’s painting.66 Yet in choosing Lake Nemi as the setting of the first scene, he selects one of 
the sites “most celebrated in Rome’s history,” where the nymph Egeria was said to have 
mourned her husband Numa, a legendary king of ancient Rome. Lake Nemi had been painted 
and idealized by many painters, including Claude.67 Seventeenth-century classical landscape 
painting “crystallizes complex reactions to a world which is full of the remains of a great but 
vanished age,” and the landscapes of Claude, especially, were seen to capture the peaceful spirit 
of Virgil’s Eclogues (39-38 BC). His landscapes proved that “the artist can actualize our dream 




Figure 13. Claude Lorrain, Pastoral Landscape, 1644 
 
 
notes, landscape painting in England was strongly influenced by the ideal landscape tradition.69 
Richard Wilson, who said he “rivaled Claude,” turned to landscape after he moved to Italy in 
1750, applying the conventions of ideal landscape to scenes of both Italy and England.70 
Predictably, Ruskin believes that “English artists are usually entirely ruined by residence in 
Italy” (3:231). After describing Wilson as the “connecting link” between Italianate and English 
landscape, Ruskin asserts that he remained the model for English landscapists in the nineteenth 
century (3:189). In a 1878 note, he writes that he has given Oxford a landscape sketch by Wilson 
“to show the state of landscape art just before Turner broke into it with a new light.”71 Yet 
Turner was strongly influenced by Wilson72 and followed his path to Lake Nemi, the setting of 
Wilson’s “Lake Nemi and Genzano from the Terrace of the Capuchin Monastery” (1756-57) and 
“The Lake of Nemi, with Diana and Callisto” (1758). 
 The goddess Diana, a quintessential pastoral figure, figures in The Golden Bough because 
she was worshipped at Nemi. While chapter 3 has shown that she is associated ironically with a 
number of characters in late-century novels, when Frazer frames his text with an image of a 
landscape dedicated to Diana, “the ideal embodiment of the wild life of nature,” it is a cue that 
the landscapes to follow are ideal scenes (1:35).73 The opening scene described above is one of a 
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number of examples. Frazer frames a chapter on tree worship with the statement that in Greece 
“beautiful woods...still linger on the slopes of the high Arcadian mountains, still adorn with their 
verdure the deep gorge through which the Ladon hurries to join the sacred Alpheus (2:7-8). This 
passage conjures a pastoral landscape with a sublime gorge. Also in the volume entitled The 
Magic Art and the Evolution of Kings, Frazer includes an ekphrastic description of atmospheric 
perspective, the characteristic means of depicting a distant view in classical landscape painting. 
As the landscape recedes from the viewer, the contrast decreases, along with detail. The colors 
become paler and closer to the background color, which is usually blue. In a passage based on 
Theophrastus’s description of the “woods of Latium,” he writes, “The purple Apennines, indeed, 
in their eternal calm on the one hand, and the shining Mediterranean in its eternal unrest on the 
other, no doubt looked then much as they look now, whether bathed in sunshine, or chequered by 
the fleeting shadows of clouds; but instead of the desolate brown Campagna...the eye must have 
ranged over woodlands that stretched away...till their varied hues of green or autumnal scarlet 
and gold melted insensibly into the blue of the distant mountains and sea” (2:188).  
In the same volume, Frazer refers to the neoclassical, Zeuxian method of idealism to 
describe his method of collecting eye-witness accounts of the places he has not visited and then 
painting “composite pictures.” He similarly writes in the preface of the fifth volume, Adonis, 
Attis, Osiris, that because he has not been to the East, he has “sought to remedy the defect by 
comparing the descriptions of eye-witnesses, and painting from them what may be called 
composite pictures of some of the scenes on which I have been led to touch.” He hopes to thus 
convey a notion “of the scenery, the atmosphere, the gorgeous colouring of the East” (5:v). Soon 
after, he describes the site of a temple to Adonis as a sublime “wild, romantic, wooded gorge.” 
He writes, returning to the sublime mode, “The hamlet stands among groves of noble walnut-
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trees on the brink of the Iyn. A little way off the river rushes from a cavern at the foot of a 
mighty amphitheatre of towering cliffs to plunge in a series of cascades into the awful depths of 
the glen. The deeper it descends, the ranker and denser grows the vegetation.” He continues,  
 
Figure 13. Gaspard Dughet, The Falls of Tivoli, 1661 
 
“There is something delicious, almost intoxicating, in the freshness of these tumbling waters, in 
the sweetness and purity of the mountain air, in the vivid green of the vegetation.” Ideal 
landscapes often include classical ruins, and Frazer describes “the temple, of which some 
massive hewn blocks and a fine column of Syenite granite still mark the site.” In this 
“magnificent prospect,” the viewer looks “across the foam and the roar of the waterfalls...up to 
the cavern and away to the top of the sublime precipices above.... Seaward the view is especially 
impressive when the sun floods the profound gorge with golden light, revealing all the fantastic 
buttresses and rounded towers of its mountain rampart, and falling softly on the varied green of 
the woods which clothe its depths” (5:28). The same picturesque styling appears in the reference 
works on which Frazer relied.74 
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 An image of Cappadocia is conceived as an ideal landscape familiar to a European.75 
This scene makes the “traveller” feel that “he has passed out of Asia, and that the highroad to 
Europe lies straight before him.” Again, there is the movement from dramatic mountains in the 
background to, through broken, crossing lines, halcyon greenery in the foreground. The scenery 
is of the “grandest Alpine character. On all sides the mountains tower skyward, their peaks 
sheeted in a dazzling pall of snow, their lower slopes veiled in the almost inky blackness of 
dense pine-forests, torn here and there by impassable ravines, or broken into prodigious 
precipices of red and grey rock” (5:120).  
 Framing grotesque scenes, these landscapes cannot be read purely as an extension of the 
picturesque tradition. Combined with grotesque imagery, they point to a loss, not of a classical 
golden age, but of the Renaissance and its long afterlife, which could still have an idealized view 
of antiquity and hope to revive its culture. Frazer demonstrates his attraction to the Renaissance 
when he writes that the “anthropologist of to-day resembles in some sort the position of classical 
scholars at the revival of learning.” The so-called “prospect” or Claudian landscape becomes a 
metaphor: the difficulty and novelty of anthropology comes with the charm of the “intellectual 
prospect which suddenly opens up before us whenever the mist rises and unfolds the far 
horizon.”76 Frazer claims to hold an advantage over the humanist, devaluing classical learning: 
“To us moderns a still wider vista is vouchsafed, a greater panorama is unrolled by the study 
which aims at bringing home to us the faith and the practice, the hopes and the ideals, not of two 
highly gifted races only, but of all mankind, and thus at enabling us to follow the long march, the 
toilsome ascent, of humanity from savagery to civilization” (1:xxiv-xxvi). But in the second 
volume, the prospect has been obscured. Frazer writes that “it is unlikely that the student’s 
search-light will ever pierce the mists that hang over these remote ages. All that we can do is to 
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follow the lines of evidence backward as far as they can be traced, till, after growing fainter and 
fainter, they are lost altogether in the darkness” (2:323). In a later volume, Frazer writes that 
primitive culture is “still to a great extent a trackless wilderness, a tangled maze, in the gloomy 
recesses of which the forlorn wanderer may wander for ever without a light and without a clue” 
(8:47). The extreme skepticism he develops would with reason produce a longing for a time still 
convinced that “two gifted races” could provide ideals.  
Scholars have heard an elegiac tone in The Golden Bough. John Vickery sees the 
essential insight of classical anthropology as an awareness that a sense of loss may be 
engendered by whole cultures, historical ages, and concepts, and The Golden Bough as a lament 
for the loss of certitude and futurity.77 The landscapes of the elegiac text may be read within the 
tradition of pastoral elegy. Frazer’s landscapes make apparent the loss of Turner’s mythology, 
which gestured to the loss of the Renaissance—and its longing for a classical age. The elegist 
traditionally wins consolation and renewal.78 In Virgil’s fourth eclogue, whose singer is 
identified as Virgil, the poet asks the goddess Lucina to look favorably on a newborn “by 
whom/The Age of Iron gives way to the Golden Age,” during which the need for labor and war 
will eventually vanish.79 The endless consuming work that went into The Golden Bough granted 
Frazer only the unstable expectation that science offers future progress.80 He anticipates that his 
work will retain its value merely as a collection, writing in the preface to the second edition, “It 
has been my wish and intention to draw as sharply as possible the line of demarcation between 
my facts and the hypotheses by which I have attempted to colligate them. Hypotheses are 
necessary but often temporary bridges built to connect isolated facts. If my light bridges should 
sooner or later break down or be superseded by more solid structures, I hope that my book may 
still have its utility and its interest as a repository of facts” (1:xix). He has at times been “brought 
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to the edge of some yawning chasm,” and can only point it out and hope others will bridge or fill 
it (1:xxiv). He thus expresses despair even as he outlines his hope for the “utility” of The Golden 
Bough, adopting the empiricist metaphor of the bridge for inference but imagining that his own 
inferences will be dismantled.  
In the final volume of the third edition, after comparing science to a golden key, Frazer 
more skeptically calls the “laws of nature” mere “hypotheses devised to explain that ever-
shifting phantasmagoria of thought which we dignify with the high-sounding names of the world 
and the universe.” Science may be superseded by “some totally different way of looking at the 
phenomena—of registering the shadows on the screen—of which we in this generation can form 
no idea.” Frazer implicitly reduces all possible knowledge to phenomenal knowledge, confining 
humanity to the cave of phenomenal flickering from which Plato sought an exit. The 
ephemerality of thought is the consolation Frazer offers: “The philosopher,” he writes, “may 
console himself by reflecting that these gloomy apprehensions...are only parts of that 
unsubstantial world which thought has conjured up out of the void, and that the phantoms which 
the subtle enchantress has evoked today she may ban tomorrow.”  
The famous close, with the tolling of the bells of St. Peter’s, has a parallel in Claude’s 
Landscape with an Imaginary View of Tivoli (1642), though without the painting’s sense of 
peaceful order. In the painting, the tiny dome of St. Peter’s appears on the skyline. In the 
foreground, travelers cross a bridge that stretches across the canvas horizontally, making their 




Figure 15. Claude Lorrain, Landscape with an Imaginary View of Tivoli (1642) 
 
 
the sun set over St. Peter’s, and turning away to look down on the lake of Nemi. Although the 
temple and priest are gone, “the place has changed little since Diana received the homage of her 
worshippers in the sacred grove…. Nemi’s woods are still green, and as the sunset fades in the 
west” the bells sound. The final lines, “The king is dead, long live the king! Ave Maria!” place 
the eras of magic and religion in parallel, the belief in reincarnation placed alongside the belief in 
resurrection, and both consigned to the past (11:306-08). Only the landscape, with its 
associations, remains. 
Frazer’s “phantasmagoria of thought” gestures laterally to Swann’s Way (1913), where 
the projected images of a magic lantern intended to release the character Marcel from insomnia 
have the opposite effect by de-familiarizing the bedroom. Marcel Proust crafted a happy ending 
out of the idea of shifting ground. But Frazer, and also Hardy, find the notion that reality consists 
of ever-shifting images of thought more destabilizing. This notion may be said to characterize 
modernity, and Hardy suggests this is so, because it is precisely when Giles Winterbourne loses 
his land that he has the curious “sense that the paths he was pacing, the cabbage-plots, the 
appletrees, his dwelling, cider-cellar, wring-house, stables, weather-cock, were all slipping away 
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over his head and beneath his feet as if they were painted on a magic lantern slide” (89). Hardy 
also refers to the “phantasmagoria of experience” in his 1891 essay “The Science of Fiction.”81 
For both Hardy and Frazer, only an empirical mindset is tenable. But the shifting images of the 
mind give each a sense of dread. The loss of the classical in their works reads as the loss 
altogether of the capacity to idealize. In addition to representing a condition in which form 
breaks down, each looks back towards the aspiration to arrive at ideal images through the 
empirical. The titles of The Woodlanders and The Golden Bough carry a tone of elegy, and both 
works treat the loss of a mythical stance towards nature. Malinowski is one among at least 
several scholars who have found Frazer’s presentation of the ancients to be, at times, romantic.82 
But in my reading, both Hardy and Frazer elegize primarily not the disappearance of pre-modern 
beliefs, but a more recent and acute loss. The project of producing stable ideal scenes is seen as 
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Frazer’s evolutionism “self-congratulatory” (200).  
10 Frazer delivered a lecture on “The Scope and Method of Mental Anthropology” in 1921.  
11 In a chapter titled, “Allegorical Causation: Magic and Ritual Forms,” Fletcher uses Frazer’s 
concepts of “imitative” and “contagious” magic to describe literary “correlates”: events that 
happen in allegorical literature rather than ancient culture. Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic 
Mode (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964). 
12 Catherine Gallagher notes that The Golden Bough influenced works by T.S. Eliot, Virginia 
Woolf, and Sigmund Freud and others who develop “implications for the cultural concept” of 
“the inward process that creates and understands a realm of symbolic representations from age to 
age.” See The Body Economic: Life, Death, and Sensation in Political Economy and the 
Victorian Novel (Princeton University Press, 2006), 170. 
13 Eliot praises Frazer’s “fine prose style” in “A Prediction,” 29. John Vickery writes that “from 
the outset his style stamped him as a literary artist,” and that this particular work of Victorian 
anthropology “shaped modern English and American literature” for its style. See The Literary 
Impact of The Golden Bough (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 8; 106. 
14 J.G. Frazer, 236-37. Robert Fraser writes that Frazer’s “refinements are more than mere 
scene-painting,” reading figures of pathos as Frazer’s religious anxiety. Making, 10. 
15 He writes that the “the glamour which Greek poetry threw over the figure of Dionysus” could 
not “conceal or erase the deep lines of savagery and cruelty imprinted on features of barbarous 
deity” (7:33). 
16 The aesthetic theorists of the later half of the eighteenth century reified the categories of the 
picturesque, the beautiful, and the sublime. But the terms were freely mixed before and after.  
17 Hugh Honour calls ideal landscapes “attempts to recreate the literary landscape” sketched by 
Homer, Theocritus, and Virgil, and elaborations by poets of the Italian and English Renaissance, 
though Margaretha Lagerlöf writes that “it would be unfair to these paintings to see them as 
purely an offshoot of a literary tradition” (159-60; 13). The French ideal landscapists were the 
common models for the picturesque sensibility. Ann Bermingham points out that it was mainly 
Gilpin, the original popularizer of picturesque, who defined the picturesque as “a model of the 
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older prospect landscape” of Claude, Gaspard Dughet, and Rosa. Price and Knight sought to 
redefine the genre so that it referred decreasingly to the Claudian prospect. See “System, Order, 
and Abstraction: The Politics of English Landscape Drawing around 1795” in Landscape and 
Power, ed. Mitchell, 79-87. Gilpin also moves away from “an academic picturesque,” in John 
Dixon Hunt’s phrase, to accommodate the “the vague, the local, the sentimental and subjective.” 
The Genius of the Place: The English Landscape Garden 1620-1820, ed. John Dixon Hunt and 
Peter Willis (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), 128.  
18 Frazer suggests he is familiar with Ruskin’s ideas when he uses the term “pathetic fallacy” to 
explain the ancient notion of the scapegoat (9:v). John Vickery connects Frazer’s visual, pictorial 
elements to Ruskin and other Victorians. Literary Impact, 32. He writes that Frazer “thought of 
his book almost exclusively in pictorial terms” and links his study to painting “in both 
conception and execution” (115-19). 
19 He expands, focusing on a mill among the ancient ruins to point out that mills were at the time 
“necessary and orthodox in poetical landscape, being supposed to give its elements, otherwise 
ethereal and ambrosial, an agreeable earthy flavour, like truffles in a pie.” He finds a “curious 
sign of the remaining influences of the theories of idealism on Turner in the treatment of the 
stone pines,” the rule of the time beings that trees and all other imperfect elements of the 
landscape are to be idealized, with idealization consisting in “the assemblage of various natural 
beauties into a whole, which was to be more beautiful than nature” (13:132-33). 
20 Claire Pace writes that the early nineteenth century prized Claude’s paintings for crystallizing 
“the most idyllic aspects of the classical past, epitomizing a specific Golden Age, an accessible 
arcadia,” and points out that Reynolds praises Claude for transporting the viewer to Arcadia. 
“Claude the Enchanted: Interpretations of Claude in England in the Earlier Nineteenth-Century.” 
The Burlington Magazine 111, no. 801 (Dec. 1969): 733-34. Lagerlöf writes that “classicism 
generally espouses an idealistic vision, a belief that an ancient classical style and ancient objects 
could express in concrete form eternal ideas and a perfection that is eternal and outside time,” 
associating a particular historical period with eternally valid models. Ideal Landscape, 166. Jane 
Brown writes that the pastoral landscape and ruins of Claude’s Landscape with Abraham 
expelling Hagar and Ishmael “express nostalgia for a golden past that one has missed—perhaps 
by a hair’s breadth, perhaps by millennia.” “Claude’s Allegories and Literary Neoclassicism.” 
Symbolism: An International Journal of Critical Aesthetics 8 (2008), 22.  
21 Langdon, Claude Lorrain, 94.  
22 Stocking traces the emergence of anthropology out of antiquarianism. Victorian Anthropology, 
53-54. Turner points out that Frazer oscillated between classical philology and anthropology and 
that The Golden Bough “remained tightly linked to classical studies” through its title, references 
to Pausanias, and descriptions of Greeks and Romans. Philology, 294-95. 
23 For a treatment of the history of philology and its relationship to antiquarianism and then 
anthropology, see Turner, Philology. 
24 Ibid., 268. 
25 The quarrel is a site at which the modern distinction between the arts and sciences emerged, 
according to Douglas Patey. By 1700, nearly all granted the moderns superiority in science, as it 
was understood at the time, and the arts were ceded to the ancients. The concept of the 
“aesthetic” emerged correlatively with modern conceptions of “science.” “Ancients and 
Moderns,” 33-39. 
26 See Anthony Ossa-Richardson, “From Servius to Frazer: The Golden Bough and its 
Transformations.” International Journal of the Classical Tradition 15 (2008): 340. Fraser notes 
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that Frazer’s theory rests on a very slim evidence, the only source ancient source connecting the 
golden bough and the rite in Servius’s fourth-century commentary on the Aeneid. 
27 Ackerman, J.G. Frazer, 236-37. See Norman Vance, The Persistence of Rome: The Victorians 
and Ancient Rome (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997). Fraser explains how Frazer came to see in the 
archeological evidence from Nemi a religious tradition perhaps older than but lasting into Roman 
civilization. See Making. 
28 Fraser notes that at the time, only Pitt’s translation mentions a “golden bough.” Making, 190. 
Turner first painted a Virgilian subject in 1798 and chose the Aeneid for his last exhibits at the 
Academy in 1850. 
29 Claire Pace, “‘The Golden Age... The First and Last Days of Mankind’: Claude Lorrain and 
Classical Pastoral, with Special Emphasis on Themes from Ovid’s ‘Metamorphoses.’” Artibus et 
Historiae, 23, no. 46 (2002): 138. 
30 David Hill writes, “In the last years of the eighteenth century when Turner’s imagination was 
formed and even” in the early nineteenth century, “it was possible to believe in the classical 
idyll, but…in the years after Waterloo, it was dead, a casualty of the war.” See Turner on the 
Thames, 52. Turner’s paintings of classical subjects convey a range of attitudes about antiquity. 
Certain painting evoke a golden age, and others emphasize human fallibility.  
31 Frazer based his theories on the often crude reports of explorers, missionaries, and traders, and 
had never visited Italy when he wrote the visionary opening scene that alludes to Turner’s 
painting. Ackerman, J.G. Frazer, 1; 137; 174. 
32 “An idea or event was felt to have some distinct correlation to where it took place,” writes 
John Dixon Hunt. The Figure in the Landscape: Poetry, Painting, and Gardening During the 
Eighteenth Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 43; 69. 
33 Stanley Hyman sees the work as a tragedy, comparing it to tragic drama in particular. Tangled 
Bank, 202-04; 254.  
34 There is a precedent for this jarring scene in Thomas Carlyle’s Past and Present. Scholars 
have written that in the Victorian period, grotesque forms represent “destabilizations of the 
panoramic picturesque gaze.” See Amigoni et al., Victorian Culture, 9. The “Victorian grotesque 
was born,” according to Paul Barlow, when “Carlyle’s ‘Picturesque tourist’ finds his view 
disrupted by the alienated presence of the unemployed.” Barlow writes that Charles Dickens and 
Ford Madox Brown saw in him “an assault on the passive picturesque gaze by which social 
experience is rendered spuriously harmonious.” “Thomas Carlyle’s Grotesque Conceits,” in 
Victorian Culture, Amigoni et al., 39. 
35 The Grotesque, 20-21. 
36 Much English writing on the genre “derives from the influence of German philosophy and 
critical theory, which sought to incorporate the grotesque into Romantic aesthetics.” See 
Amigoni et al., Victorian Culture, 8. 
37 See Kayser, The Grotesque, 10. 
38 Ruskin approves of Dante’s Chiron, declaring that “the real living centaur trotted across 
Dante’s brain” (3:115). Ruskin’s most famous passage on the grotesque compares Roman and 
Gothic griffins, and argues that the former is composed “by line and rule” (5:140-41). His 
account of the noble grotesque performs a neat appropriation of the Renaissance notion that the 
ideal form exists in the artist’s imagination before the artist renders it by referring to multiple 
models. While Ruskin’s treatment of the grotesque was the most prominent of the Victorian 
period, scholars have also found it in the fiction of Thomas Hardy. See J.B. Bullen, Expressive 
Eye, 99, 185; Sheila Berger, Thomas Hardy, 118. Penelope Vigar and Michael Irwin see the 
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imagery of the post-storm forest scene in The Woodlanders as grotesque (Novels, 49-51; 
Reading, 105). George Levine finds a particularly Darwinian grotesque in the novel’s mix of 
generic modes. See “The Woodlanders.” 
39 The Sense of Beauty: Being the Outline of an Aesthetic Theory (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1896), 256-57. 
40 T.S. Eliot writes that Frazer “has extended the consciousness of the human mind into as dark 
and backward and [sic] abysm of time as has yet been explored.” “A Prediction,” 29. Marty Roth 
presents Frazer’s project as the rehearsal of the hero’s descent into the underworld in classical 
epic in “Sir James Frazer’s The Golden Bough: A Reading Lesson” in Modernist Anthropology: 
From Fieldwork to Text, ed. Marc Manganaro (Princeton University Press, 1990), 70-71. 
41 The idea that there is a “generic human nature” was common since the Enlightenment, 
accompanied by the notion that human differences can be explained through the idea of uneven 
progress among the societies of the world. Stocking, Victorian Anthropology, 17. This idea 
developed most clearly in the social sciences in France, from Condorcet to Saint-Simon and 
Comte (25). It came to largely supplant the idea of cultural diffusion, instead proposing that 
repeated events are governed by laws (77). In Britain, this idea took the form of an “evolutionary 
associationism” that emerged in the 1860s, in which fixed relations in the environment produced 
fixed relations in the mind, and the effects of repeated associations were transmitted to the next 
generation (134). This notion of sociocultural evolution was part of a broader evolutionary 
movement and is thus “better thought of as ‘Darwinistic’ rather than ‘Darwinian’” (146). “Basic 
human rationality” was the mechanism of social evolution, so allowing moderns had to posit a 
rationalistic savage (155). The Golden Bough is a “relatively pristine” version of this viewpoint, 
long after reactions to it had begun (287).  
42 According to Leslie Stephen, Hume’s skepticism is his main bequest to the nineteenth century.  
Hume at first writes that an inference can be based on “such a multitude of experiments, that it 
admits not of the smallest doubt” (1.3.8). Yet he goes on to undermine this claim for knowledge. 
He writes that assurance “is perceptions.” “How must we be disappointed,” he writes, “when we 
learn, that this connection, tie, or energy lies merely in ourselves, and is nothing but that 
determination of the mind nothing but the addition of new probabilities,” all uncertain. “The only 
existences, of which we are certain, are perceptions” immediately present (1.4.2). He famously 
goes on to call every connection formed through association a “fiction.” The mind is “nothing 
but a heap or collection of different perceptions” (1.4.7). What was skepticism in Hume becomes 
despair in Frazer.  
43 Hyman calls primitive men “proto-scientists” in that they produce myths as hypotheses. 
Tangled Bank, 240. Ackerman writes that magic and science share an important similarity in that 
both strive to master nature. J.G. Frazer, 158. Stocking points out that sociocultural evolutionism 
reiterated themes of utilitarianism in finding progress in the production of new and better ideas, 
making the progress of science and culture identical. The task was to explain how irrationality 
had existed in the first place, and the answer expounded was that what seemed irrational and 
purposeless was in fact utilitarian and progressive. Victorian Anthropology, 311-12. 
44 Making, 121. 
45 Victorian Relativity, 200. 
46 Patey, “Ancients and Moderns,” 42. 
47 The Grotesque, 7-8. 
48 Kayser, The Grotesque, 72-98. 
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49 Ackerman writes that he would not give up his “conception of the physical universe as 
regulated by exact and absolutely unvarying laws of nature” for conceptions of physicists that 
threatened this belief by eliminating causality. Frazer’s idea that the mind is an “equally ordered, 
comprehensible, and describable ‘place’ with its own development and operation” was 
analogous. J.G. Frazer, 14-15. 
50 Stocking and Fraser both point out that Frazer’s notion of the relevance of association to magic 
comes proximately from Tylor’s Primitive Culture. Victorian Anthropology, 154; Making, 19. 
Fraser also notes that this scheme was not fully worked out until the third edition. Ibid., 122-23. 
51 See the first edition, 1:9. 
52 Kayser, The Grotesque, 20-21. Bakhtin finds that Kayser and other scholars of the grotesque 
focus only on the mode in its Romantic and modernist forms, which loses the connection to folk 
humor and is terrifying and alienated in tone. Rabelais, 46-50. 
53 The Grotesque in English Literature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 11. 
54 Barasch, “Introduction,” x-xiii; Thomson, The Grotesque, 14. 
55 “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough” in Wittgenstein: Sources and Perspectives, ed. C.G. 
Luckhardt (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979), 63. 
56 Scientific Theory, 181. 
57 J.G. Frazer, 102. 
58 Victorian Relativity, 47. 
59 Frazer produced the translation and commentary between 1884 and 1897. MacCormack writes 
that his “work on his Pausanias was thus intertwined with work on The Golden Bough almost 
from the beginning,” each referring to the other at multiple points. “Pausanias and His 
Commentator Sir James George Frazer.” Classical Receptions Journal 2, no. 2 (2010): 305.  
60 “Introduction,” 159-63. 
61 Stanley Hyman states, “If Frazer imposed one deliberate organization…it is that of a 
travelogue,” with the style sometimes pure travelogue. Tangled Bank, 264.  
62 Vickery, Literary Impact, 107. 
63 J.G. Frazer, 111. 
64 Sir James Frazer, 3. 
65 “Pausanias,” 289. 
66 Making, 3. Ruskin correctly identifies it as Lake Avernus (13:133). 
67 Langdon, Claude Lorrain, 141. 
68 Lagerlöf, Ideal Landscape, 177; 183. 
69 Lagerlöf gives a useful historiography of the term “ideal landscape.” She finds the main 
commonalities in this tradition to be biblical and mythological subjects in an ancient setting, and 
a rational, structured, pictorial space. Ibid., 17-20. Langdon characterizes classical landscape by 
balanced, structured vistas, where the “splendor of classical remains recalls those great myths 
and legends of Roman Antiquity.” Claude Lorrain, 8-9.  
70 Solkin, Painting for Money, 12-22, 77. 
71 The note is among his revisions to the Rudimentary Catalogue to the art collection he gave 
Oxford, a guide for the instruction of beginning students. Ruskin continues, “Wilson is a 
thoroughly great painter and the drawing is not to cast contempt upon him, but upon the kind of 
teaching which Landscapists received in the eighteenth century.” 
72 According to Elizabeth Manwaring, Wilson, himself strongly influenced by Claude, was “the 
strongest influence on Turner in his early work, but soon gave place to Claude, long Turner’s 
chief model” and “finally his rival.” Italian Landscapes, 74. The primacy of Virgil as poetic 
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model and Claude among painters was shown by an 1850 suite on the theme of Aeneas’ stay at 
Carthage, affair with Dido, and abandonment of her. Claude painted two scenes from the Aeneid 
early in his career and six that scrupulously followed the text at the end of his life (145). His 
painting “Coast Scene with Aeneas and the Cumean Sibyl” is lost, but there is his drawing that 
records it. Elizabeth Helsinger writes, “While Turner produced works that participate fully in the 
European tradition of historical landscape painting, he presented them as English challenges to 
that tradition.” “Turner and the Representation of England,” in Landscape and Power, ed. 
Mitchell, 104. 
73 Lagerlöf writes that “the Arcadian trail does not run parallel with the development of 
landscape painting.” Ideal Landscape, 7-8. 
74 They include Edward Robinson, Biblical Researches in Palestine; W.M. Thomson, The Land 
and the Book; E. Renan, Mission de Phenicie; G. Maspero, Histoire Ancienne; Sir Charles 
Wilson, Picturesque Palestine. 
75 David Bunn writes that colonial landscapes “came to be perceived as a repositories of 
romantic subject-matter.” The landscapes of the empire “is displayed as though already ordered 
to European conventions of taste.” “‘Our Wattled Cot’: Mercantile and Domestic Space in 
Thomas Pringle’s African Landscapes,” in Landscape and Power, ed. Mitchell, 128-29. 
76 Ann Bermingham notes that the expansive prospect landscape was traditionally associated 
with “certain mental faculties,” and was in particular “equivalent to philosophical speculation.” 
Landscape and Ideology, 84. 
77 See “Frazer and the Elegiac: The Modernist Connection” in Modernist Anthropology, ed. 
Manganaro. Vickery writes that Frazer looks forward to modernist literature in his statements of 
misplaced effort. “Out of that irresolution, inconclusiveness, and uncertainty stems the attendant 
pathos that classical anthropology felt for human history and the individual self seeking to 
comprehend it.” Literary Impact, 53; 67. 
78 Scholars note that Frazer’s research gave rise to a new theory of the pastoral elegy, now 
largely discredited but still strong. Peter Sacks refers to this theory when he writes that the 
vegetation god is “the predecessor of almost every elegized subject and provides a fundamental 
trope by which mortals create their images of immortality. This is not a new field,” Sacks writes, 
“having been studied by many scholars since the time of Frazer.” The English Elegy: Studies in 
the Genre from Spenser to Yeats (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 26. He calls 
“martyred vegetation deities” the “original subjects of the elegy” (265). See also Sarah Lambert 
on the theory that the pastoral elegy descends from ancient vegetation rites. Placing Sorrow, 
xxix-xxii. 
79 Eclogues, trans. David Ferry (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1999), 29. 
80 Christopher Herbert places Frazer in the context of the “discourse of the Unknowable” in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. He writes of a late Victorian sense that it may be 
impossible to “know or understand key elements in one’s domain of study.” While this doctrine 
is not theorized in The Golden Bough, Frazer practices an empirical science in which gathering 
data is fundamental yet which starts “from the presupposition that its object is closed to view, 
incurably ambiguous, and conceivable only as a complex of parallelisms and analogy.” Victorian 
Relativity, 190.  
81 See Vigar, Novels, 20. 
82 Malinoski refers to Frazer’s “beloved savages,” writing that he “delighted in their pranks and 
pleasures.” A Scientific Theory, 186. Lionel Trilling claims Frazer had a “doubleness of mind,” 
writing that “if he deplores the primitive imagination, does not fail to show it as wonderful and 
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beautiful.” “On the Teaching of Modern Literature,” in Beyond Culture: Essays on Literature 
and Learning (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1965), 15. Craig writes of Frazer’s 
acceptance that progress may be an illusion and science may be “another error…which he will be 
happy to dispense with, since the world that science offers us is a bleak and painful one 





Forms of Improvement: Optimism and Idealism 
 
 
The task of understanding the mind shifted from philosophy to the science of psychology 
in the second half of the nineteenth century. In conclusion, I wish to ask, what was the loss? 
There is a urge among Victorianists to recuperate the period as one of relevance for us, leading to 
engaging scholarship that shows us ways in the Victorians anticipate modernism and 
postmodernism. I would like to consider something that was lost with the period, with the 
premise that what we have lost can help to show what we have. 
I return to G. H. Lewes, representative if not riveting, for a temperature of the British 
intellectual climate in the 1870s with regard to the study of the mind.1 Both contemporary 
historians and Victorian commentators see this decade as a turning point in the transition to 
scientific definitions of psychology.2 The final volumes of Problems of Life and Mind show a 
strongly scientific orientation, the “second series” titled “The Physical Basis of Mind” (1877), 
and the “third series,” “Psychology: Its Object, Scope, and Method” (1879). In the four essays of 
the second series, Lewes gives an overview of topics in physiological research that are relevant 
to psychology, combined with his own assessments and theories. Lewes seeks to place man 
within his “material” or “biological” conditions, finding in biology the “true notion of causality” 
within the organism.3 The text provides a window onto the tension between science and 
metaphysics that existed at the time. In his typical fashion, Lewes seeks a compromise between a 
“metaphysical” view divorced from science and the “materialist” or “mechanical” view that 
examines the organism in a laboratory, yet his allegiance is to the latter.4 The ongoing pull 
towards metaphysics is evident in James Wards’s seminal article on “Psychology” for the ninth 
edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica (1885), which was to become an “intellectual landmark” 
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of Victorian culture.5 Rick Rylance calls Ward the most important voice of “idealist” psychology 
in Britain.6 Ward takes a Kantian approach, arguing that the mind has a constitutive function as it 
constructs the outside world and that “association, at least as a mechanical process, was wholly 
inadequate to describe, much less explain, any so-called higher mental functions” (Ackerman 
40). Ward’s argument for the a priori displays the strong influence of German idealism on 
psychology, but scientist empiricism eventually proved the winner.  
 However, it had to supersede not only metaphysics but also other elements within 
empiricism. Lewes outlines competing methods in the empirical approach in his third series, 
identifying three lines of thought. One rests on “introspective analysis”—this is the empiricism 
of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Condillac, Hartley, James Mill, and J.S. Mill. Recent physiologists, 
including Canabis and Gall, address the physiological aspect. A third group, including Lotze, 
Wundt, Bain, Spencer, and Taine, seek to combine the two approaches.7 Lewes hopes to 
establish accord with regard to method, arguing for a place for the “Introspective Method” in the 
new science of psychology, which relies “solely on Observation of external appearances.”8  
While elements of empirical philosophy of mind, including the method of introspection and 
associationism, became controversial, they continued to inform the new science of psychology.9  
Although experimental psychologists were still attached to philosophy departments at the 
end of the nineteenth century and finding it difficult to break away, science was ascending, and 
the British thinkers who were interested in the new psychology attended closely to developments 
in its centers, Germany and America. According to Rick Rylance, the modern form of scientific 
psychology that we still recognize emerged during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. 
The field underwent a rapid period of professionalization, with the “main agent” in the change to 
an academic and scientific discipline the “fundamental reorientation of psychology’s methods 
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and outlook created by the new Experimentalism of the 1890s and beyond.” An “Experimentalist 
revision of history” treated philosophy of mind with scorn.10 The historian of science Kurt 
Danziger affirms that “most psychologists have been taught to characterize their own scientific 
activity in terms of a framework that is derived from nineteenth-century physical science,” even 
though there are crucial differences, primarily related to the social aspect of psychology.11 He 
adds, “Contrary to [Wilhelm] Wundt’s inception, the new psychology did not prosper through 
the links with philosophy, linguistics, history, and anthropology that he had tried to forge. 
Instead, it shifted its weight to the other foot, as it were, and based its claims for recognition 
entirely on its affiliation with the natural sciences. In this it was greatly encouraged by a swelling 
tide of scientism during the closing years of the nineteenth century.”12 The distinctively British 
contribution to the study of the mind came to an end. 
  Remaining is the question of the relevance of empiricist philosophy of mind to us. This 
project has sought to trace the contours of how certain British writers conceive ideals constructed 
by the mind out of the materials of experience. Drawing from art theory and its perpetual 
negotiations with the empirical, Shaftesbury, Ruskin, and Eliot consider ideals that are expressed 
in images. At stake for my set of thinkers is the question of where the ideal can be located. 
Ultimately, my subjects crave an earthly ideal. Unable to see it anywhere, they consider the 
mind’s powers to construct ideal mental images—though, as I have tried to show, Hardy and 
Frazer contemplate the difficulties of this project. Because my main subjects conceive of ideal 
images through art images, they suggest that artworks are the only concrete representations of 
the ideal to be found.  
 The long quarrel between science and art has continued into our century, and recently 
within literary studies, science has been gaining ground. I would like to consider, finally, what I 
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have come to see as two alternate forms of the hope for improvement. Since its beginnings, 
modern science has offered optimism, the hope that its methods will lead to discoveries that 
improve human life. In certain ways, this hope has been realized. Moreover, scientific 
confidence in progress offers a powerful antidote to particularly modern fears of decay. The 
Victorian notion of degeneration can be seen equally clearly in Hardy, usually considered a 
pessimist, and Frazer, a self-proclaimed but ambivalent optimist. An optimism that was largely 
attached to the sciences, social and natural, grew in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
and remains alive in the present. Yet, as George Stocking notes, history provides few grounds for 
a belief in progress.13 Those who basically hold to an empirical world-view seem to be left with 
the alternatives of scientific optimism or a pessimism based on historical events. Yet British 
empiricism once held out another possibility, that of the idealism within it. This native tradition 
of idealism aspired to show that a better world can be not predicted or anticipated but beheld. 














1 Tracing the complexities of Victorian psychology, Rylance identifies four main strands of a 
“disorderly debate.” Victorian Psychology, 21. The “discourse of philosophy,” or philosophy of 
mind, is in this scheme the dominant one, divided into the schools of innatism and experience. It 
existed along with discourses of the soul, of physiology, and of medicine. Rylance points out, 
with regard to the example of Herbert Spencer, that scientific does not necessary mean 
experimentalist, but involved looking to contemporary theories of scientific explanation, 
including evolution (203). 
2 Ibid., 70. 
3 Problems of Life and Mind, 2nd Ser.: The Physical Basis of Mind. (Boston: J.R. Osgood & Co., 
1877), 4. 
4 Ibid., v-vi. 
5 Craig, Associationism, 181. 
6 Rylance considers Ward’s article an intervention against the idea that psychology can be 
exclusively considered a science. To Ward, psychology is philosophical, and philosophy is 
metaphysical. Victorian Psychology, 322. 
7 Problems of Life and Mind, 3rd Ser. (Boston: J.R. Osgood & Co., 1879), 4. 
8 Ibid., 82. Lewes also anticipates Sigmund Freud and the emergence of psychoanalysis. The 
second series contains a chapter called “Consciousness and Unconsciousness.” In the third series, 
Lewes writes of unconscious processes that “lie outside the range of Introspection” but are 
“observable in their results.” Problems of Life and Mind, 3rd Ser., 90-94. 
9 Craig notes the great contribution of associationism to scientific psychology in the later 
nineteenth century, as seen in the work of Bain, Spencer, and Galton. It was also the “principal 
theory from which later psychological developments had to distinguish themselves.” 
Associationism, 31. Its operations had to be incorporated even by those who wanted to resist 
them, like William James and Henri Bergson (39). Kurt Danziger notes that when psychology 
became an autonomous field, it took over methods and concepts from existing fields including 
physiology and philosophy. He describes the controversy over introspection. Philosophy of mind 
had appealed to the subjective self-awareness of readers, without any special methodology to 
distinguish psychology from philosophy. This approach went back to Locke’s notion of 
reflection, and was subjected to severe continental critique. Constructing the Subject: Historical 
Origins of Psychological Research (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 17-20.  
10 Victorian Psychology, 1-6. 
11 Constructing the Subject, 1-2. 
12 Ibid., 41. 
13 George Stocking describes the eighteenth-tension background, a tension between a 
progressivist, optimistic tradition of positivism that runs from Locke into French thought, and 
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